Propaganda, Perspective, and the British World: New Zealand's First World War Propaganda and British Interactions, 1914-1918

By

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Contents

Abstract

Despite the ubiquity of the First World War as a key moment in the development of New Zealand's national identity in scholarship and public memory, key aspects remain under explored. This thesis addresses a particularly noticeable gap – the operation and contents of New Zealand's official First World War propaganda campaign. Through this focus, this thesis particularly explores how such propaganda reflected New Zealand's place within, and engagement with, the concept of the 'British world'. Propaganda is an ideal window into the workings of the British world during the war, illustrating both the operation of the practical connections, and the ideological reflections of national, imperial, and 'British' identities in the British world. Therefore, New Zealand and Britain's First World War propaganda demonstrates the nature of the British world, particularly through exploration of the ways that New Zealand's official campaign connected to and interacted with Britain's official wartime propaganda campaign. Specifically, the thesis argues that a gap existed between the rhetorical 'British world', as constructed in the content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda, and the practical realities of how the British world operated and interacted during the war.

While New Zealand was comfortable rhetorically identifying itself as 'British' and part of the British world, practical limitations of communication and interaction with Britain often inhibited this theoretical community. The concept of 'Dominion perspective' is crucial to this interpretation. New Zealand's Dominion status was central to the operation of propaganda in and between New Zealand and Britain during the war, and to New Zealand's identification of itself within its propaganda. This interpretation reflects a wider view of New Zealand's experience of the British world. Though concepts of Dominion status and the British world were centrally important to New Zealand during the war, they were not unproblematic. These concepts were frequently reshaped both theoretically and practically. The First World War was crucial to this development, as the closer interaction and cooperation within the British world it demanded, laid bare both the practical shortcomings of the British world, and the contested nature of concepts of Dominion status and the British world itself. The operation of official wartime propaganda in the British world reflects this wider process, and its significance to New Zealand.

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List of Maps and Figures

List of Abbreviations

ANZ	–	Archives New Zealand, Wellington
ANZAC	–	Australia New Zealand Army Corps
ATL	–	Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington
AWMM	–	Auckland War Memorial Museum, Auckland
CO	–	Colonial Office
CWRO	–	Canadian War Records Office
DOI	–	Department of Information
DORA	–	Defence of the Realm Act
FO	–	Foreign Office
HL	–	Hocken Library, Dunedin
IWM	–	Imperial War Museum, London
MBL	–	Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch
MOI	–	Ministry of Information
MP	–	Member of Parliament
NEB	–	National Efficiency Board
NWAC	–	National War Aims Committee
NZNPA	–	New Zealand Newspaper Proprietors' Association
NZEF	–	New Zealand Expeditionary Force
PA	–	Parliamentary Archives, London
PRB	–	Parliamentary Recruiting Board (New Zealand)
PRC	–	Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (Britain)
TNA:PRO	–	The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew
TPA	–	Te Papa Archives, Wellington
USA	–	United States of America

VLA	–	Victoria League Central Office Archives, London
WO	–	War Office
WOCC	–	War Office Cinematograph Committee

Introduction

The First World War has been widely upheld in scholarship as a defining moment for New Zealand society and identity. However, New Zealand's official wartime propaganda, a strong expression of identity, and the cultural and political constructions of the war by New Zealand society, remain under explored. This thesis examines the organisation and content of propaganda in New Zealand during the First World War, but is not limited to New Zealand. This thesis links New Zealand's official propaganda campaign to Britain's, and explores the significance of this relationship in a 'British world' context. First World War propaganda is used as a way to explore wider issues of identity, status, perception, and interaction between New Zealand and Britain, and to explore the operation and significance of the 'British world' in the early twentieth century.

Despite the war's oft-cited and enduring significance to New Zealand society,[1] and in contrast to the vast scholarship on the British home front during the war,[2] New Zealand's First World War home front experience is curiously and conspicuously under explored in historiography.[3] General histories of New Zealand society and war, such as Christopher Pugsley's *Scars on the Heart,* or Michael King's *New Zealanders at War*, provide general frameworks, but too often rely on accepted tropes and myths, particularly Gallipoli and the ANZAC connection, rarely extrapolating the cultural, social, and political experience of the home front to any great extent.[4] Similarly, Keith Sinclair's examination of the war in *A Destiny Apart* not only conflates home front and soldier experiences, but also constructs a predictably cultural nationalist

[1] Donald Denoon, Philippa Mein Smith, and Marivic Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific,* (Oxford: 2000), pp.267-280.
[2] E.g., Trevor Wilson, *The Myriad Faces of War,* (Cambridge: 1986); Gerard J. De Groot, *Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War,* (London: 1996); Nicoletta Gullace, *'The Blood of Our Sons': Men, Women, and Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War,* (Basingstoke: 2002); Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War,* (Cambridge: 2008); Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland,* (Oxford: 2012).
[3] For an overview of the limited scale of writing on the topic see, Gwen Parsons, 'The New Zealand Home Front during World War One and World War Two', *History Compass,* 11:6 (2013), pp.419-428.
[4] Christopher Pugsley, *Scars on the Heart: Two Centuries of New Zealand at War,* (Auckland: 1996); Michael King, *New Zealanders at War,* (Auckland: 2003); see also, Erik Olssen, 'A Nation: 1914-1918', *The People and the Land: An Illustrated History of New Zealand, 1820-1920,* ed. Judith Binney, Judith Bassett, & Erik Olssen, (Wellington: 1990), pp.319-339; Erik Olssen, 'Waging War: The Home Front 1914-1918', *The People and the Land: An Illustrated History of New Zealand, 1820-1920,* ed. Judith Binney et al., pp.299-318; Ron Palenski, *The Making of New Zealanders,* (Auckland: 2012).

interpretation of the war as a defining moment for New Zealand's independent national identity.[5] Stevan Eldred-Grigg's *The Great Wrong War* is a rare attempt at a focussed approach to New Zealand's wartime home front; however, by Eldred-Grigg's own admission, the work veers sharply from accepted historical opinion,[6] with questionable results. Beyond these, and apart from a recent survey by Gwen Parsons,[7] the majority of scholarship on New Zealand's home front focuses on particular aspects of the home front experience; conscription, labour relations, and domestic dissent have all been popular.[8] Maori involvement in the war has received attention, but such work largely addresses the Maori Pioneer Battalion at the front, or Maori dissent, rather than general Maori home front experience.[9] Jock Philips and Katie Pickles have been among the few to take a cultural approach to New Zealand's experience of war, particularly focusing on memorials and remembrance.[10] Despite some recent works attempting to redress this lack of focus on the home front,[11] significant gaps remain, and the majority of the most extended, focused, and dynamic works on the New Zealand home front remain in unpublished theses, a common feature of New Zealand historiography.[12] In terms of propaganda, Paul Baker and

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[5] Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity,* (Auckland: 1986), pp.171-173.
[6] Stevan Eldred-Grigg, *The Great Wrong War: New Zealand Society in WWI,* (Auckland: 2010).
[7] Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-428.
[8] Paul Baker, *King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War,* (Auckland: 1988); Barry Gustafson, *Labour's Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand Labour Party, 1900-1919,* (Auckland: 1980); Gwen Parsons, 'Debating the War: The Discourses of War in the Christchurch Community', *New Zealand's Great War: New Zealand, the Allies and the First World War,* ed. John Crawford & Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007), pp.550-568; David Grant, *Field Punishment No.1: Archibald Baxter, Mark Briggs, and New Zealand's Anti-Militarist Tradition,* (Wellington: 2008).
[9] P.S. O'Connor, 'The Recruitment of Maori Soldiers, 1914-1918', *Political Science,* 19:48 (1967), pp.48-83; James Cowan, *Maori in the Great War,* (Christchurch: 2011); Franchesca Walker, '"Descendants of a Warrior Race": the Maori Contingent, New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, and Martial Race Myth, 1914-19', *War and Society,* 31:1 (March 2012), pp.1-21; Christopher Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu in the First World War', in *Race, Empire and First World War Writing,* ed. Santanu Das, (Cambridge: 2011), pp.194-210.
[10] Jock Phillips, 'The quiet Western Front: the First World War and New Zealand Memory', *Race, Empire and First World War Writing,* ed. Santanu Das, (Cambridge: 2011), pp.231-248; Katie Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials for Edith Cavell on the colonial edge', *New Zealand Geographer,* 62 (2006), pp.13-24; Chris Maclean and Jock Phillips, *The Sorrow and the Pride: New Zealand War Memorials,* (Wellington: 1990); Jock Phillips, 'The Great War and New Zealand Nationalism: The Evidence of War Memorials', *An ANZAC Muster: War and Society in Australia and New Zealand 1914-18 and 1939-45 – Selected Papers,* ed. Judith Smart & Tony Wood, (Melbourne: 1992), pp.14-29.
[11] Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-428; Ian McGibbon, 'The Shaping of New Zealand's War Effort, August-October 1914', pp.49-68; Melanie Nolan, '"Keeping the Home Fires Burning": Gender, Warfare, and the First World War', pp.493-515; both in *New Zealand's Great War: New Zealand, the Allies and the First World War,* ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007).
[12] Parsons, 'Home Front', p.419; For an excellent recent example see, Steven Loveridge, '"Sentimental Equipment": New Zealand, the Great War, and Cultural Mobilisation', (PhD Thesis, Victoria

Parsons address propaganda, if tangentially, through public patriotic and dissenting discourses.[13] Stephanie Gibson's exploration of New Zealand's First World War poster culture stands out as perhaps the only committed work on New Zealand's wartime propaganda, although it only focuses on a small aspect of the broader campaign.[14] The organisation of New Zealand's official propaganda campaign remains a noticeable gap in the already scant historiography of New Zealand's wartime home front.

This gap is also evident in the wealth of scholarship on Britain's wartime propaganda campaign, as most works barely mention Britain's imperial efforts.[15] Recent works by Jim Aulich and John Hewitt, and David Monger do explore the empire in some depth through the content of Britain's wartime propaganda, but the organisation of imperial propaganda falls outside their focus.[16] Several works in the extensive scholarship on imperial patriotism and female imperialism, particularly in the Manchester University Press' *Studies in Imperialism* series, certainly explore propaganda, patriotism, and national identity during the war, in an imperial context.[17] Furthermore, works on imperial interaction and technologies of communication, which address interaction between Britain and the Dominions, often consider the

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University of Wellington, 2013); see also, Simon Johnson, 'The Home Front: Aspects of Civilian Patriotism in New Zealand During the First World War', (MA Thesis, Massey University, 1975); Graham Hucker, 'When the Empire Calls: Patriotic Organisations in New Zealand during the Great War', (MA Thesis, Massey University, 1979).

[13] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.32-41, 64-69; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.550-568.

[14] Stephanie Gibson, 'First World War posters at Te Papa', *Tuhinga*, 23 (2012), pp.69-84.

[15] E.g., M.L. Sanders and Phillip Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War 1914-18*, (London: 1982); Gary Messinger, *British Propaganda and the state in the First World War*, (Manchester: 1992); Brock Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain*, (London: 2000); Nicholas Reeves, *Official British Film Propaganda During the First World War*, (London: 1986); Cate Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*, (London: 1977); M.L. Sanders, 'Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War', *The Historical Journal,* 18:1 (March 1975), pp.119-146; Brock Millman, 'HMG and the War against Dissent, 1914-18', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 40:3 (July 2005), pp.413-440.

[16] Jim Aulich and John Hewitt, *Seduction or Instruction?: First World War Posters in Britain and Europe,* (Manchester: 2007); David Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale,* (Liverpool: 2012); see also, George Robb, *British Culture and the First World* War, (Basingstoke: 2002); Nicholas Hiley, '"Kitchener Wants You" and "Daddy, What did you do in the Great War?": The Myth of British Recruiting Posters', *Imperial War Museum Review*, 11 (1997), pp.40-58.

[17] E.g., John M. Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The manipulations of British public opinion 1880-1960,* (Manchester: 1984); Katie Pickles, *Female Imperialism and national identity: Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire,* (Manchester: 2002); Matthew C. Hendley, *Organised Patriotism and the Crucible of War: Popular Imperialism in Britain, 1914-1932,* (Montreal: 2012); Katie Pickles, 'A link in 'the great chain of Empire friendship': the Victoria League in New Zealand', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 33:1 (2005), pp.29-50; Julia Bush, *Edwardian Ladies and Imperial Power,* (London: Leicester University Press, 2000).

wartime context,[18] but none of these works look specifically at the official networks of propaganda interaction through the empire during the war. Pickles' work on propaganda responses to Edith Cavell's death remains one of the few works to address First World War propaganda, culture, and identity in an imperial, transnational context.[19] However, the organisation and interaction of New Zealand's and Britain's official propaganda campaigns fall outside the focus of such works.

The aim of this thesis can therefore be considered a response to established scholarship; it aims to redress these gaps in the historiography of New Zealand's home front, British propaganda, and imperial propaganda and patriotic activity, while also tying these three strands of historiography together. In the first sense, this thesis aims to do for New Zealand's propaganda campaign what general surveys of British propaganda, like M.L. Sanders and Philip Taylor's, have done for Britain's campaign. That is, provide a detailed overview of the origin, organisation, and thematic contents of New Zealand's wartime propaganda campaign,[20] thereby filling a glaring gap in New Zealand's First World War historiography, and adding to the modest scholarship on official wartime propaganda in the Dominions.[21] Secondly, this thesis elaborates on the British context of wartime propaganda, arguing that the imperial context is necessary to understand the full extent of Britain's campaign. At the same time it also expands the scholarship on the wartime work of imperial patriotic societies and public propaganda, by illustrating the 'official' dimensions of this work.[22] Therefore, the thesis places New Zealand's propaganda campaign in the wider context of the British world, addressing questions of New Zealand identity, the operation of the British

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[18] Simon J. Potter, 'Communication and Integration: The British and Dominions Press and the British World, c.1876-1914', *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity,* ed. Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, (London: 2003); pp.190-206; Glen O'Hara, 'New Histories of British Imperial Communication and the "Networked World" of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries', *History Compass,* 8:7 (2010), pp.609-625; Duncan S.A. Bell, 'Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought, 1770-1900', *The Journal of Modern History,* 77:3 (September 2005), pp.523-562.

[19] Katie Pickles, *Transnational Outrage: The Death and Commemoration of Edith Cavell,* (Basingstoke: 2007); Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', pp.13-24.

[20] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda;* see also, Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*.

[21] E.g., Tim Cook, 'Documenting War and Forging Reputations: Sir Max Aitken and the Canadian War Records Office in the First World War', *War in History,* 10:3 (2003), pp.265-295; Robert Dixon, 'Spotting the Fake: C.E.W. Bean, Frank Hurley and the Making of the 1923 Photographic Record of the War', *History of Photography,* 31:2 (2007), pp.165-179; Aulich and Hewitt, *Seduction or Instruction;* Pickles, *Transnational Outrage;* Ron Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross: A New Zealand Failure in the Great War', *Australian Historical Studies,* 39:1 (March 2008), pp.19-35; Gibson, 'Posters', p.69-84.

[22] E.g., Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*; Pickles, *Female Imperialism*; Hendley, *Organised Patriotism.*

world, and the significance of Dominion status and 'shared Britishness' to both, during the war. Propaganda is therefore utilised as an aspect of the connection and interactions between Britain and the Dominions, that demonstrates both the way that New Zealand rhetorically constructed its place in the British world and the war, as well as the way that the nature of real, practical, organisational wartime connections and interactions between Britain and New Zealand operated. The disparity between the two constructions is a central focus of this work.

A central argument of this thesis is that despite the largely independent development of New Zealand's and Britain's official propaganda campaigns, which were immediately defined by local needs, capacity, and wartime experience, understandings of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and a distinct British world community of Britain and the Dominions, informed the approaches and direction of both New Zealand and Britain's propaganda more broadly, though not in identical ways. In considering these issues, the thesis takes a British world history approach. 'British world history' emerged as an approach in the early 2000s, as a way of readdressing British imperial history, particularly in response to post-colonial and cultural nationalist histories, by emphasising the Dominions, and explorations of imperial Britishness central foci in imperial studies.[23] The approach takes J.G.A. Pocock's 1973 plea for a new subject in British history as its inspiration. Pocock called for New Zealand, British, and British imperial historians to address the importance of Britishness, and membership of a British world, as a determining factor in the histories of the settler colonies of the empire, and to consider the history of the British Isles and the empire as a broader 'British' history, rather than as a collection of distinct national histories.[24] Despite differences, British world history shares

[23] Tamson Pietsch, 'Rethinking the British World', *The Journal of British Studies,* 52:2 (April 2013), pp.441-463; Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, 'Introduction', *Rediscovering the British World,* ed. Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.9-20; Phillip Buckner, 'Whatever Happened to the British Empire?', *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association,* 4:1 (1993), pp.8-32; Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity,* ed. Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, (London: 2003), pp.1-15; Stuart Ward, 'Imperial Identities Abroad', *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives,* ed. Sarah Stockwell, (Oxford: 2008), pp.219-243; Catherine Hall, 'What did a British World mean to the British?: Reflections on the Nineteenth Century, *Rediscovering the British World,* ed. Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.21-37; see also, Katie Pickles, 'The Obvious and the Awkward: Post Colonialism and the British World', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 45:1 (2011), pp.85-101.
[24] J.G.A. Pocock, 'The antipodean perception (2003)', pp.2-23; 'British history: a plea for a new subject (1973/74)', pp.24-43; 'The neo-Britains and the three empires (2003)', pp.181-198, all in *The Discovery of Islands,* (Cambridge: 2005); see also, 'The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary', *The American Historical Review,* 104:2, (April: 1999), pp.490-500;

considerable ground with post-colonialism.[25] In particular, both respond to the cultural nationalist approach to the histories of the former Dominions. Colonial nationalist approaches to history derive from Richard Jebb's pioneering study on national identity in the colonies of settlement, from his travels around the empire in the early twentieth century. From Jebb's work, nationalist historians, notably Sinclair for New Zealand, prioritise the construction of a 'New Zealand national story' and the analysis or 'recovery' of New Zealand's independent national identity, emphasising questions of exceptionalism, as being at odds with imperial sentiments. Nationalist approaches see themselves as 'recovering' national history from imperialism.[26] Both post-colonialism and British world historiography reject this restriction of the histories of the settler colonies to their national confines, as it obscures the importance of both international networks and colonial processes.[27] However, over the question of how to proceed beyond these national limits, and how to respond to colonial legacies, the post-colonial and British world approaches diverge.

British world historiography is by no means uncontested, and since its creation the approach has struggled and slowed considerably. As Tamson Pietsch argues, British world history has been found wanting in response to challenges by post-colonial theorists. Post-colonial approaches to history emerged in response to decolonisation from the 1960s. The main drive of post-colonialism is not only to dispense with traditional, triumphalist imperial historical narratives, but also, the 'traditional' framings of history writing associated with them. Specifically, post-colonialists argue that 'traditional' focuses on select, privileged social groups in established imperial narratives, obscure the wider, and what should be central, focus of historical study. Instead, post-colonialists call for increased focus on marginalised groups in terms of race, gender, religion, class, and sexuality, as well as explorations

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'Tangata whenua and Enlightenment anthropology', *The Discovery of Islands,* (Cambridge: 2005), pp.199-225.

[25] Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.87-91; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.441-443.

[26] Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*; 'The beginnings of a colonial nationalism: Richard Jebb in New Zealand, 1899', *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism,* ed. John Eddy & Deryck Schreuder, (Sydney: 1988), pp.111-130; John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder, 'Introduction', *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism,* ed. John Eddy & Deryck Schreduer, (Sydney: 1988), pp.1-14; Richard Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism,* (London: 1905); see also, Miles Fairburn, 'Is There a Good Case for New Zealand Exceptionalism?', *Thesis Eleven,* 92:29 (2008), pp.29-49.

[27] Peter Gibbons, 'The Far Side of the Search for Identity: Reconsidering New Zealand History', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 37:1 (2003), pp.1-10; Katie Pickles, 'Transnational Intentions and Cultural Cringe: History Beyond National Boundaries', *Contesting Clio's Craft: New Directions and Debates in Canadian History,* ed. Christopher Dummitt & Michael Dawson (London: 2009), pp.141-161; 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.85-101; Giselle Byrnes, 'Introduction: Reframing New Zealand History', *The New Oxford History of New Zealand,* ed. Giselle Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.1-18.

of the spaces 'between' obvious narratives and connections. They also question traditional 'national' framings of history, in favour of transnational and local foci.[28] Accordingly, a major criticism has been that the very aim that British world scholarship trumpets, that is to 'recover' the imperial and British dimensions of the histories of the settler colonies, is unnecessary. Pickles argues that such history is not 'hidden', but plainly obvious, and readdressing it risks reasserting the narratives of imperial dominance that post-colonialism seeks to question, highlighting the role of imperial historical narratives in establishing imperial power structures.[29] Further, Giselle Byrnes argues that the 'post' of post-colonialism is misleading, as post-colonialists do not presume colonisation is a process that has necessarily ended, and hence do not seek to necessarily avoid or deny imperialism, but instead, broaden analysis away from the confines of traditional hegemonic constructions of history, looking at those marginalised by imperial narratives.[30] Neither denies the importance of imperialism and colonisation, but both question the worth of limiting this to a 'British' world.[31] British world history scholarship has struggled to adequately respond to such challenges. This is particularly due to on-going issues of definition, understanding, and internal cohesion. From its inception, the concept of the British world has been ill-defined; much British world history is hazy about what the exact focus of the approach is, and what the limits of the British world are.[32] Amongst British world scholars, there is indeed very little consensus as to what the focus and limits of the British world should be; from Philip Buckner's conception of Britain and the Dominions, to Catherine Hall's emphasis on a fluid and porous British world, incorporating areas such as the West Indies, consensus is rare.[33]

These issues have stalled British world scholarship to a degree, and raise serious questions for the future use of the concept.[34] For instance, James Belich has brought British world historiography to something of an impasse. Belich diverts from the rest of British world scholarship by emphasising Anglo-settlement, settlers, and

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[28] Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12; Gibbons, 'Far Side', pp.1-10; Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.91-93.
[29] Katie Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.85-101; 'Colonisation, Empire and Gender', *The New Oxford History of New Zealand,* ed. Giselle Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.219-241.
[30] Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12.
[31] Gibbons, 'Far Side', pp.1-10; Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', p.91-93; Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12.
[32] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[33] E.g., Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', pp.8-10; Hall, 'British World', pp.21-22.
[34] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

the 'settler' experience, rather than 'Britishness' as his main focus, and as the unifying historical force of the British world. In doing so, Belich at once pushes Britain somewhat into the background, while also broadening his approach to include the United States of America (USA), conceptualising an 'Anglo-world', rather than a 'British world'.[35] In discussion of identity, Belich introduces the concept of 'recolonisation', which asserts that from the late nineteenth century, as the settler 'boom turned to bust', and New Zealand increasingly relied on Britain for economic security, relations between the two tightened, and New Zealand realigned its identity more closely with Britain, moving away from 'Australiasia' as an anchoring concept.[36] Belich's work is a standout of British world scholarship, but is an incomplete picture, and should not be seen as the final word on British world history. In particular, Belich rarely engages with cultural constructions of identity and the British world. In focusing on demographic and economic changes, he tends to obscure the importance of cultural associations with shared Britishness and Dominion status, not only in forming identities, but also in practically shaping political institutions and actions, something clearly evident in New Zealand's First World War propaganda. In doing so, Belich also strays somewhat towards cultural nationalist scholarship, in treating British identities in New Zealand as somehow falsely or cynically imposed at a particular moment. Therefore, there is still more to be said in response to Pocock's original plea of understanding New Zealand's history as operating within a wider shared 'British' historical space, particularly in relation to New Zealand's First World War propaganda. The legacy of Britishness to New Zealand history is far more nuanced than simply as a controlling or marginalising force, and treating it as such only limits analysis. Instead, it is equally important to explore how Britishness and the British world worked in New Zealand, acknowledging that while these were important concepts, these were also often restrictive and exclusionary, particularly, for instance, in the experience and treatment of Maori, which this thesis considers in the context of First World War propaganda.

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[35] James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939*, (Oxford: 2009); 'The Rise of the Anglo-World: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 1784-1918', *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.39-57; *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealander from the 1880s to the Year 2000,* (Auckland: 2001).

[36] Belich, *Paradise Reforged;* see also, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders From Polynesian settlement to the end of the nineteenth century,* (Auckland: 1996).

Therefore, this thesis addresses internal issues and criticism of British world scholarship, treating the concept of a 'British world' as one that needs regeneration and reconsideration in historical writing, but as on which is still valid and useful. Pickles argues that British world history is 'obvious', and rather than trying to readdress it, it is more important to look at New Zealand history in a post-colonial lens, for its 'awkwardness', addressing uncomfortable, uneven, or difficult aspects of established narratives, and considering historical forces beyond and between patriarchal imperial hegemony, including class, gender, and indigeneity.[37] However, this emphasis on 'awkwardness' should not be limited to spaces between 'obvious' British world connections. Instead, this thesis argues the need for British world scholarship to adopt and embrace such 'awkwardness', and accordingly, the main focus of this work is to explore the complexity, 'awkwardness', and unevenness of established, 'obvious' connections, through the relationship between New Zealand and Britain's official propaganda campaigns. This approach reconsiders and interrogates the British world for all its complexity, instead of simply affirming a monolithic structure or identity, which only normalises and simplifies historical experience.[38]

In readdressing the British world, this thesis makes two makes two major qualifications to the approach. The first is in its understanding of how the British world operated. In defining the British world, the thesis follows Pietsch's approach in considering it not as a singular unit of space, or certain geographic boundaries, but as comprising multiple interacting 'British world spaces', or types of interaction, divided between real geographic space, operational, or 'organisational' space, such as networks and lines of communication, and rhetorical, 'imagined' space, such as cultural constructions. This approach therefore suggests that there were various manifestations of the British world, making it a dynamic concept and community, which must be analysed as such.[39] The distribution, organisation, and content of New Zealand and Britain's wartime propaganda demonstrates the existence and interaction of these multiple British world 'spaces', or manifestations of the British world, also demonstrating that New Zealand's experience of the British world is not able to be reduced into one, simple relationship with Britain. In New Zealand's wartime

[37] Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', p.90-91.
[38] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.91-93; see also, O'Hara, 'Networked World', pp.609-625.
[39] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.447.

propaganda, 'imagined' constructions of the British world were centrally important to formations of New Zealand identity, and to its conceptualisation of the war. By contrast, the practical, organisational interaction between Britain's and New Zealand's official wartime propaganda campaigns equally shows the existence and limitations of an 'organisational' British world, as official connections and interactions between Britain and New Zealand during the war were problematic, often distant or inhibited. The disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world relationships is a central focus of this thesis, and also determined the character of New Zealand's official wartime propaganda campaign. This approach to the British world does not simply assert its existence, but questions and interrogates the concept as porous and contestable, and as Pickles calls for, picks at and exposes difficult issues, disparities, unevenness, and inequality in 'obvious' British world relationships.[40] As such, New Zealand's interaction with other regional communities and identities will also be explored, particularly the Tasman world.[41]

Embracing the awkwardness, unevenness, and complexity of British world connections does not presume that New Zealand's identification with Britishness was imposed or unwelcome. Instead, this thesis takes a similar approach to New Zealand's 'British' identity as Felicity Barnes in arguing that New Zealand's cultural engagement with Britain and the British world, demonstrated a deep and enthusiastic internalisation of British identity.[42] This refutes, particularly, colonial nationalist treatments of imperial identities as somehow at odds with an independent settler identity. Instead, this thesis sees shared Britishness as an internalised framework through which distinct New Zealand identity was often expressed.[43] This echoes Richard Jebb's original assertion that membership of the empire and shared Britishness actually facilitated distinct local identities, and Pocock's belief in the potential for distinct national histories to operate as part of a wider British history,

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[40] Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', p.90-91.
[41] Philippa Mein Smith, 'The Tasman World', *The New Oxford History of New Zealand,* ed. Giselle Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.297-319; Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering the Tasman World', *Remaking the Tasman World,* ed. Philippa Mein Smith, Peter Hempenstall, & Shaun Goldfinch, (Christchurch: 2008), pp.13-30; Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall, 'Australia and New Zealand: Turning Shared Pasts into a Shared History', *History Compass,* 1 (2003), pp.1-7; see also, Denoon, Mein Smith, and Wyndham, *Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific*.
[42] Felicity Barnes, *New Zealand's London: A Colony and its Metropolis,* (Auckland: 2012); '"Familiar London": New Zealand travel writing and the imagined metropolis, 1890-1940', *Studies in Travel Writing,* 14:4 (2010), pp.397-409; see also, 'War "Zones": The Metropolis and New Zealand, 1940 and 2005', *History Compass,* 3 (2005).
[43] W. David McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', *The Oxford History of New Zealand,* 2nd edition, ed. Geoffrey Rice, (Oxford: 1992), pp.337-338.

while advancing both.[44] Therefore, this approach sees New Zealand itself as deeply invested and complicit in the establishment of a 'British world', with its attendant power structures.

The second area in which the British world history model is re-considered in the thesis is in approaches to identity. In this regard, pursuing the British world is limited by a lack of clarity in definitions and terminology in the field.[45] As Douglas Cole argues, the application of understandings of 'nationalism' as informed by a nineteenth-century European context, is unsuitable and anachronistic for the colonies of settlement, as it limits and obscures their unique historical experience and development.[46] While cultural nationalist approaches suffer from this flaw, due to the centrality of traditional 'nationalist' models to that approach,[47] post-colonial approaches have also been accused of anachronistically applying approaches, better suited to Africa and Asia, to the settler colonies.[48] By contrast, if the British world scholarship is to prioritise the settler colonies, it is vital that such discussion of identity is particularised towards the historical experience of the British settler colonies. Besides Belich, very few British world historians have yet responded to this issue, and attempted to create new terminologies to consider the experience of the settler colonies. This thesis, therefore, responds to Cole's 1971 call for new settler-specific identity terminology and conceptual framework to understand the development and expression of national, imperial, cultural, and constitutional identities in the colonies of settlement. The concept of 'Dominion perspective' is therefore central to the arguments and analysis of this thesis.

'Dominion perspective' is presented as a new theoretical framework for addressing identity in the British settler colonies as a distinct and unique historical force, in which various strands of identity - local, national, imperial, British - were not strictly individualised or competing, but intertwined, reinforcing one another, and collectively informed by a broad acknowledgement of the particularity of the settler experience. Therefore, 'Dominion perspective', is a way of advancing British world history by firmly grounding its approach to identity, and understanding the ways that

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[44] Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, pp.327-336; Pocock, 'Antipodean perception'.
[45] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[46] Douglas Cole, 'The Problem of "Nationalism" and "Imperialism" in British Settlement Colonies'. *Journal of British Studies,* 10:2 (May 1971), pp.160-182.
[47] See, Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart;* 'Colonial nationalism'; Eddy and Schreuder, 'Introduction'; Fairburn, 'New Zealand Exceptionalism'; see also, Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12; Gibbons, 'Far Side', pp.1-10.
[48] Buckner, 'Introduction', pp.9-10.

identity operated in the settler colonies. Instead of taking the cultural nationalist line of emphasising national identity above all else,[49] or the post-colonial approach of dismissing national identity,[50] 'Dominion perspective' reconsiders how various strands of identity interacted in the thinking of those in the settler colonies during the war. Settler identity needs to be seen as a unique and dynamic historical process. The first major assumption of 'Dominion perspective' is that identity in the settler colonies cannot be simplified into a layered process of various competing local, national and imperial identities and loyalties, necessarily at odds with each other. Nor should these identities be seen as somehow false or external impositions derived solely to reinforce hegemonic power structures. Instead, in 'Dominion perspective' these varied strands of identity are seen as intertwined and interacting, with no one identity predominant in New Zealand society during the war. Instead, all were reflexive.[51] For instance, imperial sentiments often facilitated the expression of national character, while expression of national character could also confirm imperial pride and identity in itself. This is similar to, but not the same as, Linda Colley's conception of the multiplicity of identities,[52] as 'Dominion perspective' puts the focus more particularly on the Dominions. It emphasises that these identities were not individualised; while they could be competing and contradictory, they were ultimately intertwined, constantly reinforcing each other, and heavily porous. 'Dominion perspective' is also not as geographically anchored as 'national identity' is, but is a 'multi-directional' and particularly British world concept. 'Dominion perspective' did not only inform the thinking of settler societies themselves, but can also be seen at work in Britain, particularly in imperial-minded official circles and imperialist propagandists, in the case of First World War propaganda interactions. Hence, 'Dominion perspective' is a dynamic, British world concept, that influenced British world interactions generally, as much as settler societies' internal identity formations. Therefore, 'Dominion perspective' does not draw strict boundaries between different aspects or strands of identity in the Dominions, acknowledging that it is almost impossible to consider or delineate 'national identity', for instance, without discussion of imperial loyalties and identities.

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[49] E.g., Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart.*
[50] Gibbons, 'The Far Side', pp.1-10; Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12.
[51] Buckner, 'Introduction', pp.9-10.
[52] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837,* (New Haven, CN: 1982); Linda Colley, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', *Journal of British Studies,* 31:4 (October 1992), pp.309-329.

The second major assumption of 'Dominion perspective' is that this intertwining of identities was informed by an understanding of settler identity, and later Dominion status, as a privileged and unique and status in the British world, and was central to identity formation in the Dominions, and to wider British world interactions. The Dominions were keenly aware that they were different and privileged within both imperial and global frameworks, a belief shared by several British imperialists.[53] This acknowledged difference informed the way the Dominions perceived themselves and were perceived in the British world, often in a way distinct from the way the world beyond the empire perceived the status.[54] This corresponds with W. David McIntyre's emphasis on the importance of Dominion status to New Zealand politics and identity, not merely as a constitutional concept.[55] Unlike Belich's 'recolonisation' theory, however, 'Dominion perspective' is not seen as something that was either imposed, or emerged at a certain point. Even before the introduction of Dominion status in 1907, Dominion figures believed that the settler colonies were distinct, with Dominion status being seen as formal confirmation of this distinction. As such, 'Dominion perspective' is seen as a wide-ranging framework for identity. 'Dominion perspective' treats identity as a distinct process in the settler colonies, as a complex bundle of identities, including local, national, and imperial patriotisms and identities, and association with shared Britishness. Even the concept of 'imagined communities', initially a term related to nationalism, needs to be qualified when discussing the settler colonies.[56]

Emphasising the synthesis of various strands of identity within 'Dominion perspective' does not mean the concept entails an absolute or unified Dominion identity. Instead, much like the British world itself, this process was complex and often awkward, and within 'Dominion perspective' these identities had complicated, contestable, and often contradictory relations to one another. Crucially important was the tension between self-reliance and close connection between Britain and New

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[53] E.g., For Leo Amery see, Julian Amery, 'Introduction', *The Leo Amery Diaries – Volume 1: 1896-1929,* ed. John Barnes and David Nicholson, (London: 1980), p.12; For Alfred Milner see, J. Lee Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire,* (London: 2007), pp.2-4.
[54] F.R. Scott, 'The End of Dominion Status', *The American Journal of International Law*, 38:1 (January 1944).
[55] W. David McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status, 1907-1945,* (Wellington: 2007); 'Imperialism and Nationalism', pp.337-347; W. David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48,* (New York, NY: 2009).
[56] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (revised edition) (London: 1991).

Zealand. The organisation of New Zealand's official propaganda campaign, and its interaction with Britain's, illustrates this complexity. New Zealand's campaign demonstrates the importance and efficacy of Dominion self-reliance on one hand, but in its relation to Britain's campaign, the privileged Dominion status, in terms of close connection and interaction with Britain, was emphasised. In both aspects, this interaction was further problematised by the complexity of the British world. While a strong association with shared Britishness and an 'imagined' British world informed New Zealand's approach to propaganda organisation, and its cultural conception of the war and its place in the British world, the practical, 'organisational' realities of the British world defined these interactions in ways often contrary to imagined constructions or expectations.[57] Therefore, 'Dominion perspective' does not impose a restrictive identity on the Dominions; it highlights the complexity of the settler experience, and its constant development, contestability, and contradictory nature as central to understanding identity in the Dominions, as a distinct and unique historical process.

The concept of 'Dominion perspective' is, therefore, the grounding framework for identity in this thesis. In this work it is used to explore New Zealand' identity and relationship to Britain and the rest of the British world, however, as a 'British world' concept, 'Dominion perspective' could likely be used to explore and understand identity in other Dominions. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. As Barnes argues, associations with shared Britishness meant the boundaries between Britain and the Dominions were often porous, and New Zealanders could travel to Britain and feel as much a sense of ownership and 'home' as in their Dominion.[58] Accordingly, 'Dominion perspective' is a fluid concept, operating along the networks of the British world, and in its various localities, and is occasionally identified as operating in Britain, particularly in the opinions and approaches of imperialists such as Leo Amery, Alfred Milner, and Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook.[59] Such evocations of 'Dominion perspective', and constructions of concepts of Dominion status and shared Britishness, are certainly a focus of this work, however, the extensive debate surrounding the importance of the empire to British identity is

[57] For a similar general approach see, Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[58] Barnes, 'Familiar London', p.397.
[59] For Amery see, Amery, 'Introduction', p.12; For Milner see, Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism*, pp.2-4.

beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore.[60] Regardless, the wider implication of 'Dominion perspective' is considered. In particular, the tensions inherent in Dominion status were shared across the British world; a lack of consensus about what Dominion status entailed, meant different applications caused controversy and aggravation.

'Dominion perspective' illustrates and contributes to a much wider development of the contestability of identity, status, and the British world, in which the First World War was a key moment. Broadly, the British world was never a singular, cohesive unit, either physically or conceptually, but constantly developed through improvisation.[61] While strong continuity in the overall development is stressed, this thesis treats the war as a key moment, as it both provoked and realised some of the close cooperation and interaction between Britain and the Dominions that many imperialists and Dominion figures saw as right for the Dominions. It also gave the Dominions confidence, reaffirming that they would not continue in an imperial relationship in which they had no policy influence.[62] This contradictory and contested development is examined through an exploration of First World War imperial propaganda, suggesting a way into a larger debate.

Propaganda is a revealing and rewarding way to address these wide-ranging issues of identity, patriotism, interaction, and status in the British world, as it covers both rhetorical and imagined constructions of the British world, and practical, physical, organisational interactions between Britain and her Dominions, bridging what Pietsch terms, multiple British world 'spaces', or manifestations of the British world, and British world relationships.[63] As such, this thesis uses propaganda, both content and organisation, as a window into these wider issues. In taking this approach, it is important to clarify, amidst extensive debate and scholarships, how 'propaganda' is defined.

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[60] For basic arguments of the debate see, Bernard Porter, *The Absent Minded Imperialists: What the British really thought about empire,* (Oxford: 2004); Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*; see also, Andrew Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest and the "Empire Effect": Britishness and British Decisions to Invest in Canada, 1867-1914', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 41:1 (2013), pp.59-80; Hall, 'British World', pp.21-22.
[61] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', pp.337-338.
[62] Jeffrey Grey, 'War and the British World in the Twentieth Century', *Rediscovering the British World,* ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Francis Douglas, (Calgary: 2005), pp.233-25; John Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives,* ed. Sarah Stockwell, (Oxford: 2008), pp.1-20; see also, McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.
[63] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.441.

Firstly, this thesis approaches propaganda in a specifically contextual manner. Propaganda is an extremely broad, vague, and yet historically enduring concept, and as such, consensus is difficult, and risks dulling conceptual and analytical accuracy.[64] Significant scholarship is dedicated to creating macro-historical definitions of propaganda, often taking classical works of Plato, Aristotle, and Quintilian as starting points, then tracing the development of propaganda, as a vaguely singular understanding of official manipulation of popular opinion, to the modern day.[65] Similar approaches have also treated propaganda as something of a science, highlighting psychological and psychoanalytical understandings of propaganda, particularly citing Nazi propaganda as an example.[66] However, defining propaganda in such a way that it applies to the gamut of human political and intellectual history renders it redundant, and robs it of analytical purpose, either being so broad as to lose analytical edge, or so specific as to limit or obscure significant areas of propaganda.[67] Therefore, this thesis takes a contextual approach to propaganda, defining the term according to its contemporary understandings.

This thesis defines propaganda in terms of how it was understood in the British world, specifically Britain and the Dominions, from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. As Nicholas Reeves argues, this is a profitable way to look at propaganda, as it avoids misunderstanding and misconception, and gives meaning to a term that would otherwise be so broad as to be potentially meaningless. Furthermore, avoiding strict definitions in favour of a contextual approach also allows for development and change in the understanding of the term throughout the war.[68]

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[64] Haavard Koppang. 'Social Influence by Manipulation: A Definition and Case of Propaganda', *Middle East Critique,* 18:2 (2009), pp.117-143.
[65] Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, 'Introduction', *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays,* ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.ix-xv; Jacques Ellul, 'The Characteristics of Propaganda', *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays,* ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.1-49; Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion,* (London: 2006); Koppang, 'Social Influence', pp.117-143; Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, 'Persuasion, Myth and Propaganda', *Journal of Political Marketing,* 3:3 (2004), pp.87-103; see also, Messinger, *British Propaganda*, pp.9-12; Beth S. Bennett and Sean Patrick O'Rourke, 'A Prolegomenon to the Future Study of Rhetoric and Propaganda', *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays,* ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.51-72.
[66] David Culbert, '"Why We Fight": Social Engineering for a Democratic Society at War', *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays,* ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.169-187; Paul M.A. Linebarger, 'The Function of Psychological Warfare', *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays,* ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.189-200.
[67] Koppang, 'Social Influence', p.117; Reeves, *Film Propaganda,* pp.8-10.
[68] Reeves, *Film Propaganda*, p.9.

Accordingly, it is necessary to understand what 'propaganda' meant in the specific context of Britain and the Dominions during the war, and particularly how officials defined the term.

Firstly, 'propaganda' is a broad term, and this thesis will be limited to the 'official' organisation of propaganda in Britain and New Zealand. However, to discuss a sanctioned 'official definition' of propaganda is misleading, as much as concepts of Dominion status, an 'official' definition was never sanctioned in either Britain or New Zealand. For example, upon the outbreak of the war, Britain did not have a formalised propaganda organisation or campaign, and so did not have a prescribed approach.[69] Debates in Britain towards the end of the war attempted to define propaganda as a way to limit the actions of official propagandists, but little consensus eventuated.[70] Instead, in both Britain and New Zealand, the initial official understanding of propaganda was based on broadly accepted nineteenth-century understandings of propaganda. Before the war, propaganda was generally seen as a public activity, related more to patriotic organisations and campaigns. Though politicians engaged in propaganda for campaigning purposes, government involvement was frowned upon for the potential manipulative influence it may have had.[71] This approach informed the initial character of Britain and New Zealand's official propaganda. Both governments initially relied heavily on public involvement in propaganda, particularly utilising imperial patriotic societies to stimulate domestic morale and opinion.[72] As such, it is also difficult to draw a strict line between 'public' and 'official' propaganda during the First World War, as the two often overlapped. Nonetheless, this thesis considers 'official' propaganda as that created or organised by government initiative, regardless of later public involvement.

There exists significant debate as to the purpose and character of British propaganda. Brock Millman and Phillip Knightley take a dim view of British propaganda; they see the intentions of British propagandists as manipulative, repressive, and aggressively coercive, arguing that the intention of propaganda was to crush dissent and actively manipulate the public towards government ends such as

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[69] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.15.
[70] Messinger, *British Propaganda,* pp.131-142.
[71] De Groot, *Blighty*, pp.174-175.
[72] De Groot, *Blighty*, pp.174-175; Reeves, *Film Propaganda,* p.10; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.24; for New Zealand see, Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-420; Olssen, 'Waging War', p.308; Pickles, 'Victoria League', pp.34-35; Pugsley, *Scars*, p.51; Hucker, 'When the Empire Calls', pp.16-20.

recruitment. Both argue that, to achieve this, the British government utilised repressive and manipulative tactics, and actively perpetrated lies and misinformation.[73] However, this negative perspective of First World War propaganda is limiting, and mischaracterises the intentions and approaches of British, and New Zealand, propagandists. These negative understandings of propaganda mostly focus on sensationalised British atrocity propaganda of German brutality and barbarism designed to demonise Germany and her allies, and present the Allied war effort as moral and just.[74] While it is generally acknowledged that atrocity propaganda was often exaggerated, and in some case fabricated, this does not mean that all of Britain's propaganda was necessarily deceptive and manipulative. As Monger argues, this preoccupation with sensationalist 'black propaganda' obscures the broader picture; the majority of British propaganda was designed to reflect Britons' everyday experiences of the war, and was more encouraging than coercive.[75] In terms of repression and coercion, John Horne points out that this was not the intention of British propaganda, as the British government did not have the capacity or inclination to actively control and dictate to their population. On the contrary, the British government was concerned about the potential for dissent to disrupt its war effort, and particularly from 1917, worked to manage this dissent, rather than agitate it.[76] A similar approach was taken in New Zealand, as the government was extremely concerned about the potential for organised labour to disrupt the war effort, and so managed this dissent carefully. Furthermore, Paul Ward emphasises that the public would not have been responsive to such a repressive and deceitful campaign, arguing that official propaganda could not convince citizens of what they did not already believe or suspect, but worked more towards reinforcing existing beliefs, prejudices, and motivations.[77] This thesis, therefore, takes a similar approach to Horne, Monger, and Ward in arguing that propaganda in both Britain and New Zealand was generally

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[73] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* pp.7-29; Millman, 'HMG', pp.413-440; Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from Crimea to Iraq,* (Baltimore, MD: 2004), pp.83-120; see also, Pickles, *Transnational Outrage*, pp.60-61; Haste, *Home Fires*, p.107.

[74] For further exploration of atrocity propaganda see, Gullace, *Blood of Our Sons,* p.25-35; Nicola Lambourne, 'Production versus Destruction: Art, World War I and art history', *Art History*, 22:3, (September 1999), pp.352-353; Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: 2007).

[75] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.5-7; Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', pp.40-44.

[76] John Horne, 'Remobilizing for 'total war': France and Britain, 1917-1918', *State, society and mobilization in Europe during the First World War*, ed. John Horne, (Cambridge: 1997), pp.197-198.

[77] Paul Ward, '"Women of Britain Say Go!": Women's Patriotism in the First World War', *Twentieth Century History,* 12: 1 (2001), p.30.

more persuasive and encouraging, than coercive, restrictive, and manipulative. While atrocity propaganda was at times exaggerated or invented, generally propaganda worked more to encourage, motivate, excite, support, or simply inform and instruct the public, often by utilising existing patriotic sentiments, and widely-held beliefs regarding the war, rather than trying to manipulate, deceive, brainwash, threaten, coerce, or impose upon them.[78] For instance, Nicholas Hiley has argued that the most successful British propaganda was not that which operated in an intimidating or accusatory tone, but that which was encouraging and inclusive.[79]

In terms of coverage, this definition includes a wide range of official materials, including posters, pamphlets, photographs, and publications. This definition also sees 'information' as a focus of contemporary propaganda, and as such, war news, speeches, and newspaper propaganda will also be examined. As Pickles argues, war news was an important strand of propaganda, which British propagandists also considered part of their general approach to propaganda.[80] This does not necessarily assume that propagandists consistently manipulated war news for propagandistic ends, but that as contemporary propagandists considered news as part of their remit, it is important to explore the transmission and operation of war news to the Dominions, and presume that there is an inherent value in understanding how events were presented in war news.

With scant scholarship, there is limited debate in which to ground an approach to New Zealand's wartime propaganda. However, what little work there is tends to argue that New Zealand wholly 'relied' upon British propaganda due to an imperial deference, and reinforces the portrayal of British propaganda as 'manipulative'.[81] David Grant, for instance, argues that New Zealand citizens were 'naïve and conditioned' in their support for the war, and like Millman and Knightley, over-emphasises atrocity propaganda to assert the manipulative and deceitful influence of British propaganda in New Zealand.[82] Chapter 1 interrogates this assertion, arguing that while New Zealand did utilise British propaganda material and rhetoric, it did not do so from a position of subservient deference, but through a confident internalisation of this rhetoric as New Zealand's own, through shared Britishness.

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[78] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.5-7; 85-87; Horne, 'Remobilizing', pp.197-198; see also, Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion,* pp.16-26.
[79] Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', pp.40-44.
[80] Pickles, *Transnational Outrage,* pp.62-63.
[81] Gibson, 'Posters', p.70, 74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.
[82] Grant, *Field Punishment,* p.15.

To address the development of New Zealand's and Britain's propaganda campaigns the thesis is divided into several sections, according to both focus and chronology, integrating New Zealand and Britain's campaigns in a transnational manner. Firstly, the thesis focuses on different 'British world spaces',[83] or aspects of propaganda. Chapter 1 addresses the content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda to illustrate the way that New Zealand rhetorically constructed and engaged with the British world, and how its 'British' identity shaped its conception of the war. Specifically, this chapter considers the British world as an 'imagined' space, but one that was internalised and central to identity. Chapters 2 to 4 then address the organisation, development, and connection between New Zealand's and Britain's official propaganda campaigns, to understand how the rhetorical constructions explored in chapter 1 played out practically, looking at the networks and connections that made up the British world. While shared Britishness also influenced the organisation of New Zealand's propaganda, and the interaction between New Zealand's and Britain's campaigns, the disparity between the two different manifestations of the British world, rhetorical and organisational, particularly during the early years of the war, is a key focus. Despite the rhetorical importance to both New Zealand and Britain of the concept of a 'British world', shared Britishness, and constitutional concepts like Dominion status and responsible imperial government, and the effect of these concepts on their approaches to propaganda distribution, the practical nature of this relationship was markedly different. Practical limitations, both longstanding and particular to the war, inhibited close British world connections. Furthermore, the contestability of Dominion status, responsible government and British world connection, meant organisational interactions between Britain and her Dominions differed from imagined constructions. Practical, organisational reality and interaction often bore little resemblance to imagined constructions of community in the British world.

Secondly, the thesis is arranged to show the deep importance of New Zealand's and Britain's propaganda campaigns to one another's development. Instead of focusing on each nation's campaign separately, producing a more 'comparative' approach, the thesis is arranged to integrate New Zealand and Britain in analysis, and

[83] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.441.

consider the broader British world, and so is arranged chronologically. Chapter 2 examines the organisational propaganda connections between Britain and New Zealand during the first half of the war, emphasising the contrasts to the constructions of a closely connected British world highlighted in Chapter 1 due to practical limitations and the complexity of official British world interactions. Chapter 3 focuses more specifically on New Zealand's propaganda campaign, while demonstrating how Britain's approach, explored in Chapter 2, informed and shaped New Zealand's approach. The idea that New Zealand simply or passively 'relied' on Britain for propaganda is heavily questioned,[84] particularly due to the lack of practical propaganda connection between the two during the first half of the war. More extensively, the organisation of New Zealand's campaign will be used to explore its 'Dominion perspective'; on one hand, New Zealand's official propaganda demonstrates New Zealand's emphasis on Dominion self-sufficiency, as its official campaign was largely defined by local events, needs, and developments, while on the other hand, the continued over-arching influence of shared Britishness is clear in New Zealand's campaign, specifically in terms of its sharing a broad 'British' approach to propaganda, and constantly looking to British examples. This interplay of identities is central to understanding 'Dominion perspective'.

Chapter 4 then brings the two campaigns together again in the war's later years. Particularly, it looks at the ways that changes to Britain's war effort from 1917 necessitated a renewed approach to the Dominions, which flowed into propaganda and enabled the two campaigns to move more closely together towards the end of the war, to increasingly resemble the type of closely connected British world espoused in New Zealand's propaganda content. This change is then contextualised as part of a wider development and shared exploration and negotiation of what the British world, and Dominion status, meant, and how the relationship between Britain and the Dominions should operate and progress. The First World War is highlighted as a key moment of this development. Thus, propaganda is an important and useful way to explore and elucidate these changes.

This thesis provides a more extensive examination of New Zealand propaganda material than has been covered to date, complemented with extensive

[84] See, Gibson, 'Posters', p.70, 74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.

governmental files from Britain and New Zealand, to construct a picture of New Zealand's official propaganda campaign, and its connection to Britain's. This meets another criticism of post-colonialism, by taking an inter-textual approach.[85] Throughout, the rhetorical, imagined constructions found in New Zealand's propaganda are related back to the organisational findings of official files, showing the interrelation of cultural and political constructions of status, community, and identity in the British world. In terms of propaganda content, a wide range of materials is covered: photographs, posters, pamphlets, speeches, publications, and advertisements. This material was collected from many sources; newspapers provided the main source for speeches and advertisements, while posters, pamphlets, and publications such as *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book*, were found scattered throughout many New Zealand institutions, including the University of Canterbury's Macmillan Brown Library, Te Papa, and the Auckland War Memorial Museum. Visual history methods were an important aspect of this approach. In particular, the concept of the 'social life' of images, discussed by Elizabeth Edwards, is central to contextualising and understanding the visual and material aspects of New Zealand's propaganda.[86] This material forms the core of the analysis of the content of New Zealand's propaganda, which is then contextualised widely by archival material from a wide transnational source base. Compiling material for both New Zealand and Britain's propaganda campaigns was problematic due to the post-war destruction of large parts of both New Zealand's entire First World War official documentation,[87] and Britain's propaganda files.[88] As such, a transnational approach was not only analytically essential, but also useful in filling these gaps, particularly the Colonial Office files in Britain's national archives, which stand as a comprehensive and compelling record of New Zealand's war experience and communication with Britain. Other British files consulted consist mainly of Britain's Ministry of Information files, mostly compiled after the war, and looking back at the First World War campaign, along with Lord Beaverbrook's papers from the British Parliamentary Archives. Official New Zealand

[85] Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', p.90.
[86] Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Hart, 'Introduction: Photographs as Objects', *Photographic Histories: on the Materiality of Images,* (London: 2004), p.2; Ludmilla Jordanova, 'Approaching Visual Materials', *Research Methods for History*, ed. Simon Gunn and Lucy Faire, (Edinburgh: 2012), pp.41-42; Ludmilla Jordanova, *The Look of the Past*, (Cambridge: 2012), pp.4-5.
[87] Walker, 'Warrior Race', p.3
[88] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.15; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.12; Knightley, *First Casualty,* pp.83-85.

papers consulted include papers of the New Zealand Defence Department, Treasury, and Department of Internal Affairs. Unlike Britain's archives, New Zealand lacks a dedicated archival series on propaganda, therefore the campaign is constructed from a wide range of files.

In addressing the key, but under-explored, wartime connection between New Zealand and British propaganda, this thesis not only enriches several areas of scholarship, but also provides its own interpretation of the nature of Britain's imperial relationship with New Zealand and the Dominions. Propaganda demonstrates the interaction of different types of British world 'space', and accordingly, suggests new ways of understanding identity in the British world.

Chapter 1: Internalised Britishness: New Zealand's First World War Propaganda Content and Dominion Perspective

The content of New Zealand's First World War propaganda provides revealing insights into New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective' and imperial identity. It reveals the importance of 'British' rhetoric, assumptions of shared Britishness, and the concept of the British world to New Zealand's conception of itself, and its place in the empire and the war, through a construction and engagement with 'imagined British world space'. Qualifying Benedict Anderson's 'imagined community' concept to apply to imagined constructions of the British world,[1] this chapter examines how the concepts expressed in New Zealand and Britain's wartime propaganda shared a 'British language' of patriotism that reflected the interaction of national and imperial identities in New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective'. This interpretation questions the assertion that New Zealand simply 'relied' on British propaganda material, either practically or rhetorically, regurgitating 'British' rhetoric and toeing the imperial line.[2] New Zealand certainly used 'British' rhetoric as the foundation of its official wartime propaganda expressions, but it did not blindly receive and use 'British' rhetoric; instead it internalised this 'British' patriotic language, felt a sense of ownership of it, and actively adapted it to suit its local wartime identity and concerns.[3] This is an expression of 'Dominion perspective'. New Zealand's identity formation was something that it had authority and control over, even in its heavy engagement with Britishness, and as such, expressions of imperial loyalty were made due to a contemporary understanding of New Zealand's identity as a loyal, British Dominion, rather than denoting external repression of local identities, or representing systems of imperial control. New Zealand engaged with examples of borrowed British propaganda, internalising and reorienting 'British' rhetoric as its own, instead simply relying on and regurgitating it.

To examine this process, local propaganda material from New Zealand, and British material that made its way to New Zealand, including posters, advertisements, press cartoons, propagandist literature, speeches, and photography, are examined to illustrate New Zealand's engagement with wider 'British' propaganda rhetoric. Both

[1] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.441; Cole, 'Nationalism and Imperialism', p.160.
[2] Gibson, 'Posters', p.70, 74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.
[3] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.397-409; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-7.

the content of New Zealand's local propaganda, and local engagement with British materials, show that New Zealand actively shared a wider 'British world language' of imperial patriotism through propaganda. The chapter begins by analysing the visual and material characteristics of New Zealand's official, government-created propaganda, and how, despite its simple visual style, this propaganda is still rich in content and meaning. It then examines how British-made propaganda was utilised and adapted in New Zealand, how this material was easily accepted due to New Zealand's investment in this shared language, and more importantly, how it was actively adapted in New Zealand through a perception of local ownership. Finally, this British imperial propaganda rhetoric is examined to show the ways that it was used to form perceptions of the empire, specifically the ways in which it accounted for, and at times excluded, non-white members of the empire and of New Zealand society, specifically Maori.

One reason that New Zealand propaganda has received such little historiographical attention is due to a perception, both contemporary and historiographical, that New Zealand created nothing original of artistic or rhetorical interest, unlike Britain and other Dominions. This is the line taken by Stephanie Gibson in one of the very few examinations of New Zealand's First World War propaganda.[4] At first glance, New Zealand does appear to lack the type of striking, original, illustrated propaganda that was developed in Britain and the other Dominions.[5] Instead, New Zealand's official wartime poster propaganda was uniformly in a simple, letterpress style, prioritising communication of facts over illustration or rhetoric. This is unsurprising, on a practical level, as Gibson notes New Zealand's advertising industry and government printing capacity was less developed and extensive than Britain's.[6] Most of New Zealand's official posters communicated important legislation changes, such as the introduction of the Military Service Act in 1916 (Figure 1), or government initiatives such as war loans (Figure 2). Posters surrounding conscription are the sparsest; for instance, the 'Military Service Act, 1916' poster contains a single perfunctory mention of service as duty, "Remember! It

[4] Gibson, 'Posters', p.74; James Allan Thompson, director of the Dominion Museum, also made this claim in 1920, see, Te Papa Archives, Wellington (TPA), MU 000002/073/0004 – Department of Internal Affairs – World War One (Part One): Thompson to Under Secretary of Department of Internal Affairs, 20 July 1920.
[5] Aulich and Hewitt, *Seduction or Instruction*, p.36.
[6] Gibson, 'Posters', pp.73-74.

is your *duty* to enrol." (Figure 1). Treasury propaganda was slightly more evocative. Posters advertising the war loans of 1917 and 1918 included brief emotive appeals such as "New Zealand has the men and they have proved themselves equal to the world's best and bravest soldiers. New Zealand has the money – without it we could not provide for the men. – Both are needed to win the war," (Figure 2). Treasury propaganda was also slightly more illustrative. For instance, a newspaper advertisement for the 1917 War Loan instructed the reader to stop at midday and ask himself if he had donated, below an illustration of a clock (Figure 3). These advertisements were still simple, and broadly conformed to the government's plain, letterpress style, but showed some late utilisation of creative and emotive techniques. However, these were certainly not as extensive and elaborate as propaganda from the other Dominions and Britain, and were not as striking and illustrative as propaganda being created in Britain and the other Dominions.[7]



DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND.

MILITARY SERVICE ACT, 1916.

ENROLMENT OF

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE RESERVE

BY PROCLAMATIONS dated respectively 1st and 2nd September, 1916, the enrolment of the Reserve is directed. Enrolment MUST be made not later than 15th September (First Division) or 16th September (Second Division).

REMEMBER!

IT IS YOUR DUTY TO ENROL.

For the Protection of Reservists, certificates of enrolment will be issued as soon as practicable after receipt of application on form provided.

Voluntary Recruits not accepted for service will have this fact recorded in the Register on supplying proof to the Government Statistician that they have volunteered.

RESERVISTS' OBLIGATIONS.

The Reserve consists of men not less than 20 and under 46 years of age.

THE National Register is the basis of the Expeditionary Force Reserve Registers.

Men **not already registered** must supply enrolment-card not later than 16th September, 1916.

Men already registered need not supply an enrolment-card, but must, not later than 16th September, 1916, **notify present address** if place of abode has altered since registration.

Men **reaching military age** or **arriving in Dominion** after 16th September, 1916, must supply enrolment-card within fourteen days thereafter.

After enrolment every reservist who **changes his place of abode** must notify new address within fourteen days thereafter.

The Act makes the reservist's obligation to do any of the above things **a personal one,** and he is not relieved by information previously given to recruiting officer or committee.

REMEMBER!

YOU MUST DO YOUR DUTY.

Enrolled men have the **chance of the ballot.**

Men not enrolled may be sent **straight into camp.**

Employers are **forbidden to employ** men who are not enrolled.

Men who fail to notify change of address may become liable on a **charge of desertion.**

EMPLOYERS' OBLIGATIONS.

Employers must not employ a reservist who is not enrolled.
Penalty on conviction—Minimum fine, £20.

Employers must not employ a deserter.
Penalty on conviction—Minimum fine, £50, or imprisonment not exceeding three months.

ONUS OF PROOF in every case is ON THE DEFENDANT.

Call at nearest post-office For cards, forms, information, and assistance.

(By Order.) MALCOLM FRASER,
Government Statistician.

Figure 1 Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL), Eph-D-WAR-WI-1916-01 – 'Military Service Act, 1916', August 1916, Government Printer, Wellington.

[7] Gibson, 'Posters', p.70, 74; For examples see, Aulich and Hewitt, *Seduction or instruction,* pp.50-59.



LIBERTY LOAN.

MEN AND MONEY.

NEW ZEALAND HAS THE MEN and they have proved themselves equal to the world's best and bravest soldiers. NEW ZEALAND HAS THE —— MONEY, without it we could not provide for the men. ——

BOTH ARE NEEDED TO WIN THE WAR.

You must, however, put your money into action, and each help according to his means.

WAR LOAN CERTIFICATES

ENABLE ALL TO DO THIS.

For 13s. you can buy a £1 Certificate.
For £6 10s. you can buy a £10 Certificate.
For £65 you can buy a £100 Certificate.
Repayable in TEN Years.

For 16s. you can buy a £1 Certificate.
For £8 you can buy a £10 Certificate.
For £80 you can buy a £100 Certificate.
Repayable in FIVE Years.

For those of small means there will also be issued POST OFFICE WAR BONDS bearing interest payable half-yearly at FIVE PER CENT. per annum. These will be for £100 each, and the revenue from them will not be free of income-tax.

You Help Your Country—You Help Yourself

and by doing so you will materially HELP TO BEAT THE ENEMY.

LET YOUR ACTION BE PROMPT

The men are fighting and in camp. Place the necessary money in the Treasury to pay, clothe, and feed them, and provide all munitions necessary. The Post Office will accept custody of the Certificates free of all charge.

I am relying on every man, woman, and child to do their best.

JOSEPH GEORGE WARD,
Minister of Finance.

Wellington, 15th August, 1917.

Figure 2 ATL, Eph-D-WAR-WI-1917-01 - 'Liberty Loan', August 1917, Government Printer, Wellington.



Figure 3 Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZ), R 22504945 – 'At 12 o'clock to-day Stop', 1917, Treasury Department, Wellington.

The most problematic aspect of the accepted interpretation of New Zealand's propaganda, however, is that this formality of style reflected an apparently deliberate governmental decision to rely on British posters to "do the emotional and psychological work of recruitment," while locally-made New Zealand propaganda would address only local legislation, as Gibson suggests, or that New Zealand naïvely accepted supposedly manipulative British propaganda, as Grant argues.[8] While Gibson acknowledges that this was made possible through shared imperial values, this interpretation wrongly presumes that New Zealand was entirely a passive partner to the weight of British cultural exchange and propaganda in its relationship with Britain, and simply 'toed the imperial line' during the war, accepting British propaganda while failing to create any original, distinctly 'New Zealand' material. This oversimplifies the process and significance of New Zealand's cultural engagement with 'British' rhetoric and propaganda, and the wartime operation of the British world. In strictly logistical terms, 'relying' on British material to do the emotional work of propaganda would have been impractical, especially before 1917, due to, among other issues, the danger and difficulty of wartime shipping, which even made the initial dispatch of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force dangerous.[9] Accordingly, New Zealand did not receive extensive physical propaganda material from Britain as a matter of course.[10] In practical terms, the war problematized and divided practical and organisational British world connections and interactions. This illustrates the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world 'spaces' and relationships during the war. Secondly, extending the focus beyond posters is essential in understanding New Zealand's cultural engagement with British propaganda. Regarding British propaganda, Nicholas Hiley argues against letting particular examples of propaganda speak for entire campaigns, as this provides limited perspectives, citing the post-war popularity of certain posters that were relatively marginal in Britain during the war.[11] Consulting a much broader range of official propaganda materials, both local and British, shows the official New Zealand campaign's active and authoritative investment in emotive appeals, illustrations, and language through 'British' wartime rhetoric, reflecting New Zealand's authority in its

[8] Gibson, 'Posters', pp.70, 74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.
[9] McGibbon, 'Shaping New Zealand's War Effort', pp.65-66; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.195-196.
[10] See below, Chapter 2, pp.62-66.
[11] Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', pp.40-41.

propaganda construction, and cultural interactions with Britain. New Zealand was not passive or subordinate in this process, but took ownership of 'British' rhetoric, and felt comfortable in adapting it to suit its own local needs and character. This illustrates the way that the British world functioned during the war, and how the Dominions viewed themselves as fundamentally 'British'.[12] Despite the practical and constitutional difficulties of the British world, a 'homespun' British dimension of Dominion identity remained assumed, and generally enthusiastically supported, a process that was not imposed, but that New Zealand was complicit in.[13]

Through this internalisation of 'British' rhetoric, New Zealand constructed and contributed to an 'imagined' British world space, specifically a central 'British' community of Britain and her Dominions, its barriers defined by racial Britishness and shared British heritage. This adapts Benedict Anderson's concept of an 'imagined community', and illustrates how a shared 'British' language of imperial patriotism during the war informed conceptualisations of the empire, and imperial connections and identities. However, as Douglas Cole argued in 1971, nationalist models do not strictly fit the experience of the Dominions.[14] The specific focus of Anderson's *Imagined Communities* is on 'nationalism' and the nation state, specifically from a 'non-European' angle, challenging discourses of British and American imperialism. This approach, and due to 'imagined community's' prevalence, bordering on overuse, in historical writing, careful engagement and methodological precision is necessary when applying the concept to a British world or imperial context.[15] In particular, Anderson's emphasis on the importance of the twin developments of language and communication, and the expansion of print culture and literacy as facilitating the emergence of 'imagined communities', while important, is chronologically contingent, and does not necessarily suit the British Empire.[16] Anderson marks the emergence of the conditions for 'imagined communities' at a specific juncture in the late eighteenth century after vernacular languages gained supremacy over ecclesiastical languages, and new methods of print culture such as novels and

[12] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.397-409; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-7.
[13] Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.224; Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.18; Gary Sheffield, 'Britain and the Empire at War 1914-18: Reflections on a Forgotten Victory', *New Zealand's Great War*, ed. Jon Crawford and Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007), p.39.
[14] Cole, 'Nationalism and Imperialism', p.161.
[15] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp.3-4; Radhika Desai, 'The inadvertence of Benedict Anderson', *Global Media and Communication*, 4:2 (2008), p.183; Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, (Basingstoke: 2010), pp.112-113; Cole, 'Nationalism and Imperialism', p.161.
[16] Cole, 'Nationalism and Imperialism', p.161.

newspapers allowed nations to communicate and self-conceptualise through 'shared horizontal bonds of comradeship'.[17] Print culture was plainly important in the British world, as circulation of knowledge and communication through print culture was vital in establishing and reinforcing imperial bonds.[18] However, practical constraints limited this process during the war, as already noted.[19] The question of language is also vexed for the empire. While the English language was certainly a key part of the British imperial identity, as New Zealand propaganda noted,[20] it was not strictly exclusive, but flexible, being used by British propagandists to ingratiate the USA with the Allies.[21] The concept of 'imagined community' is still apt for the Dominions, but with certain qualifications. Especially during the war, the strongest tool for expressing the British imperial 'imagined community' was the 'British language' of imperial patriotic Britishness, which informed 'British' propaganda rhetoric. It is this rhetorical language that informed New Zealand's wartime propaganda, and which this chapter explores. However, this did not limit New Zealand's agency in creating its own perceptions of the war or repress expressions of local identity. Instead, this chapter explores the imperial 'imagined community', and the shared 'British' imperial language used to express it, as something that New Zealand actively invested in and shaped itself. This was an internalised, and as Stuart Ward describes, 'homespun' Britishness,[22] which did not repress, but facilitated the expression of local New Zealand identities and perspectives. This was also not simply a wartime development, as David Monger and Peter Buitenhuis have both pointed out, for British propaganda, as Britain's wartime patriotic discourse built on British concepts and literary traditions of patriotism from the nineteenth century.[23] So too did New Zealand share this imperial language before the war, notably during the South African War,[24] allowing New Zealand to easily connect with wartime 'British' propaganda rhetoric,

[17] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp.18-19, 25, 35.
[18] O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.612; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', p.191.
[19] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.195-196.
[20] E.g., Auckland War Memorial Museum, Auckland (AWMM), UB 325.N45 NEW - 'To New Zealand's Manhood', 1916, Government Printer, Wellington; see below, Figure 6, p.39.
[21] Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* (East Brunswick, NJ: 1981), pp.11-12; Jessica Bennett and Mark Hampton, 'World War I and the Anglo-American Imagined Community: Civilisation vs. Barbarism in British Propaganda and American Newspapers', *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850?—2000*, (Basingstoke and New York, NY: 1988), p.157; see also, Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p.5; 'Rise of the Angloworld', p.39; Belich favours 'Anglophone' over 'British', so as to include the USA in his conception of the 'settler revolution'.
[22] Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.224
[23] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.86, 109-110; Peter Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda 1914 and After* (London: 1989), pp.8, 22.
[24] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, p.36; Pugsley, *Scars,* p.47; Sheffield, 'Empire at War', p.39.

even at a distance, and when filtered through local perspectives. Fundamentally, the concept of being both 'British', and a New Zealander, was not an aberration at this time, an understanding central to New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective'.

The assertion that New Zealand simply or unquestioningly 'relied' on British propaganda to do the emotional work of wartime propaganda, due to the prominence of British-made designs in New Zealand, presumes that New Zealand's utilisation of British propaganda was a passive process.[25] However, the use of British material does not denote simple 'reliance'. Examining the uses and significance of specific physical examples of British propaganda shows New Zealand's authority and initiative in adopting British imperial propaganda rhetoric for its own uses. Instead of merely noting the presence of specific pieces of British propaganda in New Zealand, it is necessary to delve more deeply into what has been termed by visual historians as the 'social life of images'. As visual historians such as Elizabeth Edwards, Janice Hart and Ludmilla Jordanova argue, visual sources must be examined as historical objects, existing and operating in their own diverse contexts, being invested with meaning and significance by their contexts, uses, and reinterpretations, and so must be analysed as such.[26] Therefore, the presence of examples and images of British propaganda in New Zealand is not enough to suggest their significance. The ways that such images were contemporarily and contextually adapted and received by and for New Zealand audiences must also be examined to uncover their historical significance. Specifically, New Zealand's willingness to internalise and adapt British propaganda demonstrates the enthusiastic confidence in Britishness and the British world that was a key part of 'Dominion perspective' in New Zealand.

Perhaps the most notable example of British-made imperial propaganda used extensively in the Dominions is the 'Lion poster' (Figure 4), designed by Arthur Wardle for Britain's Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC) in 1915.[27] While it is one of the only PRC posters to reference the empire, this poster nonetheless demonstrates Britain's utilisation of imperial themes in propaganda. While some have questioned the significance of the empire in British society,[28] others have

[25] Gibson, 'Posters', pp.70, 74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.
[26] Edwards and Hart, 'Photographs as Objects', p.2; Jordanova, 'Approaching Visual Materials', pp.41-42; Jordanova, *Look of the Past*, pp.4-5.
[27] Gibson, 'Posters', p.75.
[28] E.g., Porter, *Absent-Minded Imperialists*.

demonstrated that the empire was vital to British patriotic constructions and national identity,[29] particularly in British wartime propaganda. Monger argues that in the British National War Aims Committee's (NWAC) propaganda, the empire was variously used as an extension of a general British identity, and as a means of supporting the general British patriotic narrative constructed by the NWAC.[30] The 'Lion' poster reflects this well. The poster is a British call to the empire – a roaring adult male lion, a classic British patriotic symbol, surrounded by four younger lions as the Dominions, with the tagline, "The Empire Needs Men! Answer the call. Helped by the Young Lions the Old Lion defies his Foes. Enlist Now." (Figure 4). The poster reflects the typically 'familial' representation of the empire, at least of the 'white' empire of the Dominions, typical of British wartime propaganda, much like the views of imperial advocates such as colonial administrator Alfred Milner and the Round Table Movement.[31] However, the poster's 'social life' in New Zealand is significant, as it reflects New Zealand's initiative in engaging with such patriotic British materials. The poster was eagerly adopted in New Zealand; though New Zealand only received a small number of the posters from Britain, these were then reproduced locally in large numbers by local printing concerns, such as the *New Zealand Herald,* at Government expense, and circulated widely.[32] This adaptation shows New Zealand's initiative and confidence in engaging with examples of British propaganda, and its self-sufficiency in printing and circulating this design itself, rather than relying on British donations. The composition of the adapted poster in New Zealand and other Dominions is perhaps even more revealing. The original poster was less specific than the version that was displayed in New Zealand; in place of the names of Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand, at the side of the poster, it originally only said '[t]he overseas states'.[33] India's inclusion in place of South Africa complicates this construction of a British community of the white Dominions, reflecting the often-permeable barriers of the British world. India had a certain amount of prestige and centrality in the empire over other colonial holdings, and also made a significant

[29] Hall, 'British World', p.36.
[30] Hall, 'British World', p.36; Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.10; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, p.89; see also, Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire,* pp.1-2; Buitenhuis, *War of Words*, p.8.
[31] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, p.89; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* p.52; Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism*, p.4.
[32] Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZ), R 22432788 – Posters issued during the war – Allen to Liverpool, 25 May, 1916; see also: Gibson, 'Posters', pp.75-76.
[33] Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), Art.IWM PST 5110 – 'The Empire Needs Men', 1915.

contribution to the war effort. In some ways, during the war, India appeared less problematic and more loyal than South Africa, which experienced a Boer rebellion in 1914.[34] Nonetheless, this does problematise the centrality of 'whiteness' to such constructions. Similar adaptations were made to the design throughout the Dominions.[35] This again shows New Zealand's willingness to take ownership of and adapt British material and propaganda rhetoric, while filtering New Zealand identity through it.[36] Such ownership of British material was common, and not limited to the government.[37] For instance, South Island businessman Frederick Ferriman reproduced and distributed the poster 'Why Britain is at War' (Figure 5) adapted from a British design.[38] The poster strongly cites defence of empire as a reason to enlist, claiming German ambitions were to destroy the empire, and deny British subjects their rights and liberty. Besides the addition of the New Zealand coat of arms, this poster was largely unchanged from the British original. However, the local initiative in the adaptation and display of the poster is most significant. New Zealand's Wartime Defence Minister James Allen endorsed Ferriman's work,[39] showing both official and unofficial New Zealand ease in engagement with British propaganda.[40] As Hiley argues for British propaganda, printing and distribution numbers are more revealing of the significance of a particular piece of propaganda, and the operation of the campaign, than its prominence in archives, or its post-war significance.[41]

[34] Daniel M. Stephen, '"Brothers of the Empire?": India and the British Empire Exhibition of 1924-1925', *Twentieth Century British History,* 22: 2 (2011), pp.164-166; David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire,* (London: 2001), pp.41-57; Robb, *British Culture*, p.17; Hall, 'British World', p.36.
[35] Gibson, 'Posters', p.75.
[36] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[37] For similar examples see also, Baker, *King and Country*, p.84; Gibson, 'Posters', pp.70, 73-74.
[38] ANZ, R 22432762 – Ferriman to Allen, 15 December 1915; see also, Gibson, 'Posters', p.76.
[39] ANZ, R 22432762 – Allen to Ferriman, 22 December 1915.
[40] Gibson, 'Posters', p.76; specific phrases were also directly borrowed, such as from the 'Daddy, What did You do in the Great War?' poster, see, Baker, *King and Country*, p.41; Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', p.42.
[41] Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', pp.42-44.

Figure 4 ANZ, R 22444232 – 'The Empire Needs Men!', 1915 (original design by Arthur Wardle, reproduced by the *New Zealand Herald,* Auckland).

Figure 5 ANZ, R 22444093 – 'Why Britain is at War', 1915, Lyttelton Times Company, Christchurch.

Conforming to the unobtrusive nature of British imperial involvement, such local engagement was not enforced by Britain.[42] New Zealand propagandists adopted 'British' rhetoric due to its resonance in New Zealand society, and a local internalisation of a shared British identity and imperial patriotism between Britain and the Dominions, as a part of 'Dominion perspective'. When Britain did send propaganda material to New Zealand it was seldom, if ever, sent with any formal direction or instruction. For instance, even within the Colonial Office's (CO) emphasis on the authority of Dominion Governors General in deciding whether British propaganda should be sent to their Dominion,[43] any British posters were only sent in small numbers, both to limit British printing material expenditure, and put the control of printing and distribution on New Zealand authorities, as with the 'Lion poster'.[44]

A collection of war photograph lantern slides received by the Canterbury Branch of the Victoria League of New Zealand also reflects this process. Though the slides were created by Britain's Department of Information (DOI), and distributed to the Victoria League in London to be sent throughout the empire, no instruction of enforcement regarding the uses of the slides were included by either body, with the League's London Office describing the slides as 'gifts', only suggesting their use in fundraising for the Victoria League's lectures for soldiers scheme.[45] New Zealand's predominant wartime female fundraising organisation, the Lady Liverpool fund, led by Annette Liverpool, the wife of New Zealand's Governor General, also demonstrates this point. Although the Lady Liverpool Fund was heavily modelled on Queen Mary's work in Britain, with New Zealand's efforts being endorsed by Queen Mary, New Zealand fundraisers made a point of creating a specifically 'New Zealand' campaign, if only officially. This did not denote antipathy to Britain; instead the use of British models demonstrates the interaction of imperial loyalty and national character through a process of 'active borrowing'.[46] Monger argues a similar

[42] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.11; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', p.3.
[43] See below, Chapter 2, pp.62-66.
[44] TPA, MU000207/001/0001 – Mackenzie to Massey, Memorandum No.7223, (November 1918); for paper shortages in Britain see, Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent*, p.431.
[45] Victoria League Central Office Archives, London (VLA), Sixteenth Annual Report of the Victoria League Head Office (1917), p.18; Hocken Library, Otago (HL), 96-057 – Otago Branch of the Victoria League Minute Books, 3 December, 1917.
[46] Megan C. Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation: Women Making Identity in New Zealand, 1906-1925', (MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1997), pp.80-84; see also, Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', pp.14-16.

approach was used domestically in Britain by the NWAC, in that the NWAC did not impose a strict narrative or direction upon its speakers, instead, it built upon already widely-accepted and resonant patriotic themes.[47] Therefore, an examination of the interaction of Britain's and New Zealand's propaganda activities illustrates the nature of British world connections, particularly the informality of Britain's approach to its 'formal empire'.[48] This approach facilitated New Zealand's high degree of local initiative and control in adopting and adapting British concepts and materials in imperial propaganda, complementing a presumed New Zealand ownership of such 'British' rhetoric. The presence and resonance of this material in New Zealand reflects the degree to which the shared British imperial language of propaganda and patriotism facilitated New Zealand's understanding of the war, and allowed expression of local, national, and imperial patriotisms. This interplay of national and imperial identities through a shared Britishness clearly reflects the interactions of these identities in 'Dominion perspective'.

Clearly, there were practical difficulties in New Zealand strictly 'relying' on British propaganda, and even when it did utilise physical examples of British propaganda, New Zealand retained control and authority in its use. This coincides with New Zealand's conception of its constitutional position, the core tension of 'Dominion perspective' between self-sufficiency and communion with Britain. New Zealand treasured its imperial connection to Britain, but could not, and did not want to, rely on it.[49] This tension was resolved not through seeing imperial identities as restrictive, but through internalising a British identity as a means to express national loyalties, and imperial Britishness, each reinforcing the other. Accordingly, New Zealand borrowed and internalised 'British' propaganda rhetoric as equally its own, but did not 'rely' on Britain to directly convey propaganda. This demonstrates disparity and interaction between different types of British world 'space'. While practical interactions were limited, for instance the lack of propaganda material that came officially from Britain to New Zealand, ideological identification with the British world and a shared Britishness in New Zealand, in terms of an 'imagined'

[47] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.62-65, 85.
[48] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.11; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', p.3; see also, Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.195.
[49] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, p.25.

British world space, was still very strong.[50] This was not because of New Zealand's 'naivety', or a form of submissive borrowing,[51] but a natural internalisation of 'British' war aims and patriotic language as New Zealand's own, due not only to the simple point of New Zealand fighting on the same side as Britain, but also due to the conception of New Zealand as 'British'.[52] New Zealand felt at ease with British material and rhetoric, because it saw a sense of ownership of this shared Britishness, and hence, it internalised Britishness, and used this rhetoric to express national character.[53]

New Zealand propagandists not only shared Britain's presented war aims, but also identified New Zealand's place within them, internalising Britain's patriotic constructions of Britishness as equally New Zealand's inheritance. Britain's propaganda argued that it had reluctantly entered the war in defence of Belgium, after Germany's invasion in violation of international treaty law. Britain, her empire, and Allies were then determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, defining the British cause as for defence of civilisation, nation, locality, home, peace, and the weak, and an evocation of apparently 'distinctly British' values of morality, justice, liberty, and honour.[54] New Zealand propaganda eagerly inserted itself into this narrative, conceptualised as part of the British war effort more than the Allied war effort, and portrayed these vaunted British ideals as equally New Zealand's through shared Britishness. A speech by James Allen towards the end of the war emphasised this, characterising New Zealanders as Britons, upholding particularly 'British' characteristics of honour and fair play, and values of civilisation:

> We British people were determined at the start to play the game, but our opponents did not play the game and, as the Mayor has said, we had to retaliate. It was against our nature, and constitution, but we had to do it for our

[50] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[51] Grant, *Field Punishment,* p.15.
[52] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10; McGibbon, 'Shaping New Zealand's War Effort', pp.51-52; Pugsley, *Scars,* p.69; For general discussion of Dominion identification with Britishness see also, Bridge and Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', p.3; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', pp.232-234.
[53] Barnes, *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10; 'Familiar London', pp.337-339.
[54] Gullace, *Blood of Our Sons*, p.36; see also, Lambourne, 'Production versus Destruction', pp.352-353; Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', p.14.

> own safety, and when a Briton has to adopt retaliation I hope that he does so promptly and thoroughly.[55]

These expressions not only clearly drew from Britain's wartime propaganda, but also from longer-term expressions of British patriotism and identity, illustrating New Zealand's willingness to insert itself in longer-term constructions of Britishness, and, as Phillip Buckner argues, a wider Dominion enthusiasm in adopting and internalising 'British' heroes and cultural myths.[56]

Germany was conversely characterised as the antithesis of civilisation, as fundamentally militarist, aggressive, and expansionist.[57] This representation was frequently reduced into gendered constructions of reported German atrocities in the invasion of Belgium. Accusations ranged from perceived legal transgressions, such as Germany's disregard of its treaty with Belgium as a 'scrap of paper', to lurid, sexualised, and, as Nicoletta Gullace argues, often pornographic, stories of the rape, mutilation, torture, and murder of Belgian women and children by German soldiers. Supported by Britain's 'Bryce Report', Belgium became the figure of a violated female, while Germany was defined as masculine militarism gone awry.[58] Conversely, Britain and the empire were portrayed as ideals of masculine morality, bastions and protectors of civilised and moral national values, defenders of women, children, family, and home, and undeniably on the side of right.[59] Once again, these characterisations are apparent in New Zealand's propaganda.[60] Protecting and avenging Belgium became as much New Zealand's responsibility as Britain's, in the same way that New Zealanders became personally invested in the case of Edith Cavell's execution.[61] One of New Zealand's very few non-instructional, but equally plain, propaganda posters, 'To New Zealand's Manhood', issued by New Zealand's Parliamentary Recruiting Board (PRB) in 1916, illustrates this, stating that New

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[55] 'Reprisals: Sir J. Allen's Speech', *Ashburton Guardian*, 18 September, 1918, p.8; see also: 'Trafalgar Day', *Dominion*, 22 October 1914, p.8.
[56] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.18; see also, Pickles, *Transnational Outrage,* pp.60-61; 'Mapping Memorials', p.14.
[57] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, p.86; Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', p.159.
[58] Gullace, *Blood of Our Sons*, p.25, 31; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage,* pp.60-66; Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', p.159; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.115-116; Buitenhuis, *War of Words*, pp.27-28; Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', p.14.
[59] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.86; Gullace, *Blood of Our Sons*, p.33; Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', pp.157-158; Buitenhuis, *War of Words*, pp.11-12.
[60] Olssen, 'Waging War', p.302; Keith Scott, *Dear Dot, I Must Tell You*, (Auckland: 2011), pp.423-424.
[61] Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', p.14; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage,* pp.60-61.

Zealand would not stop fighting until "Belgium's wrongs have been righted" (Figure 6). Similarly, in 1915 New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey called for vengeance for Belgian, French, and Russian blood, and for the atrocities committed by the German army, as New Zealand's moral and religious duty, extending Britain's commitment to defence of Belgium into a New Zealand responsibility.[62]



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To New Zealand's Manhood.

THE CALL TO BATTLE!

Shall the Sacrifices made be in vain?

"EVERY OUNCE INTO THE SCALE!"

MANIFESTO BY THE RECRUITING BOARD TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND.

IT is now close upon eighteen months since the Government of New Zealand, with the full consent and approval of the people of the Dominion, decided to place an Expeditionary Force at the disposal of the Imperial Authorities. In the interval we have despatched over 34,000 troops to the front, we have 12,000 more in training, and we stand committed to the despatch of 2,350 men every four weeks by way of Reinforcements. This means that by the end of the current year we shall have sent not less than 61,000 men into the fighting line—no small achievement for a country which has only a population of a little over a million.

Greater effort is called for.

We are all proud of the magnificent response that has already been made to the Empire's call for *men* to do battle in the cause of justice and liberty and for the deliverance of the oppressed. But the effort which loyalty and patriotism demand of us now is greater than was at one time anticipated, and requires that we should put every ounce of energy we possess into the scale against Germany.

The need is for Men, More Men, and still More Men!

The call comes to every man in this country who *is* in a position to do so to prepare to take his place in the fighting line! The cry comes to us from our sons, brothers, and kinsmen in the trenches: "Come over and help us!" It rings through every note of the official despatches; it is echoed by the sick, the wounded, and by the men who have returned invalided from the front; the graves of Gallipoli appeal to us silently, yet eloquently, that the sacrifices made there, and the heroic lives laid down on that shell-swept Peninsula shall not have been given in vain. No man worthy of the name can remain deaf to such appeals. *The Empire needs the faithful and devoted services of all its citizens* if it is to prove victorious in the stupendous task to which it has set its hand. Never in all its glorious history has it called upon its peoples in vain. Shall we fail it now? The Motherland, which has made many sacrifices on our behalf, appeals to her sons across the seas for their assistance and co-operation. Zeppelin raids, coastal bombardments, and the grim menace of submarines have familiarized her with the horrors of a warfare we have so far happily escaped, and which we too should experience but for the protection the British Fleet affords us. It is our duty, nay, more, our privilege, to go to her help.

The Talk of "Prussianizing."

In certain quarters of late we have heard talk of the "Prussianizing of New Zealand." Only in one way is it possible to Prussianize New Zealand, and that is by allowing the enemy to become victorious. If, by apathy and indifference, we fail in our duty, and so make conquest an easy matter for our adversaries, the responsibility will rest upon those who have declined to accept the privileges and duties of citizenship, chief amongst which is the defence of the country. Self-preservation, a care for our homes, and the sanctity of family life, apart altogether from love of country, alike demand that we should be on the alert to repel the foe, and to defend the Empire on the fields of battle, where the decisive blows must be struck that will bring either victory or defeat to the opposing forces, and which will decide our destiny, together with that of the Empire with which our fate is inseparably connected.

The German Dream of Conquest.

Germany's plans of conquest, which have been unfolded before the eyes of an astonished world since the war began, included the annexation of the British Overseas Dominions, also of Egypt and probably India. We need be under no illusions as to our fate if the Central European Powers proved victorious. The German Eagle would replace the Union Jack and the New Zealand flag in these Southern Seas. *The Huns would simply enter upon and despoil the country*, and German autocracy, backed up by Krupp's guns, would take the place of our free institutions. Democracy as we know it would perish under Prussian rule, and it would become a crime to speak the English language. Has not a leading Berlin paper told us, with the approval of the German official world, that "Mankind needs German methods" and "must make use of them for its spiritual preservation"? And has not the Berlin *Deutsche Tageszeitung* declared that we must also accept "the blessing" of the German tongue? "On all men," it arrogantly writes, "not those belonging to the more cultured races only, but on men of all nationalities and colours, the German language acts as a blessing which, coming direct from the hand of God, sinks into the heart like a precious balm, and ennobles it." And so, "English," the journal proceeds, "the bastard tongue of the canting Island Pirates, must be swept from the place it has usurped and forced back into the remotest corners of Britain, until it has returned to its original elements of an insignificant pirate dialect."

The dangers we have to guard against are very real; but if we are true to ourselves, true to the traditions of our race, and faithful stewards of the sacred heritage committed to us by our forefathers, we need not fear the result. Only by disunion, disloyalty, and half-heartedness can the victory pass from our grasp. We New-Zealanders pride ourselves most of all upon our loyalty to our Empire, our Country, and our Flag. We have made sacrifices on their behalf, but the call is for greater sacrifices still. We are proud to think that tens of thousands of New Zealand's sons count it an honour to take up arms on behalf of the Empire, and that her heroic daughters have willingly braved the perils of the battlefield and of service in strange lands in order to minister to the suffering and to succour the wounded. Duty calls us to battle on behalf of the Right. Failure to defeat the damnable doctrine that "Might is Right" will land the world into the abysmal depths of savagery. *Honour demands that we should make sacrifices* for the good of our fellow-men, for the protection of our women and children, and for the sanctity of our home life.

We must Fight on.

For Britain's sake we have sent our sons, our brothers, and our kinsmen to the war; for her sake and for our own protection, and *for the safety and happiness of our womenfolk and children*, we must continue to reinforce them and to strengthen their hands in every possible way. We must fight on until a durable peace becomes possible, and the sword must not be sheathed until Belgium's wrongs have been righted, until Russian Poland and Serbia are again freed from the yoke of the oppressor, and until ample guarantees are available for the safety of the smaller nationalities of the world. In this way we can all play our part. But to this end we must be prepared to make sacrifices, and we are satisfied that the people of New Zealand, who have already done so much in this direction, will continue steadfast to the last, and bear themselves worthily and well in this war of wars and in this hour of the Empire's greatest need.

The Call is still for Volunteers.

Many who read this appeal should enlist right away. Duty reminds them of their obligations; from the trenches their comrades call to them; *the cry of "To the front" rings out more and more insistently.*

WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT?

Men of New Zealand! We must keep the Germans out of "Old England" and out of New Zealand and every other British possession.

What is wanted now is the spirit of the Lancashire man that was related recently. His two sons had gone to the war, and word came that the younger had been killed. The father was not content, although he was considerably above military age, until he was able to take his boy's place, and one day found himself in the fighting line by his eldest son's side "somewhere in France." Gripping his boy by the hand, the father said: "I've come to take Andy's place. When word came about thy brother, thy mother bade me come to thee, and I'd be ashamed man if I failed to do summat to keep the Bosches out of old England; and we've got to do it, lad, for the sake of thy mother and thy sisters."

"We shall save Civilization."

Keeping the Bosches out of English territory we shall save civilization, we shall save the Empire, and shall be in a better position to efficiently assist our gallant Allies and redeem Belgium, Poland, and Serbia. It is our privilege to act to-day. A duty deferred or neglected may cause us life-long tribulation and anguish of mind. Let us, then, "act in the living present." *Every man able to bear arms is needed at the front.* You know if you come within that category. If you do,

ENLIST AT ONCE!

And, like a certain soldier in Kitchener's Army, you will be able to say, "I was not among the first to go, but I went, thank God, I went."

W. F. MASSEY, Chairman.

J. G. WARD, J. ALLEN, } Members of Board.

By Authority: John Mackay, Government Printer, Wellington.—1916.

Figure 6 AWMM – UB 325.N45 NEW 'To New Zealand's Manhood', 1916, Government Printer, Wellington.

[62] 'Recruiting Rally', *Dominion,* 1 November 1915, p.6; see also, 'To Aid Recruiting', *Ashburton Guardian*, 14 May 1915, p.7.

Atrocity propaganda came to be communicated through a clear imperial and Allied narrative, with key images or stories becoming instant symbols of Germany's apparent barbarism and anti-civilisational intentions, including banner stories such as Cavell's execution, and the sinking of the Lusitania.[63] For instance, in the DOI's collection of photographs for the Victoria League, the inclusion of an image of German soldiers celebrating in a captured Belgian church (Figure 7), spoke for the wider atrocity propaganda narrative. Extracts from *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book,* a fundraising book of patriotic stories, poems, and artworks, created by Lady Liverpool, following British examples, and espousing both a fiercely imperialist, and uniquely New Zealand tone,[64] emphasised German destruction of a medieval library in Louvain, Belgium. This was a popular atrocity story, used as evidence of Germany's aggression and anti-civilisation nature.[65] Nicola Lambourne argues that such atrocity propaganda stressed Germany's destructive nature, specifically using sites of religion and learning to represent Germany's barbarism, irreligiousity, and active disregard for high culture and local worship.[66] The poem 'In Memory of Gallipoli', by Johannes C. Andersen, from *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book,* even portrays Germany as Judas Iscariot.[67] This shared British imperial language of propaganda therefore meant that the same symbols and stories of atrocity propaganda could communicate the whole atrocity propaganda narrative in New Zealand, and British propaganda could seamlessly move through the British world, and be readily understood, illustrating the circulation of imperialism, and the construction of British world space, through information and cultural symbols.[68] This again demonstrates the varied manipulations and manifestations of space in the British world, in this case, imagined constructions of the British world influencing perceptions of physical, geographic space; though New Zealand was distant from Germany, and did not face the same direct, domestic danger as Belgium, through engaging with and internalising British atrocity propaganda and moral causes, it could imagine itself into the conflict more closely,

[63] Olssen, 'Waging War', p.302; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage,* pp.60-66.
[64] Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation', pp.82-84.
[65] AWMM, AY14 COU – M.A. Sinclair, 'The Sack of Louvain', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.72; Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction*, p.13.
[66] Lambourne, 'Production versus Destruction', p.353; Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction*, p.13.
[67] AWMM, AY14 COU – Johannes C. Andersen, 'In Memory of Gallipoli', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.46.
[68] O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.612; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.441.

conflating distance. This issue of geographic versus 'imagined' space in terms of distance was a defining aspect of New Zealand's wartime experience.[69]



Figure 7 Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch (MBL), MB 367/148984, Lecture slide of confiscated German post card, featuring German soldiers in a captured French church. (British Official Photographer; France; c.1916-1917).

[69] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; see also, Bart Ziino, *A Distant Grief: Australians, War Graves and the Great War*, (Crawley: 2007), pp.4, 13; Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural Memory,* (Cambridge: 1995), p.29.

Again echoing Britain's propaganda rhetoric, these concepts were anchored by a central concept of duty and sacrifice, with service at the front, and endurance and contribution to the war effort at home characterised as patriotic duty.[70] New Zealand's posters put this point succinctly, such as the rare non-instructional New Zealand government poster, 'Halt!', created by the Defence Department in 1915. This poster emphasised duty, stating: "…every man of the required age who is a British subject and is medically fit owes a duty to Empire".[71] Allen applied the concepts of duty and sacrifice in the same way, firstly characterising service, and particularly death, at the front as heroic patriotic duty,[72] but also calling for the same sacrifice and duty on the home front, through sacrifice and work to assist the war effort.[73] This equation of domestic service with military service also highlights the concept of equality of sacrifice, a vitally important and contentious concept on the New Zealand home front, which also echoed the British home front, and outside the British world, such as in France, in discussions of what Adrian Gregory terms 'economies of sacrifice'.[74] The gendered element to this 'British' concept of duty was also applied in New Zealand. Nicoletta Gullace argues that, in Britain, to serve was seen as a masculine duty, and accordingly that it was emasculating to avoid such duty, with patriotic women supposedly willing to take up the duty of unwilling men, questioning their manhood as a shaming threat of gender role reversal.[75] This gendered conception of the war, though exclusionary, allowed women to associate with the war. Along with the rhetoric of women contributing to the war through utilising their feminine strengths, Paul Ward has suggested that women were not entirely excluded from central

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[70] Baker, *King and Country,* p.36; For Britain's use of 'duty' as a central concept see, Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.85-86.
[71] The 'Halt!' poster reproduced in, Baker, *King and Country*, p.22. The poster is mentioned frequently in New Zealand's Defence Department correspondence with museums and wartime poster collectors towards the end of the war, see, ANZ, R 22432788 – Allen to Liverpool, 12 May 1919.
[72] '"Done Their Duty" – Memorials for New Zealand Soldiers', *Evening Post,* 4 November, 1918, p.8; see also, AWMM, AY14 COU – L.S. Fanning, 'The Soldier's Dream', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.57; for sacrifice in the British context see, Gregory, *Last Great War*, Chapters 4 – 6, esp. p.113.
[73] 'The Overseas Dominions', *Grey River Argus*, 10 May 1915, p.2; see also, Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-422.
[74] Baker, *King and Country*, p.36; Gregory, *Last Great War*, pp.112-113; see also, AWMM, AY14 COU – L.S. Fanning, 'The Soldier's Dream', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.57; for equality of sacrifice in a French context see, John Horne, '"L'impôt du sang": Republican Rhetoric and Industrial Warfare in France, 1914-18', *Social History,* 14:2 (May 1989), pp.201-223.
[75] Gullace, *Blood of Our Sons,* pp.36, 38-40, 44-45; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.88; Susan R. Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War*, (Chapel Hill, NC: 1999), p.113; Baker, *King and Country*, p.27.

patriotic expressions, but were complicit in the process, often embracing and creating such patriotic rhetoric.[76] Gendered distinctions of 'British' rhetoric were yet another detectable strain of New Zealand propaganda:

> Sir Joseph Ward expressed his belief that the young men of this country would do their duty. If they were disinclined to do it, let the women of New Zealand disown them.[77]

This was also extended into to defence of home and family, as in a speech in 1916, where Ward implored men to "…respond to the appeal of his own mother, his own wife, his own sister, and his own children."[78]

This illustrates the degree to which New Zealand's propaganda throughout the war utilised 'British' rhetoric, through an internalisation of shared Britishness, and British cultural constructions of the war. Accordingly, Britain's war aims and conceptualisation of the war were understandable and relatable through shared imperial language, and were taken as New Zealand's by extension. This accounts for the ease with which British-made propaganda, such as the DOI's collection of war photographs could be utilised and understood in New Zealand with little to no instruction or explanation. British propaganda rhetoric did not need to be enforced, nor did New Zealand need to be actively convinced of Britain's war aims. It is therefore inaccurate to argue that New Zealand passively 'relied' on Britain for propaganda, or simply regurgitated British propaganda; while New Zealand certainly utilised 'British' propaganda rhetoric, it took initiative in its use, and used it to express national character as much as an imperial British identity, as the two were interconnected in 'Dominion perspective'. New Zealand also adapted this rhetoric to suits its own needs, and to place the New Zealand experience and identity more firmly within it. New Zealand certainly utilised British propaganda, but did not simply or passively rely on it to explain New Zealand's entire wartime experience.

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[76] Ward, 'Women of Britain Say Go!', p.26; see also Grayzel, *Women's Identities,* p.113; Pickles, *Female imperialism;* Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.195; Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation', p.80.
[77] 'A Recruiting Rally', *Wairarapa Times*, 1 November 1915, p.4.
[78] 'The Call for Men', *The Press*, 18 April 1916, p.6; see also, AWMM, UB 325.N45 NEW - 'To New Zealand's Manhood', 1916, Government Printer, Wellington.

While New Zealand shared this language of 'British' imperial patriotism and propaganda, this facilitated, rather than inhibited, unique local responses to the war. As with physical British propaganda, New Zealand retained authority and initiative in its interaction with 'British' rhetoric, and frequently adapted and reoriented certain aspects to make it more closely relevant to the New Zealand experience of the war, and to insert the New Zealand identity into wider constructions of Britishness. Once again, this rested on a contemporary assumption that *pakeha* New Zealanders shared British identity and history.[79] This challenges the arguments of New Zealand cultural nationalist historians, such as Sinclair, who portray the First World War as a moment of clear definition for a distinct New Zealand identity, antipathetic to imperial identities.[80] The war was certainly a key moment for the Dominions in defining their identities and places in the empire, but this negotiation was still carried out through 'British' language in a wider framework of imperial Britishness.[81] This conforms somewhat more to Richard Jebb's perception of identity in the settler colonies – that expressions of independent national 'spirit' were natural and necessary, and did not necessitate a rejection of British identities, but were an evocation of them.[82] 'British' rhetoric was not borrowed or enforced, but was a means of extending New Zealand self-expression and identification.

New Zealand propaganda often not only expressed a New Zealand ownership of British history, but also New Zealand's responsibility in protecting, guarding, and most importantly furthering that 'British' historical glory and tradition. The 'To New Zealand's Manhood' poster (Figure 6) characterised this in racial terms, as a 'sacred heritage', which New Zealanders had to live up to.[83] In a speech advocating the Military Service Act in 1916, Allen took up this concept, arguing that Britain's traditions made New Zealand what it was:

> It is a privilege to share in the traditions of the Motherland. She has helped to make us what we are; we inherit much from the past, and we are confident that

[79] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.18.
[80] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, pp.170-173; 'Colonial nationalism', p.113; Olssen, 'A Nation', pp.319, 322; 'Waging War', p.313; Pugsley, *Scars*, pp.70, 75.
[81] Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.237-239.
[82] Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, pp.334-335.
[83] See also, the New Zealand Defence Department's 'Halt!' poster from 1915 in, Baker, *King and Country*, p.22; AWMM, AY14 COU – F.C. Rollett, 'New Zealand and the War', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.24.

> our New Zealand men and women serving at the front, with their comrades from other parts of the Empire, are securing for us something now which will make our own country and the Empire and our people nobler and better in the days that are to come.[84]

This emphasis on New Zealand's responsibility to carry forward British history illustrates J.G.A. Pocock's conception of New Zealand and British history – that New Zealand naturally has ownership of the British past, but within this has authority to carve out its own branch of this history.[85] When British propaganda discussed the moral superiority of the British race, New Zealanders could feel satisfaction, but were also advised to feel a responsibility, a further emphasis on wartime duty.

Within this emphasis on New Zealand carrying British history forward, a distinctive Dominion and New Zealand settler character and identity was also emphasised. James Allen stated in a speech in 1915; "the blood of the pioneers of this country still beats in the veins of our boys to-day."[86] Deeply associated with this emphasis was the concept of 'Better Britain', which held that British heritage, combined with the 'pioneer spirit', had made New Zealand an elite and heroic fighting force, stressing New Zealand's distinctiveness and dynamism within the wider British identity. [87] This did not reflect a splintering of New Zealand identity from a broader British identity, as Sinclair claims was the case in discussion of New Zealand's settler spirit, particularly during the Boer War,[88] but a distinctly New Zealand contribution to the shared British heritage. This impulse for New Zealand glorification was most evident in discussions of the Gallipoli campaign. J.L. Mortimer, in 'The Men of the Dardanelles', from *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book*, argues that the Gallipoli campaign would not only contribute to the British military tradition, but would give New Zealand its own military glory to rival those of the ancient world:

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[84] 'To Win the War', *NZ Truth*, 3 June 1916, p.6; see also, 'Trafalgar Day', *Dominion*, 22 October 1914, p.8; 'Recruiting Rally', *Dominion*, 1 November 1915, p.6.
[85] Pocock, 'Antipodean perception', pp.21-23.
[86] 'N.Z. and the War', *Dominion*, 20 September 1915, p.2; see also, 'The Call for Men', *The Press*, 18 April 1916, p.6.
[87] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p.21, see also, Sinclair, 'Colonial nationalism', pp.124-125.
[88] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart,* pp.171-173; 'Colonial nationalism', pp.111-130

> Men of the Dardanelles! Ah, that great name is writ forever on the scrolls of fame. Thy fame, New Zealand! Do thou make it well, thou hast a story now which thou may'st tell to thrill the heart and give tongue release more than the oft-told tales of Rome or Greece.[89]

Eventually New Zealand's deeds in the Palestine campaign, especially its role in capturing Jerusalem, were added to this rhetoric of New Zealand achievement, particularly in New Zealand post-war literature.[90] Gallipoli is rightly considered a turning point in New Zealand's war effort, and had an equally strong influence on New Zealand propaganda.[91] The campaign reoriented the concept of duty, with the heroic New Zealand dead of the Gallipoli campaign being utilised to call for more men to protect and capitalise on their heroic sacrifices.[92] This too was a British, and as John Horne notes, also French, concept of service as a blood sacrifice.[93] Once again, this concept, though European, was adopted with authority in New Zealand to illustrate and glorify Gallipoli as a distinctly local experience of the war. In this way, New Zealand's settler identity was naturally bound up with shared Britishness, showing the interaction of such strands of identity in New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective'.

The twin concepts of duty and sacrifice were further re-oriented in New Zealand, to make the calls more immediately relevant to New Zealand. Specifically, the concept of duty was expanded to include concepts of imperial loyalty and responsibility. Allen expressed this in a speech in 1917, responding to emerging feelings of war weariness, arguing that defence of empire and New Zealand's domestic interests were intertwined, and if anything, imperial interests were more important during the war:

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[89] AWMM, AY14 COU – J.L. Mortimer, 'The Men of the Dardanelles', p.151; Charles F. Salmond, 'Fallen at Gaba Tepe', p.113, both in, *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915).
[90] Eitan Bar-Yosef, 'The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36:1 (January 2001), p.99; James E. Kitchen, '"Khaki Crusaders": Crusading rhetoric and the British Imperial soldier during the Egypt and Palestine campaigns, 1916-18', *First World War Studies*, 1:2 (October 2010), p.144; see also, 'Honours Board', *Evening Post,* 12 December 1917, p.11; 'An Historic Occasion', *Dominion*, 2 October 1918, p.6.
[91] Baker, *King and Country*, pp.23-25.
[92] 'Mr. Allen's Visit', *Fielding Star*, 27 March 1916, p.3; 'New Zealand's Part', *Poverty Bay Herald,* 11 July 1917, p.4.
[93] Gregory, *Last Great War*, p.113; Horne, 'L'impôt du sang', p.202.

> It is unfortunate, of course, that the broader interests of New Zealand, as a dominion of the British Empire, should pull in a direction contrary to what we may term her domestic interests, but there is no question which of the two should be regarded as the more important at a time like this. The paramount consideration for New Zealand, as for every part of the Empire, must be the successful prosecution of the war.[94]

This passage also illustrates a wider point of 'Dominion perspective'. Specifically, Allen succinctly conveys what Stuart Ward portrays as a central tension of Dominion identity during the war: the contradictory divergence of Dominion domestic interests, at the same time as increased imperial cooperation and expression of wider imperial loyalties.[95] In New Zealand's official propaganda, this was reconciled by reorienting the concept of duty towards 'loyalty' and 'responsibility'. Allen argued New Zealand owed service not only to itself, but also to Britain, and as a loyal Dominion, it had a responsibility to respond to the Motherland's pleas, expanding self-sacrifice to a national level. This was not portrayed as a reluctant responsibility, but a duty that New Zealand could take pride in, through an emphasis on New Zealand's duty to its British heritage, and with it an appropriation of 'British' heroes. This is succinctly put in the 'Halt!' poster, with the phrase, "Your Empire Calls You, and – England Expects!"[96], a repurposing of Viscount Horatio Nelson's famous plea at the Battle of Trafalgar, "England expects that every man this day will do his duty."[97] The evocation of Nelson is significant. Cynthia Behrman argues that between 1885 and 1905, the cult of Nelson solidified in Britain. In light of increasing economic and naval pressures on the empire, Nelson was treated as a national hero, and an ideal of British morality and heroism to remind Britain, and her Dominions, what made them great, particularly as a naval power. Nelson also encapsulated concepts of duty and sacrifice for King and country, which translated naturally into wartime rhetoric. Behrman states that Nelson and the 'England Expects' phrase were engrained into the minds of every British schoolboy.[98] Its use in New Zealand's first non-instructional propaganda poster, therefore, indicates both New Zealand's sense of investment in

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[94] 'The Obligation of Service', *Otago Daily Times,* 12 July 1917, p.4.
[95] Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.237-239.
[96] Baker, *King and Country,* p.22.
[97] 'Trafalgar Day', *Dominion*, 22 October 1914, p.8.
[98] Cynthia Fansler Berhman, *Victorian Myths of the Sea*, (Athens, OH: 1977), pp.96-97.

and ownership of grand traditions of British history, and its belief in the need to repay Britain through duty and service for the inheritance of these traditions. This concept was also delivered in more sympathetic ways, less as a demand from Britain, and more as a desperate plea from 'Old England' or the 'Mother Country', such as in the 'To New Zealand's Manhood' poster (Figure 6)[99]: "The Motherland, which has made many sacrifices on our behalf, appeals to her sons across the sea for their assistance and cooperation."[100] This was also extended from a metaphorical call, to extension of specific calls for increased effort and manpower from British politicians like Lloyd George and Lord Kitchener to the empire and the people of New Zealand directly.[101] This illustrates the ways that New Zealand's propaganda not only helped shape New Zealand's self perception, but its conception of Britain and the empire. In response to these calls, it was argued that New Zealand could not maintain its honour by refusing Britain's pleas in its time of need. As such, a similarity was drawn between Germany's betrayal of its treaty with Belgium as a 'scrap of paper', arguing that New Zealand would be no better than Germany if it did not honour its duty to Britain.[102] This complicated strictly 'familial' associations into something more formal, but nonetheless, illustrates the complexity of New Zealand's sense of internalised Britishness, tempered with a sense of both duty and loyalty to 'Home' in New Zealand's propaganda. Through this reconceptualisation, the call to duty remained the same, but was extended to fit with New Zealand's experience of the war.

'British' rhetoric was also actively shaped in New Zealand's propaganda to account for specific New Zealand difference, or local New Zealand concerns. In particular was the need to account for New Zealand's distance from the war. Bart Ziino argues that distance from the front, while a feature of the home front experience throughout the empire, made the wartime experience of the antipodes distinct, as Australia and New Zealand were furthest from the front of any part of the empire. This made grief, mourning, and commemoration of the war in the antipodes a more communal experience.[103] This impulse is evident in New Zealand's propaganda,

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[99] See above, p.39.
[100] See also, 'Recruiting Rally', *Dominion*, 1 November 1915, p.6.
[101] '"More Men, More Men!" and still "More Men!"', *Free Lance*, 15 October 1915, p.6; 'Urgent Call for More Men', *Dominion*, 4 September 1915, p.9; 'Call for Men', *Ashburton Guardian*, 12 April 1918, p.4.
[102] '"To Win The War"', *NZ Truth,* 3 June 1916, p.6; 'New Zealand's Part', *Evening Post*, 11 July 1917, p.6.
[103] Ziino, *Distant Grief*, p.29.

through attempts to conceptualise and encourage New Zealand's sacrifice through distance and commemoration.[104] In some cases this distance was portrayed as a virtue, making New Zealand's sacrifice particularly morally admirable, as men were going to a war that had not yet impacted the New Zealand home front, as another extract from *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book,* by W.H. Triggs, explains:

> Such sacrifices are being made throughout the Empire, but of the mothers of New Zealand it may be said that their devotion is the more to their honour because while the Motherland is almost within the sound of the enemy's guns, we in these happy, prosperous isles are far from the scene of the conflict to all appearances wrapped in complete security, and therefore the need for sacrifice, although just as real as in England, is less apparent.[105]

Gallipoli was also conceptualised in terms of distance, as a way to bring the immediate significance of the war to the New Zealand home front, as F.C. Rollet's extract from *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book* explains:

> But it was not until the cables announced that great landing on Gallipoli, and the long lists of killed and wounded were made public, that they realised to the full that their own country was taking part in the war.[106]

Further shaping of the British propaganda discourse to suit the needs of New Zealand society became particularly necessary due to New Zealand's conscription debate. Specifically, British, and to an extreme, 'Anglo-Saxon' histories, were used to justify New Zealand's introduction of conscription. It was argued that New Zealand was still keeping to British ideals of anti-militarism, as New Zealand was simply following Britain's lead. The complexity of this issue is revealed, however, by Allen's decision to evoke Oliver Cromwell as an example of British use of military conscription, and the American President Abraham Lincoln's use of the system in the American Civil

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[104] Ziino, *Distant Grief*, pp.19,59.
[105] AWMM, AY14 COU – W.H. Triggs, 'New Zealand Mothers and the War', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.73; see also, 'Keep Sport Going', *Evening Post*, 29 October 1915, p.3; 'Recruiting Rally', *Wanganui Chronicle*, 6 November 1916, p.4.
[106] AWMM, AY14 COU – F.C. Rollett, 'New Zealand and the War', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.23; Ziino, *Distant Grief*, p.59.

War as evidence of its use in an 'Anglo-Saxon' context. Both were contentious examples, showing the difficulty of reconciling conscription with the established British ideal of anti-militarism.[107] This illustrates the potential for the USA to be included in constructions of otherwise 'British' heritage, though it was more problematic and uncomfortable.[108]

These varied renegotiations of 'British' rhetoric illustrate the degree to which New Zealand had authority, control, and initiative in shaping its conception of the war, and its own identity. However, this was still negotiated within a wider framework of shared Britishness. It shows that negotiations of Dominion status did not necessitate rejection of imperial identities, but were often explored through them, through an internalised 'British' rhetoric, and the creation of imagined British world space, demonstrating the complexity of 'Dominion perspective'. New Zealand's engagement with this shared language also had implications in terms of racial inclusion and exclusion, and relations with Maori, and influenced how Britain and New Zealand interpreted the empire, and their places within it.

New Zealand's cultural construction of the war along the lines of 'British' propaganda rhetoric meant that certain groups were excluded from, or struggled to align themselves with, such patriotic constructions of the war. For instance, Irish immigrants to New Zealand struggled with conflicting allegiances, or embarrassment after the Easter Rising of 1916, which sat uncomfortably against imperial patriotism.[109] However, this exclusionary nature of 'British' rhetoric was most pronounced for non-white and indigenous populations of the empire. The view of the British world presented in this 'British' propaganda rhetoric was problematic in terms of the place of indigenous populations within it. This spoke to longer-term debates of imperial racial inclusion and exclusion. Catherine Hall argues that the boundaries of the British were not fixed, but fluid, as indigenous peoples often managed to include themselves through contact or a self-identification with imperial Britishness.[110]

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[107] '"To Win the War"', *NZ Truth,* 3 June 1916, p.6; see also, Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', p.155, 157; see also, 'Military Service', *The Press*, 12 June 1916, p.7.
[108] Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', p.157; Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p.5.
[109] Seán Brosnahan, '"Shaming the Shoneens": The Green Ray and the Maoriland Irish Society in Dunedin, 1916-22', *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration and New Zealand Settlement*, ed. Lyndon Fraser, (Dunedin: 2000), pp.118-120.
[110] Hall, 'British World', pp.25-26; see also, Bridge and Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', p.3; Buckner and Douglas, 'Introduction', p.14.

However, despite this potential fluidity, and a strain of liberal concern for the wellbeing of native populations, Phillip Buckner argues that most British imperialists were not cultural relativists, and an inherent belief in the superiority of 'white Britishness' was common.[111] Douglas Lorimer claims that since the nineteenth century the debate on race and the empire had been divided between those calling for assimilation, typically abolitionists and proponents of the 'civilising mission', and those who promoted an exclusionary discourse, which emerged towards the turn of the century.[112] Native populations could attempt to include themselves within the British world, but they ran into issues when they attempted to define themselves as 'racially British'. This was especially true in the Dominions where, as Buckner argues, distance from 'Home', and close contact with native populations made identifications of white 'racial Britishness' even more pronounced,[113] despite occasional acceptance and inclusion of certain colonial locations, particularly India, in New Zealand's propaganda. These issues of racial inclusivity arose in Britain's war effort, and cultural manifestations of the war.[114] In particular, they are clear in representations of the empire in official British propaganda, such as the Victoria League collection of war photographs. Imperial depictions in this collection are not necessarily racially 'exclusive'; there was still worth in portraying non-white colonial troops to emphasise the size, strength, and inclusive morality of the British war effort and empire.[115] Nonetheless, they are 'exclusionary', and privilege 'white Britishness', portraying the core of the empire as a central 'British family' of Britain and the Dominions, with the periphery kept at a distance.[116] This is particularly portrayed in images of close, friendly, familial cooperation and association between British and Dominion troops, such as the image of New Zealand and British troops leaning on a shell pile (Figure 8), in contrast to the collection's more exclusionary depiction of native and colonial troops, showing native troops as separate, distinct, and isolated, such as the depictions of West Indian troops in the collection (Figures 9). The

[111] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', pp.27-28; see also, Alan Lester, 'British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire', *History Workshop Journal*, 54 (Autumn 2002), p.25.
[112] Douglas Lorimer, 'From Victorian Values to White Virtues: Assimilation and Exclusion in British Racial Discourse, c.1870-1914', *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.110-111; see also, Lester, 'British Settler Discourse', pp.25, 29.
[113] Buckner and Douglas, 'Introduction', p.15; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.219; Bridge and Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', p.3.
[114] Robb, *British Culture*, p.11.
[115] Robb, *British Culture,* pp.7-8, 11-12.
[116] Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, p.5.

imagined British world space created in such propaganda was clearly exclusionary, and limited to Britain and the Dominions. Non-white, colonial soldiers were not obscured, but were not depicted in the same inclusive, familial way.[117]

Figure 8 MBL, MB 367/148991, Five Royal Field Artillerymen with a New Zealand trooper leaning on an 18-pounder shell dump near Becourt Wood. (Lt. Ernest Brooks; Becourt Wood, Pas-de-Calais, France; 1916).

Figure 9 MBL, MB 367/148915, Members of the British West Indies Regiment in camp on the Albert-Amiens Road during the Battle of the Somme, 1916. (Lt. Ernest Brooks; Albert-Amiens Road, Somme, France; September; 1916).

[117] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.441, 447-448.

This issue of 'racial Britishness' and 'whiteness' took on a new dimension and relevancy in New Zealand, due to the place of Maori. Maori inclusivity in New Zealand is a much wider issue, demanding attention beyond the scope and capacity of this thesis. Therefore this discussion is limited to wartime contexts. Maori were not uniformly against the war. As in the Boer War, during the First World War, certain *iwi* eagerly volunteered for service, espousing their loyalty and enthusiasm, mostly those who had fought for the British in the New Zealand Wars, notably the Arawa iwi,[118] which published a pamphlet in support of conscription of Maori.[119] However, Maori were at first excluded from the war entirely; Maori offers to send a battalion, rebuffed during the Boer War, were only accepted during the First World War after Britain used Indian troops to hold the Suez Canal.[120] This was due to the British principle of the undesirability of having black or native soldiers fighting a white enemy.[121] Though the Maori offer was eventually accepted, cultural characterisations of the war along British lines still led to issues of ideological exclusion and disillusionment, and a sense that Maori did not have an interest in the war. This is illustrated well in a letter from a Maori citizen, E. Karetai, to the *Otago Daily Times* in 1915:

> The Maori understands that England has gone to war for honour's sake – that Germany violated a 'scrap of paper', which her representative had signed for the protection of a small country. So far so good. But the mere Maori mind cannot help asking, where is Britain's honour? What about the 'scrap of paper' Britain signed for the protection of a small people, and the promises contained therein? Why has Britain allowed the New Zealand Government to violate that 'scrap of paper', called the Treaty of Waitangi? Did I hear the Minister say those injustices were past? No; they live to-day, and will live for ever, a blot on New Zealand's history, and – shall I say it? – on Britain's honour and her much-vaunted fairplay.[122]

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[118] Ashley Gould, '"Different Race, Same Queen": Maori and the War', *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue*, ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2003), p.120.
[119] The National Archives : Public Record Office, Kew (TNA:PRO), CO 209/297 – 29649 'Pamphlet on the subject of conscription', 17 June, 1918, p.439, 513-520.
[120] Gould, 'Different', pp.119-120; O'Connor, 'Recruitment of Maori Soldiers', p.49.
[121] Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu', p.197; O'Connor, 'Recruitment of Maori Soldiers', p.49; see also, Robb, *British Culture*, p.8; Walker 'Warrior Race', p.2; Gould, 'Different Race', p.120.
[122] 'Maori Loyalty', *Otago Daily Times*, 6 September 1915, p.2.

This clear Maori dislocation from the 'British' rhetoric was a significant barrier to Maori enlistment, particularly in the implacable Waikato region, which refused attempts at enlistment and even conscription of Maori.[123] Therefore, there was a need to find a way to involve Maori in the war, and accommodate Maori identity into the 'British' wartime patriotic rhetoric.

Reinforcing New Zealand's engagement with a wider British intellectual and cultural language,[124] Maori became reconceptualised in new Zealand's propaganda through the British Victorian racial discourse of the 'martial race myth', which asserted that certain races were genetically suited to battle and warfare as 'warrior races'.[125] This accommodated Maori involvement and success in the war, and interaction with rhetoric of imperial Britishness. Christina Thompson argues that British conceptions of Maori as inherently aggressive and warlike were longstanding. This was a reflexive discourse, and during the war it was considered a positive and inclusive characterisation, instead of a way to negatively characterise Maori as brutish, as it was often used in the nineteenth century.[126] This concept of Maori as a warrior race became central to depictions of Maori soldiers. For instance, newspaper illustrations such as 'The Spirit of his Fathers' (Figure 10) and 'The Maoris at Gallipoli' (Figure 11), both depict Maori in an 'exotic', warrior-like manner, with tongues out and eyes flaring, in hand to hand combat with the enemy, a scenario which was very different from the reality of the Gallipoli campaign. Such depictions were common. Both illustrations depict Maori as inherently brave and skilled in battle, channelling their warrior ancestors, further expanding the mythology of the Gallipoli campaign by co-opting traditional symbols of Maori dress and warfare in this First World War context. This was a positive and inclusive depiction, because in both images enemy Turks are depicted as unable to resist and contain Maori warriors. Yet it is still one that fundamentally set Maori aside as different from the 'British' icon 'Tommy Atkins'. This concept was even utilised by Maori MPs, such as Apriana Ngata, also a member of the Maori Recruiting Board. Ngata stated that Maori involvement in the war would be beneficial, rather than jeopardising the survival of

[123] Walker, 'Warrior Race', p.4; O'Connor, 'Recruitment of Maori Soldiers', pp.49, 65-67.
[124] O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.612; Lester, 'British Settler Discourse', pp. 25, 29.
[125] Walker, 'Warrior Race', pp. 2, 15.
[126] Christina A. Thompson, 'A Dangerous People Whose Only Occupation is War: Maori and Pakeha in 19th Century New Zealand', *The Journal of Pacific History*, 32:1 (June 1997), pp. 109, 111-114.

the race, as it was the lack of battle in recent memory that had led to the decline of the naturally martial Maori race:

> The Maori race had declined because it was only very recently that they had stopped fighting, and it took more than half a century for some of the Maori warrior tribes to suit themselves to the requirements of peace. When the Maoris first volunteered it was not patriotism – that and other things of the sort came afterwards as excuses … But they went first for a sheer love of adventure, and because the spirit of their fathers were calling them to battle.[127]

This is a telling representation of the martial race myth. It illustrates that the exclusive nature of the shared British imperial discourse of patriotism, which appealed so naturally to pakeha New Zealanders, necessitated finding new ways to accommodate and include Maori in the war effort, and the mythology of New Zealand's war experience. However, as a British intellectual and racial discourse in its own right, it also shows the continuing influence of British cultural discourses in formulating New Zealand's cultural perceptions and identities, even through interaction of pakeha and Maori identities.[128] This ideological distinction informed British perceptions of Maori, as the martial race myth made Maori soldiers racially 'acceptable' in depictions of the imperial war effort.[129] This reflected a wider process of New Zealand's cultural conceptualisation of Maori. Maori proved an anomaly in New Zealand's conceptualisation of itself as 'racially British'. A prominent response to this was to reconceptualise Maori through attempts at to 'assimilation' and 'civilisation'. Maori were generally considered the most likely of the indigenous populations British settlers encountered to be able to be 'civilised' through British contact, by British racial theorists. From the late nineteenth century, a policy of assimilation took place in New Zealand, which entailed culturally reconsidering Maori as 'Brown Britons', or 'White Maori', normalising Maori into a British identity.[130] In the context of the war,

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[127] 'Maoris and the War', *Auckland Star,* 2 June 1916, p.2; Walker, 'Warrior Race', p.13; see also, Ernest Denis Hoben, AWMM, AY14 COU – 'Ake, Ake, Kia Kaha', *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book of literature and art,* ed. A.W. Shrimpton, (Christchurch: 1915), p.130.
[128] Walker, 'Warrior Race', p.20.
[129] Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu', p.196, 200.
[130] Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.189-190, 106-207; see also, Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and race: Aryanism in the British Empire,* (Basingstoke & New York, NY: 2002).

Maori were normalised in a militaristic identity, though clearly many Maori still felt alienated by this heavy reliance on ‘British’ rhetoric during the war.

Figure 10 ATL, A-312-1-088 – Blomfield, William, ‘The Spirit of his Fathers’, *New Zealand Observer*, 25 December 1915.

Figure 11 AWMM – D 526.2 MAO, 'The Maoris at Gallipoli', *Dominion*, 15 November 1915.

The content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda illustrates the ways that New Zealand invested in an imperial 'imagined community' with Britain, through a shared British imperial language of patriotism. This was not a process that entailed local unfiltered replication of British cultural norms, or repression of local expressions. New Zealand retained authority, initiative, and control in its engagement with 'British' patriotic rhetoric, and used this imperial language as a way to negotiate its own identity. Local expression and perception was common, but was achieved

within a framework of shared Britishness, and a strong engagement with 'imagined' British world space, emphasising a central British world community of Britain and the Dominions. This also allowed Britain's wartime propaganda rhetoric to translate so effectively in New Zealand. Within this local expression and exploration of identity, New Zealand's on-going renegotiation of its place in the empire is evident. This also allowed an expression and exploration of 'Dominion perspective'; tensions between autonomy and loyalty, self-interest and imperial duty are evident, but are expressed within a language that assumed overarching 'British' loyalty, even through 'national' pride. However, despite the strength of these assertions in New Zealand's wartime propaganda, the reality of the British world did not necessarily mirror the depicted harmony of a collective and cooperative 'Britishness'. In practical terms, the British world was a problematic community, and the interaction of Britain and New Zealand's propaganda organisations illustrates the numerous practical limitations, and ideological misunderstandings, that inhibited and complicated British world relationships. New Zealand's wartime propaganda shows the complexity of its position and identity during the First World War; despite a heavy investment with 'British' rhetoric, 'imagined' British world space, and a self identification as British, New Zealand did not passively rely on British propaganda in this process, but actively engaged with and internalised it, using 'British' rhetoric to express New Zealand's identity and experience of the war.

Chapter 2: The Colonial Office and Responsible Government: British Imperial Propaganda Organisation, 1914-1916

Identification with shared Britishness, and the construction of an 'imagined' British world space, were vital features of the content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda, and informed its understanding of the war. However, New Zealand did not 'rely' on Britain to provide propaganda or organise its campaign. British material and rhetoric was important, but made its way to New Zealand through mostly private initiative, and was actively adapted and reshaped for New Zealand audiences. In terms of organisation, distribution, and interaction, for the early years of the war, the two campaigns were largely officially disconnected. This chapter illustrates the complexity and 'awkwardness' of the British world, through the disparity between 'imagined' space, through cultural constructions, such as those in the content of New Zealand's propaganda, and 'organisational' space, comprising official interactions, distributions, and exchanges of propaganda. The operational relationship between British and New Zealand propaganda was much more problematic than that suggested by the content of New Zealand's propaganda, and limited the close connection that the Dominions desired. This was partly due to practical inhibitions of the British world, both longstanding and particular to the war, which inhibited the flow of propaganda from Britain to New Zealand. This was also an ideological issue. Despite concepts of Dominion status and responsible imperial government being central to both British and New Zealand approaches to propaganda, these views did not form an easy consensus. Due to a confident belief in self-sufficiency in New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective', New Zealand did not want to strictly 'rely' on British propaganda, but even in its relative isolation and self-sufficiency, New Zealand propagandists still looked to British approaches to propaganda, and anticipated close connection and attention from Britain regarding propaganda. Against this, Britain's approach to imperial propaganda, and to the concepts of Dominion status and responsible government, emphasised a 'hands off' approach, limiting the propaganda connection between Britain and the Dominions. The complexity of this situation, in terms of the ideological tensions between cooperation and close contact, and responsible government and self-sufficiency, was difficult to manage between the two campaigns, and led to dissatisfaction. This highlights the significance of the tensions of 'Dominion perspective', and the contestability of Dominion status, to propaganda

connections, and to British world interactions more widely, and accordingly, both influenced Britain's imperial propaganda approach to 1916.

This chapter examines how the Dominions fit into Britain's wider propaganda campaign, and how Dominion propaganda from Britain was organised. Next it explores the impact of and reaction to, the British policy in the Dominions, with regard to criticisms and conflict. Finally, it focuses more closely on New Zealand's particular position in the imperial propaganda network, and the British world more widely. New Zealand's geographic and demographic conditions meant its place within Britain's propaganda campaign was distinct even within the category of 'Dominion'.

Despite their importance as a source of soldiers for Britain's war effort, their apparent centrality to the empire, the importance of the empire to British politics and culture,[1] and New Zealand's self-assumed centrality to the British world,[2] for at least the first half of the war, the Dominions were a relegated, fairly unimportant category of Britain's extensive propaganda campaign, comprising only a very small focus in the wider picture. Between November 1914 and September 1915 Britain's PRC produced 5.7 million standard posters, 550,000 strip posters, and 450,000 show cards, from 140 different designs.[3] Comparatively little of this material reached New Zealand from Britain; as has been noted, the transmission of such posters to New Zealand was patchy, and was mostly achieved through occasional small-scale donations from Britain, or through private initiative.[4] This contrast between the 'imagined' British world space constructed in New Zealand's wartime propaganda, and the practical, 'operational' space of the interactions between Britain and New Zealand's propaganda campaigns, illustrates the complexity and awkwardness of British world connections, and the disparity between different British world spaces.[5] This was partly a practical issue, related to the capacity and initial focus of Britain's propaganda campaign, and practical limitations of British world connection, especially during the war. Essentially, Britain's initial propaganda organisation was

[1] Hall, 'British World', p.36; Buckner and Douglas, 'Introduction', p.11; Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', pp.8-10; Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest', pp.59-60.
[2] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[3] Hiley, 'Kitchener Wants You', pp.40-41.
[4] See above, Chapter 1, pp.31-34; see also, TPA, MU000207/001/0001 – Mackenzie to Massey, Memorandum No.7223, (November 1918).
[5] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

too improvised, overstretched, and focused on neutral and enemy audiences, to consider the Dominions.

Before 1914, the British government had no official propaganda organisation, as propaganda, beyond political party campaigning, was seen as a potentially dangerous method of influence the government was better to avoid.[6] Accordingly, Britain's official wartime propaganda campaign was rapidly improvised, with ensuing disorganisation, waste, and competition that would plague the system until 1916, when steps were taken to rationalise the system.[7] The two initial priorities and reasons for Britain's propaganda campaign were countering Germany's sophisticated attack propaganda, and influencing opinion in neutral nations, particularly the USA. Domestic propaganda even took a backseat to these initial priorities.[8] As such, the Dominions were deferred. Initial propaganda bodies like the Neutral Press Committee and the News Department of the Foreign Office (FO) took no interest in the Dominions, while the Dominions were only one of many general 'national' categories in the work of the War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House.[9] With added pressures of paper shortages, cost, and shipping dangers, Britain's networks of propaganda distribution were therefore critically over-stretched from the beginning of the war, limiting their output.[10] While Britain scrambled to design and institute new, sophisticated propaganda systems and networks to influence neutral opinion, and printed vast amounts of propaganda for the home audience, under significant practical pressures, the Dominions, their loyalty and self-sufficiency assumed, and indeed legislated through the 1907 Dominions Act, were deferred in Britain's early propaganda campaign.

Issues of categorisation reinforced the Dominions' complicated place in Britain's initial propaganda organisation. The Dominions' failure to strictly fit into established propaganda categories of 'enemy', 'neutral', or 'home', meant they occupied an uneasy position in Britain's propaganda campaign, being relegated to a small and unimportant focus, compared to such other audiences. For instance, in a War Office (WO) proposal of December 1915 for an inter-departmental conference

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[6] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.15; De Groot, *Blighty*, p.174.
[7] De Groot, *Blighty*, pp.174-5; see also, Robb, *British Culture*, p.96, 119; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.12.
[8] Sanders, 'Wellington House', p.119.
[9] Sanders, 'Wellington House', p.121.
[10] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* pp.167-8; Millman, 'HMG', p.431; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.195-196.

regarding the 'guidance' of 'Home and neutral press' in "matters affecting military interests",[11] it was left to the CO to point out that the Dominions, and the empire in general, had essentially been excluded, due to this recurrent issue of categorisation.[12] Although New Zealand, and to an extent British opinion, imagined New Zealand and the Dominions as a part of the central 'British family' of the British world, as more of a 'hinterland' to Britain than a distant periphery,[13] organisationally, the Dominions struggled to find a place in British propaganda, again highlighting the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of the British world.[14] However, these issues of practicality and capacity only partly explain the isolation of the Dominions in Britain's propaganda campaign. Despite their unusual position in the purview of Wellington House, particularly during its time under the FO from January 1916 to February 1917, they were still officially a category of the Bureau's work from the beginning.[15] British propagandists were not ignorant of the Dominions' existence, and did not think them so unimportant that they never considered them. Instead, this isolation was also a conscious decision from Britain.

At its lowest ebb, propaganda to the Dominions was not only patchy, but also actively discouraged, due to the CO's approach to Dominion interaction. Britain's imperial propaganda approach illustrates the operation of the British world during the war, in particular, the significance of the contestability of central British world concepts of Dominion status and responsible government. This contestability not only fuelled the central tension between self-sufficiency and imperial connection in 'Dominion perspective', but also led to mild tensions and dissatisfaction from the Dominions, due to different emphases between Britain and the Dominions towards imperial propaganda, and imperial community.

Unlike the WO, instead of forgetting the Dominions, Wellington House was apparently eager to increase its propaganda efforts throughout the empire, but was restrained by the CO. In November 1916, after the first round of British propaganda reorganisation, a joint conference was held between Wellington House and the CO, to address Wellington House's policy for propaganda distribution to the empire.[16] The

[11] TNA:PRO, CO 323/685 – 56822 'Containing enemy press propaganda', 9 December, 1915.
[12] TNA:PRO, CO 323/685 – 56822 'Containing enemy press propaganda', 9 December, 1915.
[13] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.397-409; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-7; cf. Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest', pp.59-60.
[14] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[15] Sanders, 'Wellington', p.121.
[16] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.

two bodies held very different positions; Wellington House was eager to increase its imperial propaganda output but this enthusiasm was met with a stern response from the CO, as the CO's minutes of the meeting illustrate:

> Wellington House feel themselves bound by the terms of their appointment to press their propaganda to the fullest possible extent not only abroad but also throughout the Empire … We [the CO] feel that propaganda in the Empire is, except in a few special cases, sheer waste of public money, and want to damp it down so far as we can.[17]

The CO objected to Wellington House's proposals on both practical grounds, and on principle. Wellington House proposed that increased coordination between British and imperial propagandists could be achieved through Colonial and Dominion Governors communicating with Wellington House via telegraph every six months, regarding what official propaganda activity was being undertaken in their locality.[18] The CO's first objection was practical; it saw the proposal as unnecessarily wasteful, choking already clogged telegraph lines, and distracting governors from their work with "idle propaganda."[19] This was a reasonable complaint. Paper shortages were becoming problematic in Britain, while telegraph lines were certainly overstressed.[20] The CO also considered such efforts redundant, as Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law, himself a Canadian, stated, "loyalty as a general rule need[ed] no spur, to justify the trouble and expenditure involved" in the Dominions.[21] This was also ostensibly accurate. During this time in New Zealand, internal political disputes, such as tensions of the national government, and the continued threat of labour unrest, were not dramatic enough to wholly disrupt New Zealand's war effort. As Parsons argues, strong labour opposition to the war existed, but was marginalised in public discussions for most of the war.[22] It appears that these issues did not significantly concern British politicians. Instead, the CO only consented to propaganda efforts in

[17] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[18] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[19] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[20] Millman, 'Managing Domestic Dissent', p.431; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.195-196; see also, O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.613.
[21] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[22] Parsons, 'Debating the War'; Baker, *King and Country*, pp.15-23; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, pp.60-61; Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', pp.20-21.

areas of the empire where loyalty was less certain. For instance, in a discussion with Wellington House in 1915, it was decided that circulating a collection of cartoons by the Dutch cartoonist Louis Raemaekers may be useful in South Africa.[23] The situation in South Africa was delicate and seen as dangerous, with the Boer-led rebellion of 1914 causing concern over South Africa's involvement in the war. The rebellion, resulting from simmering Anglo-Boer tensions over the outcome of the recent Boer War and Alfred Milner's 'anglicising policy', was easily put down, but still raised concern in South Africa and Britain.[24] However, South Africa was clearly an exception; regarding the same proposal the CO argued that "opinion in Aust[ralia] and NZ needs no spur", so the policy was unnecessary.[25] Moreover, Boer relations were within the remit of British authority, where New Zealand's internal political tensions were not. Although this belief in the redundancy of Dominion propaganda activity does not wholly account for the CO's attempts to actively restrict propaganda from Britain to the Dominions.

Tellingly, the CO was much less restrictive regarding propaganda towards the crown colonies and protectorates. Though perceived to be pointless, the CO was happy for Wellington House to circulate pamphlets and papers in both 'European' and 'native' languages throughout the colonies as it had been doing, as long at it was at the local Governor's discretion.[26] The approach towards the Dominions was much more restrictive. In the resolution of the conference, Wellington House's future policy towards the Dominions was firmly established.

> The Governments of the self-governing Dominions are the sole responsible Authorities for their respective territories, and for this reason no propagandist publications of any description shall be circulated in Australia, Canada, South Africa or New Zealand without the concurrence of those Governments [through consultation with their High Commissioners].[27]

The term 'responsible authorities' is significant. The CO's anxiety to avoid any undue or unregulated propaganda material finding its way to the Dominions relates to a

[23] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 'Raemaeker's cartoons', 15 December, 1915, pp.639.
[24] Robb, *British Culture,* p.17; T.R.H. Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion, 1914', *The English Historical Review*, 78:306, (January 1963), pp.73-74.
[25] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 'Raemaeker's cartoons', 15 December, 1915, pp.639.
[26] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[27] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.29.

broader understanding of responsible imperial government. Specifically, the British government was careful not to impinge upon Dominion authority. The generally held perspective, especially in the CO, was that Britain should not dictate or interfere with the self-governing Dominions.[28] The CO was so concerned with maintaining this non-interference that it vetted all interactions between the Dominions and Wellington House.[29] 'Responsible government' was a central concept to the general understanding of Dominion status. The achievement of 'responsible government' was one of the assumed requirements, and as W. David McIntyre claims, the 'backbone', of Dominion status, though this was not its limit or the definition.[30] The system worked to resolve the conflict of imperial governance – of an executive body responsible to an external authority – by ensuring each Dominion had its own 'responsible' representative government, answerable only to the crown, not the executive of the United Kingdom, through a Governor. In practice this meant the Dominions were essentially autonomous in domestic matters, with only foreign affairs directed from London, though there was little 'official' coherence, and no official definition, only an agreement of principle.[31] Thus, it was not for Britain to dictate Dominion domestic policy. This did not denote conflict, nor was it seen to foreshadow independence; at the time the operation of responsible government was considered the final stage in national development as a member of the empire.[32] Accordingly, the CO was anxious to keep Wellington House well within the boundaries of responsible government and Dominion status in its attempts to direct propaganda in the Dominions. This highlights the complexity of British world relations, and the conflict inherent in 'Dominion perspective'; while cultural constructions of the British world emphasised close connection, community, and association between Britain and the Dominions as a central British family, practical, official interactions between Britain and the Dominions were starkly different. In particular, official, operational understandings of imperialism, responsible imperial rule, and Dominion status, which while also central to such cultural constructions,

[28] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* p.20; Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism,* pp.101-103, 334; Andrew Stewart, 'The "Bloody Post Office": The Life and Times of the Dominions Office", *Contemporary British History,* 24:1 (2010), p.44; McIntyre, *Britannic Vision,* pp.77-79.
[29] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.30.
[30] McIntyre, *Britannic Vision,* p.73.
[31] McIntyre, *Britannic Vision,* pp.73-75.
[32] Cole, 'Nationalism and Imperialism', p.171; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, pp. 19-20, 67; Bridge and Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', p.6.

often limited and complicated interaction between Britain and the Dominions.[33] Echoing Britain's hesitancy to directly 'coerce' domestic opinion, the CO took a similarly 'hands-off' approach to Dominion propaganda.[34] Close imperial interaction, particularly propaganda, was more often facilitated by public initiative, and patriotic societies, especially during the early years of the war, which made up for the gaps left by official organisation.[35]

The CO's approach made considerable sense, theoretically. Practically, propaganda to the Dominions, whose loyalty was assumed, was not as strong a priority as winning American support, for example, and ideologically the CO's observance of responsible government was prudent. However, in practice this approach became problematic. A crucial aspect of New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective' was the contestability of understandings of Dominion status, the limits and purpose of responsible government, and how differing emphases could cause tensions. Such tensions ensued due to the specific approach to 'Dominion perspective' of the CO's imperial propaganda policy. This is evident in the organisation of, and Dominion responses to, Britain's wartime news distribution to the Dominions. News circulation was an important aspect of Britain's imperial propaganda, and exemplifies the practical and ideological issues inherent in Britain's propaganda approach to the Dominions more widely. Simon J. Potter argues imperial networks of communication such as the press helped to facilitate a wider 'British' identity amongst Britain and the Dominions, particularly Britain's network of undersea cables.[36] This was especially true during the First World War, as communication of war news was vital for the Dominions, and much demanded in New Zealand.[37] However, press networks, like Britain's wider propaganda organisation, were not sufficiently organised or prepared for the demands the war

[33] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', p.447-450; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', p.16.
[34] For Britain's 'hands off' approach to domestic propaganda see, Horne, 'Remobilizing', pp.196-197; for Britain's 'hands off' approach to imperial governance see, Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.11; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', p.3.
[35] Pickles, *Female imperialism*, p.4-8, 16-17; Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.29-32; Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, p.3; Hendley, *Organised Patriotism*, pp.3-4, 7-10, see below, Chapter 3, pp.91-93.
[36] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.201-202; O'Hara, 'Networked World', pp.611-612; Bell, 'Dissolving Distance', pp.524-525.
[37] TNA:PRO, CO 209/290 – 27878 'Postage on Newspapers and periodicals from UK to NZ' (9 June, 1916); Baker, *King and Country,* pp.23-24; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage*, p.63; Ziino, *Distant Grief*, pp.1-4; see also, Potter, 'Communication and Integration', p.192.

placed on them, and letter post remained important.[38] The major inhibitions to this system were, yet again, capacity, cost, and coordination. During the war congestion of undersea telegraph cable networks reached critical levels. Cost also proved prohibitive both before and during the war. Furthermore, despite increased opinion towards centralisation, by the outbreak of the war, there was no central, 'official' line of communication between Britain and the Dominions. Instead, national 'combinations' of Dominion newspapers competed with the private Reuters network, which Britain invested in heavily, to supply each Dominion with news from London.[39] The divergence of this system meant official news communications from London to the Dominions during the war was difficult, costly, and had to be prioritised against more pressing wartime communications due to congestion, as with the rest of Britain's propaganda.[40] Therefore, long-standing issues worsened during the war, as the war both increased demand, and restricted capacity for regular official news communications from London to the Dominions.

British organisation of war news was not much better. After initially agreeing to limited access to the front for Dominion press representatives, it was hastily decided in September 1914 that the CO would compile and supply a daily telegram of war news to all Dominions, crown colonies and protectorates, to be sent from the Press Bureau.[41] However, this system quickly revealed its inadequacy, and by 1915, complaints of its failure had already emerged from the Dominions. Firstly, the Dominions felt offended that they received inordinately less attention than the British, foreign, and specifically American presses. In 1915 the Australian press correspondent Keith Murdoch complained:

> The Press Bureau is obliging, but does not pretend to place us on the same footing as British, and has in some cases given preference to the American press.[42]

[38] O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.615.
[39] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.198-9; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage*, p.63; O'Hara, 'Networked World', pp.613-615.
[40] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', p.198-9.
[41] TNA:PRO, CO 323/643 – 33373 'Press Bureau's Announcements', p.12; see also TNA:PRO, CO 753/1 War – Dominions – Index – 1914, p.8.
[42] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 52159 'London Correspondents of Colonial Newspapers', p.186.

In press communications, the Dominions did not receive the same privilege of close contact and community that was expressed in New Zealand's propaganda content.[43] Murdoch's complaint illustrates the limitations of Britain's campaign to the Dominions. The campaign's disorganisation and reliance on private, commercial networks gave the Dominions the perception that they were little more than an afterthought to the Press Bureau, which they essentially were in the wider picture of propaganda. This illustrates the tensions of 'Dominion perspective', and British world interactions, specifically the disparity between the Dominions' belief that as a special imperial category they deserved more attention, and a British perception that this status meant the Dominions should be self-sufficient. Furthermore, as the telegrams were merely an improvisation by the CO, the content was also considered substandard. Complaints noted that the imperial press rate for telegram communications of 7½ d per word meant that important news reached Australasian papers in limited or abridged form, notably speeches by King George V and British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith.[44] Again, this represents the tensions of 'Dominion perspective'; while the Dominions wanted to be self-sufficient, and did not want Britain to interfere, Dominion status was seen to denote privilege, and so there was also a desire for tangible evidence of that privilege, especially in circulation of information and political inclusion.[45] The Press Bureau did address these complaints, acknowledging that news communication to the Dominions was important, but again stressed that issues of proximity, organisation, technology, and Dominion sovereignty prevented greater connection between Home and Dominion presses.[46] Other British government bodies shared this position. When asked by the CO in December 1915, whether news could be sent more quickly to the Dominions, the offices consulted - the WO, the India Office, the FO, and the Admiralty - all replied that while news circulation to the Dominions was important, they could not foresee a way of improving the system, as news could not reach the Dominions before the British press without either holding news back in Britain (which would be detrimental as the domestic press often pre-empted official announcements in any case), or sending

[43] See above, Chapter 1, pp.36-50.
[44] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 52159 'London Correspondents of Colonial Newspapers', p.186; TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 56704 'Press Bureau', p.298.
[45] Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.233-25; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', pp.1-20; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65; McIntyre, *Britannic Vision,* pp.76-80.
[46] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 52159 'London Correspondents of Colonial Newspapers', p.186.

sensitive information before it was due to be released.[47] The WO proved perhaps most willing, agreeing to do all it could to "remove from [the Dominions'] minds the impression that they are not considered in every way possible,"[48] while the India Office agreed to send the information included in its telegrams to India for inclusion in the CO telegrams. This shows a differentiation in organisational space and interaction between Britain and the Dominions, and Britain and India. Despite cultural associations, the organisational apparatus of interaction with India was much more sophisticated, at least partially due to British concerns of Indian loyalty.[49] However, in these cases, it was generally agreed that this would only give the CO an advantage of a few hours at best, and would not improve the general problem.[50] This illustrates the British world's wartime operation – while the Dominions were acknowledged as a privileged 'British' inner circle, ultimately practical considerations set the parameters for British world connections, and inhibited closer communication, inclusion, and interaction. Despite British administrators' rejection of Murdoch's claims that more attention was paid to the USA than the Dominions, clearly priorities of garnering neutral support dictated that greater propaganda attention be paid to the USA and other neutral nations during the early years of the war,[51] rather than to addressing the technological and organisational inhibitions to closer communication with the Dominions.

Despite the centrality of concepts of Dominion status and responsible government to British and New Zealand approaches to official imperial propaganda, and more broadly to British world interactions and relationships, achieving consensus in understanding of these concepts was difficult, due to these terms' contestability.[52] Dominion criticism of the CO's approach to imperial propaganda illustrates the complexity of British world relationships due to the contestability of Dominion status, and the impact of the often-contradictory impulses of 'Dominion perspective' on these relationships, such as the connection between Britain and New Zealand's wartime propaganda campaigns. This relates to longer-term debates of the nature of

[47] TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 56704 'Press Bureau', pp.299-305.
[48] TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 56704 'Press Bureau', p.305.
[49] Stephen, 'Brothers of the Empire?', pp.164-166; Cannadine, *Ornalentalism*, pp.41-57; Robb, *British Culture*, pp.19-20; Hall, 'British World', p.36; see above, Chapter 1, pp.32-33.
[50] TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 56704 'Press Bureau', p.302.
[51] For British efforts towards the USA see, Bennett and Hampton, 'Anglo-American', pp.157-159.
[52] McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision,* pp.76-80.

the empire and the British world community, specifically debates of imperial federation. In particular, tensions that arose in response to the CO's approach to Dominion propaganda reflected wider frustrations at the continued influence of the CO in Dominion affairs, and the belief amongst the Dominions that Dominion status had still not been organisationally achieved by the outbreak of the war.[53] This illustrates a central issue of British world interactions; while it was understood culturally to denote a certain 'British' privilege through shared Britishness, Dominion status' ill-defined nature caused disputes and misunderstandings when applied to organisational, operational interactions.

Discussions of Dominion status in relation to official wartime propaganda interactions between Britain and the Dominions illustrate the wider development of British world relationships, and question established constructions of the empire. Specifically, Britain's supposedly 'formal' empire of settlement was not officially directed and designed, but emerged over time, with debates as to its meaning and operation emerging later.[54] Accordingly, the relationship between Britain and her settler colonies developed in practice, rather than being officially defined. Frequent debates of how the empire should function, and whether it should federate, were numerous between the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and vigorous in New Zealand. However, progress and consensus was slow.[55] Hence, like the concepts of 'Greater Britain' and the British world, 'Dominion status' was highly contestable.[56] Although 'Dominion status' was officially granted in 1907, the concept of Dominion status was similarly still developing and contested, and understandings were formed through broad shared principle rather than official definition. Therefore, the level of distinction and involvement the Dominions desired, particularly regarding involvement in imperial policy not been realised by the outbreak of war in 1914,[57] as expressed in a 1917 report by Leo Amery, an under-secretary in the Lloyd George

[53] Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.233-25; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', pp.1-20; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.
[54] Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', p.11; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', p.3.
[55] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.33-35, 40.
[56] For the contestability of Dominion status see, McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* p.20; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.44; McIntyre, *Britannic Vision,* pp.77-79; Grey, 'War and the British World', p.237; For the contestability and fluidity of 'Britishness' and the British world see, Bridge and Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', pp. 2-3, 8; Hall, 'British World', p.21, 23; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.224.
[57] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, pp.52-54, 6; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.44.

Government and a staunch imperialist.[58] This meant the operational and organisational reality lagged behind Dominion self-identification as a separate and privileged community within the empire, again illustrating the disparity between 'imagined' and 'operational' British world spaces.[59] The First World War was a crucial moment in this wider development of Dominion status; while it demonstrated the potential for close, effective cooperation between British and Dominion leaders desired by the Dominions, and set precedent through Lloyd George's 1917 Imperial War Cabinet, it also exposed Dominion dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the growing divergence between Dominion self-interest and imperial loyalty.[60] Dominion reaction to Britain's imperial propaganda organisation during the war's early years illustrates these tensions of 'Dominion perspective',[61] particularly regarding the continued involvement of the CO in Dominion relations, as an example of organisational reality lagging behind Dominion self-conception and cultural constructions of the British world.

As the British agent for the Dominions, the CO was a staunch proponent of the need to remain aware and respectful of Dominion status. Concerning propaganda distribution it acted to ensure the Dominions were fairly included to the same degree as other propaganda audiences,[62] while also protecting Dominion sovereignty by, for instance, setting out firm limitations to Wellington House regarding what it could send to the Dominions.[63] In this capacity as Dominion advocate, the CO often took the Dominions' side against British governmental departments. For instance, in 1917, the Australian press correspondent C.E.W. Bean complained to the CO, through the Australian High Commissioner, Andrew Fisher, that the Australians were given insufficient recognition, attention, and praise in the British press for their military victories.[64] War Secretary Lord Derby rejected this accusation, arguing that the Australians were often given excessive attention, complaining, "these Colonials are

[58] TNA:PRO, CAB 17/190 Memoranda on Imperial Coordination by Leo Amery, 1917, pp.3-4; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.239-242; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.45.
[59] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[60] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-68; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.239-242; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.45.
[61] TNA:PRO, CAB 17/190 Memoranda on Imperial Coordination by Leo Amery, 1917, pp.3-4; Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.239-242; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.45.
[62] TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 56704 'Press Bureau', 56704, p.295; CO 323/685 – 56822 'Containing enemy press propaganda', 9 December, 1915.
[63] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.22.
[64] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 – Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), p.8.

very trying".[65] Regardless, then Colonial Secretary Walter Long supported the Australian claim, stating it was necessary to devote as much attention as possible to Australia to remove any feelings of neglect.[66] The CO, therefore, tried to walk a difficult line between accommodating and including the Dominions, and not interfering and infringing on their status, showing what Andrew Smith argues as British recognition of the 'Britishness' of the Dominions, and their concomitant status.[67] The CO tried to be both moderator and advocate for the Dominions in Britain's propaganda campaign, supporting their complaints no matter how unfounded. However, Dominion criticism and dissatisfaction with this approach still ensued.

Dominion criticism of the CO's propaganda management was in many ways inevitable, as the very involvement of the CO in Dominion affairs, including propaganda distribution, was a significant issue to the Dominions, representing a continued tension of misunderstanding between Britain and the Dominions regarding Dominion status, and was seen as a slight on Dominion pride, reflecting wider tensions of 'Dominion perspective'.[68] Amery claimed that CO administration meant the Dominions were technically subordinate to a British government department. This issue also spoke to contemporary conceptions of how the Dominions understood their place in the empire in terms of 'racial Britishness'. Specifically, it was argued that the inclusion of the Dominions in the CO insulted Dominion pride as they were "grouped with non-self governing dependencies and with backward populations of all sorts of races," which, it was felt, negatively coloured the tone of CO's relations with the Dominions.[69] This reflects not only the Dominions' assumed political superiority, but also a concomitant belief in the innate racial superiority of 'white Britishness'.[70] Instead, it was desired that the Dominions should be treated as their own group, with their own official body.[71] Once again, this was an issue of practical realities failing to match Dominion ideological expectations in the British world.

[65] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 – Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), pp.2-3.
[66] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 – Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), pp.2-3.
[67] Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest', pp.59-61.
[68] Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', p.45.
[69] TNA:PRO, CAB 17/190 Memoranda on Imperial Coordination by Leo Amery, 1917 p.19.
[70] Pickles, *Female imperialism,* pp.37-39; Buckner, 'Whatever Happened', pp.27-28; Lorimer, 'Victorian Values', pp.110-111.
[71] Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', pp.43-44.

Despite its attempts to accommodate 'Dominion perspective', the CO's involvement continued to draw Dominion complaint, particularly due to the CO officials' insistence on being heavily involved in this process, including vetting Wellington House propaganda.[72] From the CO perspective this prevented any imposition on responsible government, but from the Dominion position, this inhibited Dominion statesmen's ability to interact with British officials on an equal footing.[73] The CO's efforts demonstrate the difficulty of realising such operational and constitutional relationships between Britain and the Dominions due to the inherent contradictions of 'Dominion perspective'. Essentially, the Dominions contradictory emphases on the self-sufficiency of Dominion status on one hand, and its assumed privilege of close contact, cooperation, and attention from Britain on the other, meant managing this contradictory balance became problematic. Therefore, despite its stringent observation of, and respect for, the limitations of responsible government and local divergence,[74] the CO often fell short of Dominion expectations, failing to satisfy the contradictory impulses of 'Dominion perspective'. This fuelled existing tensions, caused complaint, and satisfied few.

A central issue of Dominion criticism of the CO's propaganda approach was in its handling of the WO's policy of 'generalisation' in its presentation of the British war effort, which entailed presenting the imperial war effort as a general and unified 'British' effort. While this approach did emphasise shared Britishness and the centrality of the Dominions in the empire, it also tapped into a deep vein of Dominion competition. Dominion figures frequently complained that their local achievements were not given enough publicity, or that another Dominion had received more attention. This aggravated another contradictory aspect of 'Dominion perspective'; the identification as both part of a unified, privileged group in the empire, in close communion with Britain, and as nationally distinct within that group, with local characters and achievements. As such, the concept of shared Britishness, expressed so confidently in New Zealand's 'British' propaganda rhetoric, could be problematic, as it risked over-generalisation, and fuelled competition.[75] In the Australian case, one of Bean's major complaints against the Press Bureau's depiction of the Australian troops

[72] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.29.
[73] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, p.65.
[74] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.29; see also, Pocock, 'Neo-Britains', pp.187-8.
[75] Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, pp.101-103, 334; Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Redisovering', pp.13-14; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.299; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* p.46-52

and the policy of 'generalisation' of British and Dominion troops in press reports, was that it disadvantaged Australia through being applied unevenly, as Canadians were apparently favoured with greater attention. According to Bean, Canadians were often specifically and inordinately praised, while Australian troops were 'generalised', and only specified by their losses, as German reports apparently emphasised victories against Australians.[76] This dispute highlights the extreme difficulty the CO had in dealing with 'Dominion perspective', particularly due to the often-unreasonable character of Dominion complaints at their treatment by British authorities. As Long's reactions to Bean's fellow Australian, Murdoch's, complaints demonstrate, the Dominions were difficult to manage due to their frequent complaints, and were indeed often trying.[77] While constructions of the British world in New Zealand's propaganda portrayed Britain and the Dominions as a unified, and privileged, 'British' group, Dominion figures also wanted Britain to recognise their distinctive national characters and contributions. Regardless of however warranted these complaints of press coverage were, Dominion criticism and dissatisfaction was also stoked by British efforts at catering to Dominion difference in propaganda interaction.

While maintaining a general approach to all the Dominions, the CO, and other departments, also had to respond to practical realities, and the differences and relative importance of each Dominion.[78] Once again, while necessary, such differentiation provoked further complaints of favouritism and exclusion, and fuelled Dominion rivalries. It also further illustrates the disparity between 'imagined' and 'operational' British world spaces and connections.[79] Canada was commonly seen by other Dominions, particularly Australia, as being unfairly favoured by Britain.[80] Canada was unique amongst the Dominions; the only Dominion in the northern hemisphere, it was also the largest, most profitable, and closest to Britain. Its proximity and connection to the USA also made it distinct from the other Dominions, and strategically more useful in influencing American opinion.[81] Smith has demonstrated that, from around 1890, Canada replaced Australia as the most profitable Dominion,

[76] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 – Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), p.8-9.
[77] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 – Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), pp.2-3, see above, pp.71-72.
[78] Pocock, 'Neo-Britains', pp.188-9.
[79] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[80] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1119 Recognition of Australian Troops (May 1917), p.1.
[81] Pocock, 'Neo-Britains', pp.188-9.

and accordingly most British investment in the Dominions went to Canada.[82] Wartime competition between the two largest Dominions was, therefore, longstanding. These differences informed Britain's approach to propaganda in Canada. Britain's supposed Canadian favouritism also raised tensions in New Zealand, particularly over reduced postal rates for newspapers, trade journals, and periodicals between Britain and Canada. New Zealand appeals for Britain to bring postal rates to New Zealand into line with reduced Canadian levels pre-dated the war,[83] reminiscent of similar calls for the recognition of Dominion privilege through imperial preference on British trade with the Dominions.[84] Calls for reduced postal rates intensified during the war, as New Zealand saw the exchange of such publications, particularly newspapers, as vital to maintaining connection with Britain during the war,[85] and local information of war news:

> The postal authorities do not appear to realise how great is the interest of the overseas people in the doings of [Britain]; and it is especially necessary at the present time that those people should be kept well informed of all that is going on.[86]

However, once again, practical realities inhibited this closer interaction and privilege, and Britain repeatedly denied New Zealand's appeals. In practical terms, reduced postal rates for Canada made sense where they did not for New Zealand, as Canada was a much larger, and closer, market than New Zealand; overall the rate of publications sent to Canada was more than Australia, South Africa and New Zealand combined.[87] Secondly, the proximity of Canada to Britain meant reductions were relatively cheap, while the proximity of the USA to Canada meant British publications had serious competition in the Canadian market.[88] New Zealand's complaints continued throughout the war, until 1917, when Britain deferred the issue

[82] Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest', p.61.
[83] TNA:PRO, CO 209/281 – 27457 'Postage on newspapers and periodicals from UK' (25 July, 1914).
[84] Steven E. Lobell, 'Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain's Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903-1906, 1917-1923, 1930-1932', *International Studies Quarterly,* 43:4 (December 1999), p.679; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp.66-67.
[85] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.198-9; Pickles, *Transnational Outrage*, p.63; O'Hara, 'Networked World', pp.613-615.
[86] TNA:PRO, CO 209/281 – 46993 'Magazine and Newspaper post' (27 November, 1914) p.702.
[87] TNA:PRO, CO 209/281 – 46993 'Magazine and Newspaper post' (27 November, 1914) p.702.
[88] TNA:PRO, CO 209/282 – 44724 'Magazine Post' (13 November, 1914).

until after the war, due to paper shortages, putting the matter to rest for the war at least.[89] This clearly illustrates the significance of practical issues in determining British world relations. While the CO, however unsuccessfully, attempted to approach the Dominions in a generalised, unified way, geographic characteristics and practical limitations ultimately directed interactions between Britain and the Dominions, and particularly, how much attention each Dominion received regarding propaganda distribution.

A similar imbalance of attention also applied to South Africa, due to its delicate political situation. South Africa's Boer population made its internal political situation especially delicate, and the 1914 Boer rebellion caused considerable concern in Britain.[90] Understandably, the CO's approach to propaganda in South Africa was much more considered, and requiring greater delicacy and attention, as Wellington House was made aware.[91] Therefore, South Africa was allowed to be an exception to the CO's rule of preventing Wellington House sending propaganda to the Dominions, such as the aforementioned distribution of Louis Raemaekers' cartoons, with original Dutch captions, which was seen as acceptable in South Africa to alleviate political tensions, since Raemaekers was a 'pro-Entente Dutchman', whose work could inspire and ingratiate the Boer population.[92] New Zealand's situation was rather less problematic. By contrast, it was seen as unnecessary to direct and initiate such specific propaganda campaigns to Australia and New Zealand, as it was felt that opinion did not need motivation there.[93] The only comparable situation in New Zealand was relations with Maori. However, as shown above, New Zealand managed appeals to Maori in its propaganda locally.[94] Furthermore, it was less necessary and less constitutionally appropriate for British propagandists to intervene in internal Maori relations as they did in Anglo-Boer relations, as British involvement in New Zealand's Maori affairs was a wider issue, dating back to the New Zealand Wars, where it was eventually officially settled that the New Zealand government had sole authority in this area.[95]

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[89] TNA:PRO, CO 209/295 – 24151 'Postage rates on newspapers, etc., from NZ to UK' (8 May, 1917).
[90] Robb, *British Culture,* p.17.
[91] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 'Raemaeker's cartoons', 15 December, 1915, p.641.
[92] TNA:PRO, CO 323/689 – 57324 'Louis Raemaekers' Cartoons', 13 December, 1915, pp.346-9.
[93] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 'Raemaeker's cartoons', 15 December, 1915, p.639.
[94] See above, Chapter 1, pp.50-57.
[95] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, pp.29, 31.

As with Canada and South Africa, the specific situation and characters of Australia and New Zealand also influenced how Britain perceived and interacted with the antipodean Dominions. Britain's approach to Australia and New Zealand regarding propaganda distribution not only further illustrates how tensions arose regarding conflicting constructions of the British world between Britain and the Dominions. Specifically, the use of the concept of 'Australasia' marked a difference between New Zealand and Britain's conception of the British world, and New Zealand's place within it.[96] It also illustrates the interaction of the British world with other regional communities, like the 'Tasman world'.[97] Besides Australia and New Zealand's closely linked histories, both were distinct amongst the Dominions as both were isolated by vast oceanic distance from Britain. This isolation, and proximity to each other, shaped both Dominions' imperial experience, and continues to do so.[98] Furthermore, this geographic consideration meant Australia and New Zealand occupied a different position in Britain's propaganda network than Canada and South Africa. Neither was especially useful in influencing neutral opinion as Canada was to the USA. In terms of internal political character, with no extra-European populations akin to Boers or French Canadians, their internal political situations were also less dangerous. Despite the difficulties of the national government in New Zealand, and the conscription debate in both nations, especially Australia, such issues were internal rather than imperial political matters, and so Britain did not intervene.[99] Therefore, due to geographic proximity, and an appearance of external similarity, the two Dominions were often grouped together, as with propaganda distribution from Britain; Australia and New Zealand were conceptualised as 'Australasia'. This reflects a central issue of New Zealand identity within the British world, specifically the significance of Australasia and the 'Tasman world' in New Zealand's self-perception.

This British emphasis on 'Australasia' is significant, as is the concept of 'Australasia' itself to New Zealand identity. Particularly relevant is the intersection of New Zealand's 'British' and 'Australasian' identities during the war. As Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall note, it is striking that, despite the historical and

[96] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[97] Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', pp.298-301.
[98] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', p.13; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.297; Pocock, 'Neo-Britains', p.189.
[99] TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 'Raemaeker's cartoons', 15 December, 1915, p.639.

geographic proximity of New Zealand and Australia, since the late nineteenth century their relationship has been characterised by efforts to ignore each other.[100] Cultural nationalist Sinclar has reinforced this by arguing that antipathy to Australia was a long-evident feature of New Zealand identity, which stalled pro-federation sentiments,[101] while Belich argues that the process of 'recolonisation' diminished New Zealand's engagement with 'Australasia' as a grounding regional community and identity.[102] However, the networks of Britain's propaganda campaign suggest this process was more complex. New Zealand's rejection of 'Australasian' identity is accurate, to an extent. For instance, during both the First and Second World Wars, for all the prominence and endurance of the ANZAC myth of Australian and New Zealand national-realisation, and the emergence of an enduring 'ANZAC' bond on the slopes of Gallipoli,[103] trans-Tasman interaction during both world wars has also been highlighted as being competitive and divisive, particularly during the Second World War.[104] The content of New Zealand's First World War propaganda certainly indicates that 'British' identity was more important to cultural constructions of the war than 'Australasian' identity, and that New Zealand firmly placed itself, at least culturally, in a 'British world' during the war.[105] However, while New Zealand's Tasman world relationship was clearly defined through mutual disregard and largely good-willed hostility, the Australian tie was still central to New Zealand's identity, and more immediately, its place in Britain's propaganda network. Specifically, the organisational significance of 'Australasia' reinforces the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of space in the British world, and between Britain's and New Zealand's constructions.

The most telling indication of Australia and New Zealand's treatment as 'Australasia' in Britain's propaganda organisation is a series of WO maps from 1917 showing networks of propaganda distribution by continent. As Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall argue, maps of 'Australasia' are useful to understand the changing ways that Europeans conceptualised the region,[106] specifically in this case,

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[100] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering, pp.13-14; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.299.
[101] Sinclair, 'Colonial nationalism', pp.115-118; Jebb, *Colonial Nationalism*, pp.87-88.
[102] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p.46-52.
[103] Olssen, 'A Nation', p.321; King, *New Zealanders at War*, p.131; see also, Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p.159.
[104] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', p.22; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* p.117-118; Pocock, 'Antipodean perception', pp.17-18.
[105] See above, Chapter 1, pp.36-50.
[106] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', pp.16-17.

how Britain conceptualised Australia and New Zealand within its global propaganda networks. In these maps, organised broadly by region, Australia and New Zealand were treated as one unit broad regional area. The only map for the region features Australia, with points indicating the networks from which New Zealand would be supplied (Figure 12). This map is a telling indication of New Zealand's place in Britain's propaganda networks, and in the British world more widely. Though New Zealand is absent from the map, it is clear that New Zealand and Australia were treated as one regional community; the map indicates that films to 'Australasia' were distributed through the War Office Cinematograph Committee (WOCC). Britain's conception of Australasia, and its other Dominions, in its maps of distribution is fairly consistent with the overall approach to imperial propaganda of the CO. Maps featuring Canada and South Africa (Figures 13 & 14) are much more sophisticated, portraying detailed local networks of distribution, specifically in relation to their important neighbours, such as the USA. The Australasian map's conversely more simplistic character, with fewer networks and points of distribution, reflects Britain's perception of the antipodean Dominions, and the comparative importance placed on the USA and Africa regarding distribution. Australasia, as self-sufficient and largely unproblematic, was seen to be able to handle its own distribution with limited input from Britain, in a sense affirming British confidence in Australasia through an 'inverse privilege'. In this sense, Britain's 'neglect' of Australia and New Zealand in propaganda distribution equated as much to a sense of trust, that the Dominions were loyal and could organise their own campaigns. The creation of a map for Australasia at all in this light shows notable consideration from Britain. This categorisation made practical sense, as Australia and New Zealand were indeed isolated and unproblematic within the wider scope of Britain's propaganda. However, this contrasted sharply to New Zealand's firm placement of itself in a British world, closely associated with Britain, in the content of its propaganda. This once again highlights the contrast between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world spaces. As much as New Zealand's 'British' identity was preeminent, while 'Australasia' ceased to be a guiding light for New Zealand ambitions,[107] its practical, geographic position in the Tasman world still informed New Zealand's war experience, even if

[107] Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* p.46-52

not completely with enthusiasm or pride.[108] Although the British world clearly informed New Zealand's cultural constructions and identifications, Tasman world connections were often more defining of organisational relations with Britain.

This endurance of 'Australasia', particularly in British organisational categories and approaches, despite the concept's lack of relevance by the early-twentieth century in New Zealand and Australian identity, demonstrates that a 'Tasman world' still had significance (particularly practical), especially to British propaganda networks. While 'Australasia' had flexible meanings, 'Tasman world' refers to the 'communities of interest' and enduring connections and interactions between Australia and New Zealand that were central to the formation and identities of both countries.[109] Mein Smith and Hempenstall suggest no contradiction in New Zealand seeking to ignore or deny the influence of Australia or the 'Tasman world', but still being deeply affected by it.[110] Clearly, regarding organisation and practical connection, Britain still considered New Zealand part of 'Australasia' during the war. What matters in discussing New Zealand's national identity and 'Dominion perspective', and its broader position in the empire, is the clear endurance and significance of trans-Tasman links, and the concept of 'Australasia' as a grounding regional concept, even if this was an undesirable conceptualisation, unenthusiastically engaged with, in New Zealand.

[108] See, Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.298.
[109] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', pp.18-19; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.298.
[110] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', p.14.



Figure 12 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent - Australian Map.

Figure 13 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent – North American Map.



Figure 14 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent – South African Map.

The endurance of the Tasman world, and the contested endurance of 'Australasia' yet again illustrates the complexity of the British world. Extending Pietsch's argument against seeing the British world as one coherent, geographically-defined unit, it interacted with other regional communities and constructions.[111]

[111] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

Investigating these interactions is a vital part of Pocock's original plea to re-evaluate the British world.[112] In investigating the interaction between the British and Tasman worlds in New Zealand, it is clear that neither should be neglected. Though 'Australasia' ceased to hold the same cultural relevance, New Zealand's place in the Tasman world continued to be defining in an organisational sense. Conversely, despite the British world's cultural relevance to New Zealand identity and constructions of the war, practical inhibitions often meant that this community was not operationally realised, at least in the way New Zealand expected or desired. As Hall argues for the empire in British politics, even in its apparent absence, the Tasman world was significant to New Zealand's conception of itself.[113] It certainly seems clear that 'Australasia' was still central to Britain's propaganda networks, and to how Britain viewed the region.

As ever, Dominion pride meant New Zealand took issue with this British approach, and complained at the impact of the conceptual placement of New Zealand as part of 'Australasia' in Britain's propaganda networks, further spurring Dominion tensions and competition. New Zealand often took offence at unfavourable comparisons to Australia, and to being portrayed as the 'junior partner' of Australasia. For instance, New Zealand often had to refute claims that its introduction of conscription in 1916 showed its weakness and lack of enthusiasm for the war, compared to Australia's rejection of conscription. In August 1916, New Zealand complained to the CO regarding a recent piece in *The Times* concerning Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes' visit to London. New Zealand claimed the piece contained an unfavourable portrayal of New Zealand's introduction of conscription as denoting lack of enthusiasm for the war, compared with Australia's rejection of conscription as denoting continued dedication. New Zealand officials claimed this was not the first time the Northcliffe press had offended New Zealand, and that such comments would only cause friction and disharmony between the Dominions.[114] Following correspondence from the New Zealand High Commissioner, Thomas Mackenzie, *The Times* issued a limited apology, stating it was not its intention to offend New Zealand pride, indeed praising New Zealand's efforts, but did not retract

[112] Pocock, 'Antipodean perception', pp.20-23; see also, Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', pp.298-301.
[113] Hall, 'British World', p.36.
[114] TNA:PRO, CO 209/288 – 40961 'Voluntary System and Compulsion Bill – statement in "Times"' (28 August, 1916), p.813.

its comments.[115] As usual in such disputes, the CO supported New Zealand.[116] Crucially, these rejections of 'Australasia' in New Zealand were based on portrayals of New Zealand as 'Australasian' in Britain. What offended New Zealand politicians most was a perceived questioning of New Zealand's independent Britishness, and its enthusiasm for the war, further demonstrating the central importance of shared Britishness in New Zealand's identity formation. However, rejecting the connection between Australia and New Zealand was also cause for complaint. In 1917, complaints emerged regarding the WO's failure to inform the New Zealand government of Australia's permission to reduce its reinforcement contributions, as the WO had not anticipated New Zealand and Australia would want such information on each other's actions.[117] In this case, through ignoring supposedly redundant 'Tasman world' connections, the WO misread the level of competition between New Zealand and Australia, and caused tensions. Clearly, Tasman world identities still mattered when they intersected and interfered with New Zealand's 'British' identity.[118]

Looking more specifically at New Zealand, it is clear that New Zealand occupied a distinct place in Britain's propaganda networks, within both the category of self-governing Dominions, and the Tasman world, which influenced its organisational, practical connection to Britain. More than any other Dominion, New Zealand reflects the scarce nature of British wartime propaganda to the Dominions. New Zealand was the smallest and least significant part of the most non-problematic group – Australasia – within the lowest priority of Britain's propaganda campaign, the self-governing Dominions. New Zealand was isolated, even more than Australia, by its distance from Britain in the Pacific.[119] Its size and small population compared to Canada and Australia meant New Zealand could never command the same attention from Britain as its larger fellow Dominions. This is clearly illustrated in New Zealand's absence from the WO's map of propaganda distribution by continent; the only reference to New Zealand is a note stating, "distribution in New Zealand through steamship [companies] and business firms" (Figure 12). New Zealand was never a

[115] TNA:PRO, CO 209/288 – 40961 'Voluntary System and Compulsion Bill – statement in "Times"' (28 August, 1916), p.815.
[116] TNA:PRO, CO 209/288 – 40961 'Voluntary System and Compulsion Bill – statement in "Times"' (28 August, 1916), p.816.
[117] TNA:PRO, CO 537/1120 Reinforcements, rate of (September 1917), p.1; see also, Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p.164.
[118] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', p.15; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[119] Pocock, 'Neo-Britains', p.189.

practical priority to Britain's propaganda campaign. Its isolation and distance from Britain meant that all of its propaganda was first sent through Australia – New Zealand was at the end of the Australian line of communication. The effect was to leave New Zealand's propaganda stranded and isolated. Little was sent from Britain to New Zealand, while New Zealand did little to try to impose itself any further. This isolation, therefore, informed New Zealand's approach to propaganda. It could not 'rely' on British propaganda, but still enthusiastically expressed Britishness through its use of 'British' wartime rhetoric. This tension of 'Dominion perspective' was what caused mild conflict in Britain's relations with the Dominions.

While British approaches often sought to manage the difficult balance between accommodating 'Dominion perspective', and responding to practical realties of the war and the British world, misunderstandings of how the Dominions saw themselves caused discontent and offence. Though some complaints were practically unreasonable, they reflect the importance of Dominion status to self-perception in the British world. This reflects the distinction between 'imagined' and 'operational' British world spaces in Britain's imperial propaganda networks, and the impact of divergent interpretations of Dominion status and the British world community, particularly in New Zealand's relation to 'Australasia'. While shared Britishness was centrally important to informing New Zealand's approach to propaganda, and conceptualisation of the war, consensus was often difficult in the British world.

The complexity and contestability of Dominion status made interaction between Britain and the Dominions complicated and potentially problematic. The CO's approach to imperial propaganda tried to accommodate the various, sometimes contradictory, impulses of 'Dominion perspective', treating the Dominions as a unified and superior group within the empire, while also attempting to accommodate and celebrate local divergence and achievement. Almost inevitably, criticisms emerged against this approach, due not only to the competitive nature of Dominion identity, but also to long-standing frustrations at the Dominions' organisational position in Britain, such as its continued involvement with the CO, as not properly reflecting the importance of Dominion status. The war only highlighted and exacerbated these issues of British world interaction. New Zealand was particularly disadvantaged, as its size, distance from Britain, frequent conflation within 'Australasia', and comparatively settled internal politics, meant it received the least

attention of all of the Dominions in propaganda distribution and press coverage. Practically, New Zealand was at the end of the Australian line of distribution. New Zealand's connection to Britain was still clearly important to identity, but due to its geographic distance, and practical realities of the British world during the war, close association with Britain was difficult to achieve. This clearly illustrates the complexity of the British world, and the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world spaces; while New Zealand clearly imagined itself in a close British world community with Britain, as something of a 'hinterland' to Britain,[120] in a practical sense New Zealand was fairly disconnected from Britain, and the Tasman world often remained a more immediately relevant organisational community. This situation, then, along with New Zealand's own 'Dominion perspective', informed the organisation of its own official propaganda, specifically its isolated and self-sufficient tone.

[120] Barnes, *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10; 'Familiar London', pp.337-339.

Chapter 3: Disconnection and Self-sufficiency: New Zealand Propaganda Organisation, 1914-1918

As with New Zealand's engagement with 'British' rhetoric in the content of its propaganda, the organisation of New Zealand's wartime propaganda campaign was more complex than a simple 'reliance' on British material or assistance.[1] Britain's application of concepts of Dominion status and responsible government in its imperial propaganda distribution, combined with practical limitations of British world interaction, limited the extent of New Zealand's direct connection to Britain's propaganda campaign. Accordingly, New Zealand's propaganda campaign was isolated and autonomous, determined by national, practical considerations. In an immediate sense, New Zealand's propaganda was disconnected from Britain. As they did for Britain's approaches to the Dominions, issues of cost, capacity, and official resources determined the extent of the New Zealand government's campaign, while social and political developments, notably the conscription crisis of 1915-1916, informed the direction of the campaign. Ostensibly, New Zealand's propaganda campaign appeared definitively 'national', and disconnected from the British world. However, more deeply, New Zealand's British world connections, and its internalisation of shared Britishness, expressed so confidently in the content of its propaganda, were extremely important and formative for New Zealand's official campaign. Following Pocock's model of British world history, this chapter examines New Zealand's official propaganda campaign as a national, locally-defined development, still fundamentally within, and as a development of, a wider British framework.[2] Despite its organisational disconnection from Britain, New Zealand's internalised British identity remained important in terms of the content and general approaches of its official propaganda campaign.[3] As with the internalisation of 'British' rhetoric in the content of New Zealand's official wartime propaganda,[4] New Zealand's official campaign was grounded in shared assumptions and approaches to Britain's campaign, regularly referring to British examples and experience for guidance, which were then adapted and applied to suit local needs. This inter-

[1] See above, Chapter 1, pp.28-29; see also, Gibson, 'Posters', pp.73-74; Grant, *Field Punishment*, p.15.
[2] Pocock, 'Antipodean perception', pp.6-7.
[3] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[4] See above, Chapter 1, pp.36-50; see also, Barnes, 'Familiar London', p.398; *New Zealand's London*, pp.2-4.

dependence of national and imperial identities,[5] and the practical, organisational significance of New Zealand's British identity, despite New Zealand's practical isolation from Britain, illustrates New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective', and its significance to the operation of its war effort. This also reinforces the central argument of the operation of the British world; while ideological identifications with Britishness in New Zealand were strong and formative, the nature of Britain and New Zealand's organizational relationship and connection was vastly different. Therefore, the isolation, and national focus of New Zealand's propaganda campaign did not denote disconnection from shared imperial Britishness, but reflected what this identification meant in practice. Specifically, this chapter explores the tensions between membership of the British world and the Tasman world in New Zealand. Though 'British' identities were clearly more important, Tasman world connections were often more practically relevant to New Zealand's propaganda organization during the war.[6]

This chapter gives a broad overview of New Zealand's wartime propaganda campaign, its basic methodology and organisation, and the main government departments involved. It then looks more closely at the trajectory and development of the campaign, and how New Zealand's conscription crisis necessitated renewed efforts and innovations. Throughout, it is argued that while the campaign was autonomously directed and defined, it was connected to and influenced by British developments and shared British world perspectives.

The efforts of the CO to restrict British propaganda to the Dominions meant New Zealand's propaganda campaign developed largely independently. Outwardly Britain's and New Zealand's campaigns bear little resemblance or explicitly obvious connection to each other. New Zealand's propaganda campaign was understandably much more limited than Britain's, and failed to produce the extent of original propaganda, such as the striking, original, illustrated official posters that represented one of the main propaganda legacies of the war, that Britain, and indeed the other Dominions, did so prolifically.[7] A significant reason for this, also a recurrent theme of New Zealand's propaganda campaign, was cost and capacity. As John Connor argues

[5] On which, see Pickles, *Female imperialism*, p.16.
[6] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', pp. 13-14; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', pp.297-298; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p.46.
[7] Aulich and Hewitt, *Seduction or instruction*, p.53; 106.

for New Zealand's overall war effort, New Zealand's small size and limited resources, especially compared to large, prosperous fellow Dominions of Canada and Australia, and of course to Britain, restricted New Zealand's actions, and meant it had to stretch and creatively tailor its resources from the beginning of the war.[8] New Zealand was thus not able to create a propaganda campaign of comparable sophistication to its imperial counterparts. Similarly, New Zealand had none of the pressures of appealing to multiple neutral, allied, and enemy audiences, besides home propaganda, that Britain did, and so had a much smaller official propaganda output. While Britain began the war with unprepared, haphazard, and improvised propaganda machinery, but which would by the war's end become "the most highly developed organisation of all the belligerents for influencing public opinion,"[9] New Zealand's propaganda throughout the war remained much more limited, muddled, not dissimilar from that of the Boer War. Ultimately, the character of New Zealand's propaganda was determined by practical considerations of capacity and funding.

The constraints of cost and capacity partly explain the New Zealand government's initial reliance on the public to take control of wartime propaganda and patriotic activity. However, as Gwen Parsons argues, a belief in the voluntary spirit was also strong amongst the New Zealand public, and defined New Zealand's war effort. As in the Boer War, when supplying and supporting the expeditionary force was funded by public initiative, early in the First World War, a great deal of the New Zealand public, particularly the enthusiastic local elite and middle class, eagerly took control of patriotic activity through a multitude of patriotic funds and fundraising events, which remained fiercely local and parochial throughout the war. Patriotic societies such as the Victoria League were especially active in this direction.[10] In terms of propaganda, examples such as Frederick Ferriman's distribution of the 'Why Britain is at War' poster, or publications such as *Countess Liverpool's Gift Book,* demonstrate the public was willing and eager to initiate propaganda, while still following British models, such as Lady Liverpool's work as a New Zealand re-

[8] John Connor, *ANZAC and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations of Australian Defence,* (Cambridge: 2011), p.124; Malcolm McKinnon, *Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury 1840-2000,* (Auckland: 2003), pp.83-85; see also, G.R. Hawke, *The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History,* (Cambridge: 1985), p.120.
[9] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.1.
[10] Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-420; Olssen, 'Waging War', p.308; Pickles, 'Victoria League', pp.34-35; Pugsley, *Scars*, p.51; Hucker, 'When the Empire Calls', pp.16-20.

creation of Queen Mary's work in Britain.[11] Such reliance on public involvement in one sense only reinforces the local, disconnected nature of New Zealand's propaganda campaign; reliance on public initiative and local control of propaganda and patriotic funds was cost effective for the government, and allowed expressions of local pride and loyalty.[12] However, this insular, local character did not preclude continued association with wider British identities in New Zealand; rather, the two were interconnected in 'Dominion perspective', with distinctly New Zealand efforts also fulfilling imperial duties and pride.[13] In a wider sense, this initial character of New Zealand's propaganda campaign, as a combination of limited 'official' efforts, supplemented by public action, illustrates New Zealand's identification with shared Britishness.

Identification with shared Britishness informed the New Zealand government's approach to propaganda. Though Britain's campaign developed over the course of the war to be a much more extensive and varied campaign, the initial official belief that propaganda should operate as it had during the nineteenth century, out of the hands of politicians and under public initiative, was also held in Britain at the beginning of the war.[14] Despite practical differences, New Zealand's propaganda campaign fit within a wider British framework because it began from shared 'British' assumptions of the place of propaganda. The initial direction of Britain's propaganda was for the government to control as little as possible; Wellington House and the Press Bureau were to issue 'official' statements to neutral nations, with an emphasis on 'fact', while the majority of domestic propaganda would be left to the public, with some limited government involvement, such as through Britain's Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC).[15] This approach was shared by New Zealand. James Allen emphasised the restrained nature of New Zealand's official propaganda, stating the government had "been doing our best in a quiet, unostentatious way, which is the best way after all."[16] A piece in the *Evening Post* from 1915 illustrates that this style was initially what was desired from the government:

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[11] ANZ, R 22432762 – Allen to Ferriman, 22 December 1915; see also, above, Chapter 1, pp.31-34; Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation', pp.82-84.
[12] Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-420; Olssen, 'Waging War', p.308.
[13] Pickles, *Female imperialism,* p.16; Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation', pp.81-82, 88-90.
[14] De Groot, *Blighty*, p.174-5; Reeves, *Film Propaganda*, p.10; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.3.
[15] Reeves, *Film Propaganda*, p.10
[16] Letter from Allen to Mackenzie, 25 September, 1915, cited in, Baker, *King and Country,* p.34.

> We should unhesitatingly prefer the drab, pedestrian, Blue-book style in which the present Government dissembles its own feelings … The most ardent admirer of the plain style will assuredly be unable to detect the faintest suspicion of flummery in the speech delivered by His Excellency [Lord Liverpool] yesterday.[17]

The New Zealand government's reliance on its public for initial propaganda organisation, limiting its own propaganda to official, restrained efforts, was not simply due to lack of funds, though this was important, or lack of action due to a reliance on Britain, but rather due to an adherence to a broader British approach to propaganda,[18] illustrating the official, organisational manifestation of internalisation of 'British' ideals, similar to the engagement with Britishness in the content of New Zealand's propaganda. In that sense, New Zealand's propaganda organisation illustrates J.G.A. Pocock's interpretation of British world history. Though the character and focus of New Zealand's propaganda campaign was national, and self-sufficient, it was informed by shared British understandings and approaches, and operated within a wider British tradition.[19] That the two campaigns then diverged is evidence of the interdependence of imperial and national identities in New Zealand during the war – adherence to British principles enabled expression of national identity, rather than blind re-creation of British forms. This suggests that while there were disparities between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world spaces and connections between Britain and New Zealand,[20] an internalised Britishness remained important to New Zealand, even in an organisational sense, and even in relative practical isolation from Britain.[21] Furthermore, this shared belief in the voluntary spirit and public patriotism formed a central part of British world interaction. Patriotic societies such as the Victoria League, the Navy League, and Canada's Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire were crucial to the formation and continuation of imperial relationships between the Dominions and Britain, and the promotion of imperial Britishness. Such organisations formed important public networks of imperial

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[17] 'The Governor's Speech', *Evening Post,* 26 June 1915, p.6.
[18] De Groot, *Blighty*, p.174-5; Reeves, *Film Propaganda*, (London: 1986), p.10.
[19] Pocock, 'Antipodean perception', pp.6, 21-23.
[20] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[21] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.

interaction and were, of course, extremely active during the war.[22] Clearly, strong public initiative and involvement was central to the formation of British world networks and the creation of shared imperial Britishness, not limited to either Britain or New Zealand.

Thus, New Zealand's propaganda campaign, though reasonably isolated and disconnected from Britain, inward looking, and nationally focused and organised, was formed within a wider British framework. This illustrates the interaction of 'national' and 'imperial' sentiments in New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective'; neither focus was predominant, as an association with shared Britishness facilitated the expression of national character. This reliance on British approaches continued throughout the war, as New Zealand constantly looked to British examples for the development of its official propaganda campaign. For instance, during New Zealand's conscription crisis in 1915 and 1916, which defined the development of the campaign, New Zealand looked to Britain's propaganda organisation for direction. Issues of national resources and capacity, and the impact of national developments such as the conscription crisis were immediately important, but this national focus was not at odds with association with wider British identities. Instead, association with Britishness allowed expression of New Zealand identity, just as in New Zealand's use of 'British' propaganda rhetoric. Therefore, this interplay between national and imperial identities, central to 'Dominion perspective', had wider, practical, political, social, and organisational implications.

While the New Zealand government's official propaganda campaign was informed by a wider 'British' approach to propaganda, as New Zealand constantly looked to Britain's propaganda work as an exemplar, British approaches and experience were always applied according to national needs and developments. Elements of national character and British influences were equally important. Though similarly disorganised at the outset of the war, New Zealand's more centralised government meant that its propaganda campaign was much more limited and condensed than Britain's.[23] The main government bodies responsible for propaganda were the Defence Department and the Treasury. Beyond these, New Zealand did not

[22] Pickles, *Female imperialism*, p.4-8, 16-17; Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.29-32; Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, p.3; Hendley, *Organised Patriotism*, pp.3-4, 7-10.
[23] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.15; Hawke, *Making of New Zealand*, p.105; McKinnon, *Treasury*, p.83.

create specific government organisations for the control of propaganda as Britain did, though the government certainly looked to these British developments for inspiration. Semi-official organisations established later in the war, such as the PRB, and the National Efficiency Board (NEB), became involved in propaganda to a limited extent, and specific propaganda appointments evoked British examples on a much smaller scale. Overall, the character of New Zealand's propaganda campaign remained limited, prioritised efficiency and cost effectiveness, and followed broadly the same practices and systems throughout the war. Significant change and development only occurred in response to major problems like the conscription crisis.

The Treasury took considerable initiative in creating propaganda throughout the war, in relation to war loans. In 1915 the New Zealand public began calling for a war loan in the same manner as Britain, even suggesting New Zealand citizens should donate to the British loan if the New Zealand government did not institute its own, reinforcing an easy association with Britain. Finally in 1915 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Joseph Ward announced a New Zealand war loan.[24] War loans were thereafter issued for every year of the war, and into the post-war years to finance repatriation work for soldiers.[25] The attendant propaganda associated with these loans was extensive, encompassing posters, flyers, pamphlets, and press advertisements. By the end of the war, the Treasury even began to out-pace the Defence Department in its production of propaganda material.

The NEB was a semi-official government board, established by Allen in 1917 in response to public calls for improved industrial relations and efficiency in the war effort, with the remit of national planning and education towards national and industrial efficiency for post-war New Zealand.[26] In this way, New Zealand linked with Empire-wide concerns for 'national efficiency'. Since the Boer War, concerns had spread throughout the Empire, from Britain, regarding the degeneration of the British race, and the need for 'efficiency' and organisation to rejuvenate the Empire

[24] 'New Zealand Finance', *Northern Advocate,* 29 June 1915, p.3; see also, McKinnon, *Treasury,* pp.85-86.
[25] ANZ, R 10560719 – Secretary to the Treasury memorandum to the Traffic Inspector, New Zealand Railways, Wellington, 22 October 1920.
[26] Baker, *King and Country*, p.138; John E. Martin, 'Blueprint for the Future? "National Efficiency" and the First World War', in *New Zealand's Great War: New Zealand, the Allies and the First World War*, ed. John Crawford & Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007), p.520.

and the British race.[27] The cult of 'efficiency' thus became a popular and pervasive imperial discourse, and the NEB sprang from such discussions. However, the NEB had questionable success. It only met a handful of times, instituting one major initiative, due to Massey and Ward's continued suspicion and scepticism of the board, and the NEB's internal disputes and discord.[28] In spite of this, and although it was not a dedicated propaganda body, it created limited amounts of its own propaganda, such as poster campaigns to alert farmer reservists of their obligations under the Military Service Act,[29] and pamphlets on matters of industrial efficiency, such as women's employment in industry.[30] It was also active in exchanging propaganda material and pamphlets with other parts of the empire, particularly Australian organisations, and received British parliamentary reports on matters of efficiency and industry.[31] In this way, the board was active in Empire-wide discussions of 'efficiency', and was an agent of the exchange and interaction of such ideas throughout the British world, if only in a limited way.

New Zealand's High Commissioner, Lord Liverpool, was also involved in propaganda, as the main channel through which propaganda flowed from Britain during the war, conforming to the CO's policy of propaganda exchange.[32] The New Zealand Railways Department, the Government Printing Office, and the Advertising Office of the Department of Internal Affairs were also all involved on the supply and distribution side.[33] Throughout the war, all departments creating propaganda followed a general procedure for its creation and distribution, devised early on in the war, and adapted little throughout the war, which again prioritised cost effectiveness and efficiency. Proofs of propaganda publications were sent from their respective government bodies to the Government Printing Offices, conforming to the government's established simple, letterpress style.[34] Included would be instructions advising numbers to be printed, and where material should be sent to around New

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[27] G.R. Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politic and Political Thought, 1899-1914,* (Berkley and Los Angeles, CA: 1971), pp.35-54; G.R. Searle, *A New England?: Peace and War 1886-1918,* (Oxford: 2004), pp.302-306.
[28] Baker, *King and Country*, pp.139-140; Martin, 'Blueprint', p.521.
[29] ANZ, R 3090828 – Ferguson, Chairman of NEB to Allen, 27 March 1917.
[30] ANZ, R 3090761 – 'Women's War Work' pamphlet, National Efficiency Board, Government Printer, 1917.
[31] ANZ, R 3090731 – Under Secretary of the Department of Information to Secretary of NEB, 9 May 1919.
[32] ANZ, R 22434750 – Allen to Lord Liverpool, 6 June, 1918; see above, Chapter 2, p.64.
[33] E.g., ANZ, R 10560716 – Secretary to the Treasury memorandum to the Traffic Inspector, New Zealand Railways, Wellington, 11th August, 1917.
[34] Gibson, 'Posters', pp.73-74; see also, Chapter 1, pp.25-28.

Zealand,[35] typically police stations, post offices, and especially railway stations. Many government departments had contracts with New Zealand Railways to advertise on railway property before the war.[36] Railway stations were key locations for government propaganda; Treasury war loan posters were sent in their thousands to flag stations in fourteen different locations, major centres and small towns, throughout New Zealand regularly for each war loan campaign, as were PRB and NEB posters.[37] Advertising at railway stations ensured wide exposure due to rail's continued importance as a means of travel in New Zealand during the war, especially among labourers.[38] Display on railway property was also highly cost effective, due to New Zealand Railways' concession of allowing payment for advertising space for the Defence Department during the war, to be deferred until after the war.[39] This system was the standard for official propaganda distribution throughout the war. However, more broadly, New Zealand's official propaganda campaign also underwent significant changes and expansions, determined by national developments.

The most significant government body involved in propaganda creation and distribution was surely the Defence Department. The Defence Department organised the government's earliest propaganda through its Military Districts, and created most of the government's official, letterpress posters. The Defence Department's efforts once again reinforce the limited nature of New Zealand's official propaganda, dependent on national capacity. As one of the first actions of the government's propaganda campaign, the Defence Department introduced a series of small advertisements outlining regulations and calls for recruits in local newspapers, run by the Group Commanders of the various New Zealand military districts, and was

[35] For a Treasury example see, ANZ, R 22504954 – G.F.C. Campbell, Secretary to the Treasury to Government Printer, 11 August, 1917; for a NEB example see, ANZ, R 3090828 – Ferguson, Chairman to NEB to Officer in Charge of Advertising Office, New Zealand Railways Department, 28 March 1917.
[36] ANZ, R 10508136 – List of Government Departments Exhibiting Notices at Railway Stations, 27 May 1915.
[37] ANZ, R 10560716 – Secretary to the Treasury memorandum to Traffic Inspector, New Zealand Railways, Wellington, 6 October 1915; 5 August 1916; 11 August 1917; 11 March 1918; For PRB see, ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray (Secretary of Parliamentary Recruiting Board) to Assistant-General Manager of New Zealand Railways, 15 August 1916); for NEB see, ANZ, R 3090828 – Ferguson, Chairman of NEB to Officer-in-Charge Advertising Office, New Zealand Railways, 28 March 1917.
[38] James Watson, *Links: A History of Transport and New Zealand Society*, (Wellington: 1996), pp.99, 107.
[39] ANZ, R 10508136 – Railway Advertising Officer Memorandum, 2 December 1916; New Zealand Railway Department Head Office Circular, 3 January 1917; Railway Advertising Office memorandum 1 December, 1915; 2 December 1916; List of Government Departments Exhibiting Notices at Railway Stations, 27 May 1915.

therefore largely local. These advertisements were placed in newspapers in November 1914, when the initial burst of recruits began to slow.[40] However, the system was limited by the Department's desire to reduce costs; it was frequently questioned whether advertisements placed in local papers justified the expense.[41] Echoing the non-illustrative nature of New Zealand's letterpress propaganda posters, the advertisements themselves were extremely basic; even the inclusion of the Royal Arms was deemed an extravagance to be omitted. The advertisements simply informed men of how and where to enlist.[42] Such basic propaganda continued throughout 1914 and 1915, supplemented by a loose Defence Department campaign of letterpress posters and speaking tours of politicians, particularly the Defence Minister, James Allen, to call for recruits, and inform men of the process. Political speeches unsurprisingly contained the most fulsome expressions of propaganda rhetoric of the government's campaign at this time; as such newspapers remained a vital tool in communicating such propaganda speeches throughout the country to a wider audience.[43] At this point extensive propaganda seemed unnecessary due to the groundswell of emotion and enthusiasm resulting from the Gallipoli campaign, which helped to return recruiting numbers in mid-1915 to near the levels of the initial burst in August 1914. Furthermore, though dissenting propaganda certainly existed, it was marginalised and reasonably limited during this period.[44] This policy was sufficient until the recruiting crisis of mid-1915, when recruiting numbers began to drop, and calls for conscription emerged.

Reinforcing the significance of national developments in the development of New Zealand's official propaganda campaign, New Zealand's conscription crisis of late 1915 and 1916 significantly impacted on its war effort, and specifically affected and changed the government's approach to propaganda methods and organisation. However, these changes were still strongly influenced by British examples. From late 1915, New Zealand faced a recruitment crisis, as numbers dropped, partly in response

[40] ANZ, R 22434550 – New Zealand Defence Forces General Headquarters Memorandum, 16 November 1914.
[41] ANZ, R 22434550 – Allen to Commandant of Nelson, 25 June 1915; Defence Department memorandum, 15 February 1916; New Zealand Military Forces Headquarters memorandum, 26 July 1916.
[42] ANZ, R 22434550 – New Zealand Military Forces Headquarters memorandum, 3 September 1915.
[43] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.55-57.
[44] Baker, *King and Country*, pp.25-26, Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.550-551.

to New Zealand's realisation of the reality of war through returned soldiers, ever-growing casualty lists, and outbreaks of influenza, measles, and spinal meningitis at Trentham military camp.[45] As the government panicked it would not be able to meet its reinforcement contributions, a wide social debate erupted, exacerbating existing social and class tensions, between those who saw conscription as necessary for the proper operation of New Zealand's war effort and domestic industries, and those who saw it as unnecessary, inherently objectionable, classist, unfair, unpatriotic, un-British, shameful or restrictive. This was not a simple left-right dispute, but cut across several social groups and classes.[46] Eventually conscription was generally seen as inevitable and necessary, and was introduced through the Military Service Act of 1916. However, the crisis gave the government legitimate and continued cause for concern, encouraging dissent and hardening the labour movement against the war.[47] Labour relations were already delicate at the start of the war having threatened to break out into open violence in 1912, so the government was always conscious of labour sentiments, and avoided deliberately agitating the labour movement.[48] Those calling for conscription were often just as vociferous. Some even believed the crisis could spill over into civil war.[49] The crisis caused social fissures, and invigorated the labour movement, which gained momentum, and formation as a political party in New Zealand as a result of the crisis.[50] The crisis also demonstrates that New Zealand society was not as unified or unanimously enthusiastic for war as the CO assumed, reflected in its decision that propaganda was unnecessary in New Zealand due to loyalty and enthusiasm.[51] New Zealand's official propaganda campaign changed significantly in response to this national crisis, in both organisation and approach, including the emergence of the PRB, which led to an increased centralisation and professionalization of New Zealand's official propaganda. The crisis dramatically demonstrated to New Zealand politicians, particularly Allen and Massey, that more

[45] Baker, *King and Country*, p.31-34; Parsons, 'Home Front', p.421; Olssen, 'Waging War', pp.304-306; Pugsley, *Scars*, pp.97-98; Margaret Levi, 'The Institution of Conscription', *Social Science History,* 20:1, (1996), pp.141-143.
[46] Baker, *King and Country*, p.42-46; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp.98-103; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.553-555; Levi, 'Institution of Conscription', pp.141-143.
[47] Baker, *King and Country*, p.31-34, 42-46, 64-70; Gustafson, *Labour's Path*, pp.108-109; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.553-555; Eldred-Grigg, *Great Wrong War*, pp.18-19; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.98-103; Levi, 'Institution of Conscription', pp.141-143.
[48] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand*, p.60.
[49] Olssen, 'Waging War', p.304.
[50] Gustafson, *Labour's Path,* pp.105-108; Parsons, 'Home Front', p.421.
[51] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.224-227; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.550-551; see above, Chapter 2, pp.62-69.

extensive engagement with national opinion through official propaganda was necessary. From late 1915, criticism was particularly directed towards the disorganisation of the government's recruiting campaign.[52] In response, from early 1916 the government expanded its propaganda output, utilised new materials and approaches, and professionalised its organisation. While these changes were in response to a national crisis, reinforcing the New Zealand campaign's insular focus, the campaign also utilised British examples and identifications with shared Britishness in this development, in the same way it actively engaged with 'British' propaganda rhetoric.

New Zealand's assumed 'Britishness' was an important dimension of the conscription crisis. One of the central issues of the debate was how conscription would affect New Zealand's 'British' identity. Many believed New Zealand should not introduce conscription as it would reflect poorly on New Zealand's enthusiasm for the war, while others believed it would be disrespectful to introduce conscription before Britain had.[53] The very issue of conscription also threw up issues for New Zealand's strong identification with rhetorical British morality, a key component of which was an aversion to militarism and compulsion. Conscription was seen by some as a betrayal of these values, something that had been debated during New Zealand's introduction of compulsory military training in 1909.[54] Conscription was also seen as a betrayal of the ideology of New Zealand as 'Better Britain'; an important dimension of New Zealand's association with a shared British heritage was that settlers were escaping the evils of the 'old world', particularly class and the evils of urban and industrial life, and rejuvenating the British race. Introducing conscription was seen as a potential return to such evils, an indication of the waning vitality of New Zealand's settler population, as 'Better Britons' should not need to be conscripted.[55] Conversely, association with British rhetoric and atrocity propaganda also spurred conscription in New Zealand. As Pickles argues, the execution of Edith Cavell encouraged acceptance of conscription in New Zealand and Canada in the same way it did for Britain.[56] Once Britain finally did introduce conscription in 1916, the path was laid for New Zealand, and the government followed British organisational examples to

[52] Baker, *King and Country*, p.32.
[53] Baker, *King and Country*, p.41, 227; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.100-103; Olssen, 'Waging War', pp.303-305.
[54] Baker, *King and Country,* p.12.
[55] Baker, *King and Country,* pp. 11-12, 79-80; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.21-23.
[56] Pickles, *Transnational Outrage*, pp.68-69.

introduce conscription, such as recreating the Derby scheme through a National Register to determine the number of men willing to volunteer. Conscription was thus made more palatable by being presented as following, and perhaps even improving, a British example, learning from the issues of Britain's application, again somewhat evoking 'Better Britain',[57] and showing the importance of associations with British principles and examples in informing national debates and decisions. In terms of propaganda, New Zealand once again followed Britain's lead, following Britain's moves towards centralisation of propaganda, and continually looking to Britain for inspiration.

One of the most significant changes to New Zealand's official propaganda campaign resulting from the conscription crisis, was increased official attention to and organisation of propaganda. Despite the widely held realisation that conscription was necessary to ensure New Zealand met its reinforcement contributions, the voluntary system was still popular.[58] Therefore, from late 1915 to early 1916, Massey dedicated his efforts to attempting to make the voluntary system work in the hope that it would endure for the rest of the war, through a substantial new recruiting campaign.[59] With this campaign came new found attention to propaganda. Notably, on 21 December 1915, Massey created the PRB, with himself as its head, to organise and centralise the new campaign.[60] With this, New Zealand finally had a recruiting body akin to the British PRC to organise its recruitment and propaganda.

Beyond organisation, Massey's recruiting campaign of late 1915 saw expansion and improvement of official propaganda materials and methods. Notably, in early 1916, the government began to take direct charge of the importation and distribution of illustrated propaganda posters, expanding beyond letterpress posters. In March 1916, Massey contacted the Australian Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in Melbourne, requesting 100 copies of the committee's eleven best poster designs.[61] These posters were then sent to local New Zealand recruiting committees to be "conspicuously displayed throughout your District for the purposes of stimulating recruiting."[62] This is an extremely telling change to New Zealand's official campaign.

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[57] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.79-80, 86-87; Olssen, 'Waging War', pp.303-305.
[58] Parsons, 'Home Front', pp.419-420; Olssen, 'Waging War', p.304.
[59] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.79-86.
[60] Baker, *King and Country*, p.79.
[61] ANZ, R 10075020 – Massey to Robinson, Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, Melbourne, 6 March 1916.
[62] ANZ, R 10075020 – Recruiting Board memorandum, 30 March 1916.

Firstly, though the government did not create these posters, likely due to the limited capabilities of official printing, their direct, official importation shows the government's increased interest and control of propaganda, distributing material for the specific purpose of encouraging moral and stimulating enlistment, instead of relying on public figures to create and distribute illustrated propaganda, as Allen had advocated at the beginning of the war. This importation also speaks to New Zealand's 'Dominion perspective', and the importance of its various imperial connections. Specifically, it highlights the continued practical and ideological relevance of the Tasman world. Despite the presumed lack of relevance of the Tasman world to New Zealand at this time,[63] and though New Zealand's cultural identifications with Britain were stronger than those with Australia, practical Tasman world connections remained often more relevant. It was much easier and safer for New Zealand to import posters from across the Tasman than from Britain. For all the cultural significance of New Zealand's identification with the British world, its was place at the end of the Australian line of distribution, for specific importation of material.[64] Furthermore, New Zealand's trans-Tasman connections still had ideological relevance. Despite the heavy use of typically 'Australian' symbols in examples of Australian propaganda,[65] broadly speaking the same 'shared British language' that allowed British propaganda to be easily understood in New Zealand was also shared with Australia, as indicated by the interest in earlier exhibitions of Australian posters, with easily understood 'pregnant messages'.[66] Again highlighting the complex relationship between 'imagined' and 'organisational' space and relationships in the British world, and the fluidity of the British world in terms of its intersection with other global and regional communities, New Zealand's Tasman world connections were difficult to dismiss. While New Zealand clearly identified with its British connections to a much greater degree, Tasman world connections remained a vital part of New Zealand's official wartime propaganda campaign.[67]

As part of the same campaign, the PRB also began utilising new mediums and locations. Using the recently imported Australian illustrated posters, in 1916 the PRB launched a campaign of lantern slide illustrations to be displayed in New Zealand

[63] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p.46-52.
[64] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', pp.13-14; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.299; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* p.46-52
[65] Aulich and Hewitt, *Seduction or Instruction,* p.54.
[66] 'Your Country Calls – Come and Help!', *Wanganui Chronicle,* 18th October, 1915, p.4.
[67] Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', pp.298-300; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

cinemas to assist recruiting.[68] A report in the *Poverty Bay Herald* noted "a fine selection of English and Australian recruiting posters has been used to prepare a series of lantern slides" to be shown in cinemas.[69] The collections of illustrated slides were distributed widely throughout the country, with over 90 locations receiving collections.[70] This represents the increasing coordination of propaganda in New Zealand by 1916, as it was noted the slides were designed to "supplement the pictorial posters which were recently distributed throughout the Dominion for public display."[71] Furthermore, it also suggests the government was more willing to contribute significant funds, material, and effort to this campaign. The campaign also demonstrated New Zealand's moves towards more modern propaganda techniques. For instance, the utilisation of cinemas was significant, as the memorandum explaining the campaign suggested:

> Picture theatres are largely patronised by the public at the present time, and particularly by many eligible men who probably would never see the ordinary posters or attend recruiting meetings … these slides will provide perhaps the only means of bringing home to many people the duty they owe to their country in the present great crisis.[72]

The utilisation of cinemas was a very perceptive move. As Christopher Pugsley notes, cinema was extremely popular in New Zealand at the outbreak of the war, and had even begun rivalling popular church attendance.[73] Cinema was also a strong focus for Britain's propaganda campaign, due to its extreme popularity in Britain during the war, as it was a cheap and accessible public entertainment for both citizens on the home front, and soldiers on leave. Film offered entertainment, and perhaps most significantly during the war, access to footage of men on the front lines through war films.[74] Britain devoted significant efforts to film propaganda, led by Canadian press

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[68] ANZ, R 10075029 – Secretary of the Recruiting Committee memorandum.
[69] 'The Call for Men: Recruiting Board's Fresh Enterprise', *Poverty Bay Herald,* 15 April 1916, p.4.
[70] ANZ, R 10075029 – Recruiting Board Scheme Appendix A – List of Boroughs, Counties, and Town Districts in Several Military Districts.
[71] ANZ, R 10075029 – Secretary of Parliamentary Recruiting Committee memorandum, 1916.
[72] ANZ, R 10075029 – Secretary of Parliamentary Recruiting Committee memorandum, 1916.
[73] Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu', p.195; see also, Jan Rüger, 'Entertainments', *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919, Vol. 2 A Cultural History,* ed. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, (Cambridge: 2007), pp.108, 116.
[74] Rüger, 'Entertainments', p.108.

magnate, Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, who had already been developing war films for Canada.[75] New Zealand's use of cinemas to display recruiting propaganda follows this trend, and demonstrates national initiative and character as determining factors in the development of New Zealand's propaganda, still influenced by developments and trends in Britain. Like Lloyd George's 'Hold Fast' speech in Britain, intended to boost public morale and read before cinema presentations throughout Britain,[76] the New Zealand government saw cinema as a way of exposing a mass captive audience to official propaganda messages. However, despite the scale of these changes, their impact is questionable. For all the government's efforts to save the voluntary system, conscription eventually was introduced in 1916. Accordingly, this more extensive and modern campaign only lasted for a short time, before again requiring change.

The introduction of conscription via the Military Service Act in late 1916 necessitated a much more professionalised and organised propaganda campaign. Ironically, despite increased moves towards illustrated propaganda, with the Military Service Act, the official campaign returned to its previous reliance on letterpress, official style posters. Communicating the introduction of conscription to ensure the system operated smoothly was now more important than rallying support and volunteers. In August 1916, a new poster was designed to publicise the Military Service Act.[77] In its letterpress style, and method of distribution, this poster conformed to established approaches and systems, but also showed innovation, as the poster was distributed much more widely. Notably, not only were large numbers of the poster, in multiple sizes, to be displayed conspicuously at police stations and post offices, but police were also to coordinate display of the poster in other locations, such as hotels, shops, and public houses, at specific areas in each for maximum exposure.[78] Posters and placards were displayed prominently by tramway companies, at factories, depending on the number of workers, and to be sent to rural locations.[79] Further utilising cinemas, the Military Service Act poster was also reproduced as

[75] Reeves, *Film Propaganda,* pp.65-66; Cook, 'Documenting War', p.286; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.129; Haste, *Home Fires*, p.46.
[76] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.52-54.
[77] ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Secretary of Post and Telegraph Department, 15 August 1916.
[78] ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Assistant General Manager of New Zealand Railways, 15 August 1916; Gray to Secretary of the Labour Department, 18 August 1916.
[79] ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Government Printer, 23 August 1916.

lantern slides to be displayed frequently in cinemas, before, after, and during the interval of all main features. However, issues soon arose, as it became obvious that the text of the letterpress style poster was too small to read by cinema audiences, and therefore the slides had to be redesigned.[80]

Despite difficulties, the changes to this campaign reflect the development of New Zealand's propaganda by 1916. Firstly, the campaign was largely expanded. Instead of small-scale local recruiting campaigns through Military Districts, the Military Service Act campaign of 1916 necessitated a blanketing of the country with posters and regulations at several different locations, while also utilising the new techniques and materials. However, just as significant was the campaign's professionalisation and centralisation. The government continued to rely on the public during this campaign, as posters, placards and slides were to be displayed by the public at private locations such as shops, factories and cinemas. However, by late 1916, such display became mandatory. Police were to check the display of these materials, and report any failures to do so, which was later made even more explicit in New Zealand's War Regulations, introduced to give the New Zealand government the same sort of wartime authority the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) gave to Britain - yet another example of New Zealand adopting British methods.[81] The introduction of conscription meant this developing system needed to be professionalised and centralised even further.

The Military Service Act's impact on government propaganda efforts is also evident in the increased use of newspaper advertising from 1916. Throughout the war, the New Zealand Newspaper Proprietors' Association (NZNPA) encouraged the government to expand its use of paid newspaper advertising columns to stimulate recruitment, and to publicise war loans.[82] Significantly, president of the NZNPA, Phineas Selig, highlighted the success of such advertising campaigns in Britain, as a reason for New Zealand to follow suit:

> We feel sure the wisdom of following the example of the 'Mother of Parliaments' will appeal to you. Especially at this trying period in the history

[80] ANZ, R 10075029 – Gray to King's Picture Theatres, Thames, 30 August 1916; Recruiting Board memorandum, 5 September 1916.
[81] ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Commissioner of Police, 18 August 1916; Gray to Solicitor-General, 10 August 1916; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.9.
[82] ANZ, R 22434550 – President Newspaper Proprietors Association to Allen, 27 November 1914.

> of our Empire it is necessary for our rulers to keep in constant touch with their people – and the best way to do this is, obviously, to use those mediums handled daily by the people.[83]

Though this was almost certainly partly an attempt by New Zealand newspapers to attract business, it also once again highlights the importance of British examples in New Zealand's conception of propaganda, both official and private. For Selig and the NZNPA, the use of newspaper advertising columns by the British government was reason enough to recommend their worth to the New Zealand government.[84] While in one sense this suggests a degree of New Zealand deference to British examples,[85] it also more broadly shows shared comprehension of official propaganda with Britain. Just as conscription was made less contentious by evoking Britain's application,[86] citing British examples in this case suggests a degree of insecurity regarding government involvement in propaganda.[87] Though New Zealand was often confident in directing its own propaganda campaign, and internalising 'British' rhetoric, invoking British organisational examples still tended to give an air of legitimacy and safety to propaganda activity. This also suggests wider acknowledgement of the limited scale of the government's propaganda campaign.[88]

Cost and payment remained significant barriers to the expansion of New Zealand's propaganda. Wherever possible, the government tried to cut costs by encouraging the public, or private enterprises like the press, to fund propaganda as an expression of patriotism, while maintaining official control.[89] Responding to a letter from the *Oamaru Mail,* again encouraging public patronage, Massey argued the press should allow the government free advertising space as an expression of patriotism, stating newspapers in Britain had done so for Lord Derby's recruiting scheme.[90] This use of Britain's Derby scheme as a model of how New Zealand's propaganda campaign should operate, is another telling reflection of British examples informing New Zealand initiatives, particularly relating to conscription and recruitment,[91] and

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[83] ANZ, R 10075019 – Selig, *The Press* Advertising Manager to Massey, 25 May 1916.
[84] ANZ, R 10075019 – Selig, *The Press* Advertising Manager to Massey, 25 May 1916.
[85] Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', p.14.
[86] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.58,86.
[87] De Groot, *Blighty*, pp.174-175.
[88] See also, 'Is there a War on?', *Dominion,* 1st December, 1915, p.6.
[89] ANZ, R 22434550 – Allen to President Newspaper Proprietors Association, 29 December 1914.
[90] ANZ, R 10075019 – Massey to Milne, 18 March 1916.
[91] Baker, *King and Country,* pp.58,86; Olssen, 'Waging War', p.304.

also shows the government's willingness to use public initiative for propaganda, though this time in a more directed manner. However, this argument was met with an unenthusiastic response from editors and newspaper proprietors, who argued the pressures of the war on the press meant profits were already being affected, and newspapers should not be unduly burdened, as they had already demonstrated their patriotism. Furthermore, they argued the government did not expect other industries to provide services for free.[92] Similarly, newspaper proprietors countered the use of the British example by stating not only were the two nation's press' profitability incomparable, but in Britain, money did indeed exchange hands for material that was specifically advertisement.[93] British examples informed such disputes, though ultimately interactions were defined by cost and capacity on both sides.

This economic approach to newspaper propaganda changed in response to the Military Service Act, for which the government undertook an extensive advertising campaign to ensure maximum publicity. Small advertisements were designed, still in the letter-press style, but this time including the Royal Arms, and placed in newspapers throughout the country. The campaign was extensive; twenty-three newspapers were sent multiple insertions of the advertisement, with several others being sent one, blanketing the entire country. The government also agreed to pick up the cost for this campaign. For the duration of the campaign, the cost was estimated at £184 for each newspaper receiving one insertion, and up to £400 for those newspapers receiving up to six insertions,[94] a large sum considering the government formerly quibbled over the expense of the use of the Royal Arms in its advertisements. Pamphlets regarding the regulations of the Military Service Act were also circulated, with suggestions to print important paragraphs in editorial columns.[95] Although disputes over payment continued throughout the war, especially with Christchurch and Lyttelton newspapers,[96] after 1916, the government's use of

[92] ANZ, R 10075019 – Dinwiddie to Massey, 2 March 1916; Acting Editor of *The Press* to Massey, 1 March 1916; *Manawatu Evening Standard* Managing Director to Massey, 15 April 1916; R 10075019 – Dinwiddie to Massey, 2 March 1916.
[93] ANZ, R 10075019 – Managing Director of the *Southland Times,* to Massey, 1 March 1916; Dinwiddie to Massey, 2 March 1916.
[94] ANZ, R 10075019 – Malcolm Fraser, Government Statistician to Gray, 10 August 1916.
[95] ANZ, R 10075019 – Gray, memorandum, 23 August 1916.
[96] ANZ, R 10075019 – G.C. Hodgkins, Clerk in Charge of the Advertising Department to Manager of Christchurch Press Co. Ltd., 24 November 1916; Manager of Christchurch Press Co. Ltd. to Clerk in Charge of the Advertising Department, 28 November 1916; Lyttleton Times Co. Ltd to Clerk in Charge of the Advertising Department, 26 June 1916; Allen to Editor of Christchurch Press, 15 December, 1917.

advertising became much more extensive and professionalised, and showed willingness to invest more time and money in propaganda than formerly.

This increased organisation and professionalism of propaganda distribution resulting from the conscription crisis also flowed into other departments' propaganda. After 1916, Treasury operations became much more efficient and confident, with expanded propaganda for war loan campaigns. For example, in 1917, the Treasury began placing propaganda in the carriages of trains and tramways.[97] For the 1918 War Purposes Loan, the Treasury sharply increased its output, printing 100,000 copies of one small flyer titled 'Questions and Answers' alone, alongside tens of thousands of war loans posters and placards, again eschewing previous concerns of cost and paper shortage.[98] The Treasury also increasingly utilised newspaper advertisements, for instance, for the 1917 and 1918 loans, several evocative newspaper advertisements were introduced in the weeks preceding the loan.[99]

It is clear from 1916, the New Zealand government gradually took more active control of official propaganda, and developed more extensive and professional approaches. While the government continued to borrow material from both Britain and Australia, it coordinated this material more confidently into defined national campaigns. Much as it did with 'British' propaganda rhetoric, while the New Zealand government embraced and internalised 'British' organisational approaches to propaganda as useful, they were selectively applied, to suit and cater to New Zealand's national needs, rather than blindly followed for their own sake, or due to an ultimate deference to British cultural norms. Ultimately, national interests and capacity determined the progression of New Zealand's campaign. This highlights the interdependence of national initiative, character, and control, together with a deep association with shared imperial Britishness inherent in 'Dominion perspective'.[100]

Besides New Zealand's increasingly professional official propaganda campaign, the conscription crisis also necessitated increased attention to dissent,

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[97] ANZ, R 10560716 – Secretary to the Treasury memorandum to the Traffic Inspector, New Zealand Railways, Wellington, 16 August 1917.
[98] ANZ, R 22504987 – J.J. Esson, Secretary to the Treasury to General Manager Christchurch Tramway Board, 11 March 1918, 15 March 1918.
[99] ANZ, R 22504945 – 'Have you invested in the war loan?' advertisement, 171; 'War Loan' advertisement, 1917; 'Lend Every Shilling' advertisement, 1917; 'Have you helped to win the war?' advertisement, 1917; 'Help to win the war' advertisement, 1917.
[100] McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', pp.337-338; Buckner, 'Introduction', pp.9-10; Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.21-23

specifically public pacifist, anti-militarist, and latterly, anti-conscription propaganda. Monitoring this dissent was extremely important to the government, as labour relations were already delicate,[101] and avoiding unrest was key to maintaining industrial supply during the war. However, while some have argued that First World War propaganda was actively controlling, manipulative, and primarily focussed on suppressing opinion,[102] to see censorship and monitoring of dissent as the main focus of Britain or New Zealand's propaganda campaign is inaccurate. Censorship certainly was an aspect of the New Zealand, and British, governments' approaches to propaganda; in the same way New Zealand's official campaign embraced patriotic public propaganda, its reaction to dissenting propaganda is relevant to its overall approach, but it was certainly not the sole focus of the campaign. In its response to dissent, the New Zealand government took a light approach, very similar to Britain's, preferring persuasion rather than coercion.[103]

Anti-militarist movements were established before the war; generally founded either by labour interests, or amongst middle class citizens with an interest in nonconformist religion or liberal politics. Many organisations emerged in response to New Zealand's introduction of Compulsory Military Training in 1909, a rare example of New Zealand going beyond British examples in introducing compulsory military service before the war. These organisations formed the core of the wartime anti-militarist and anti-conscription movements.[104] During the war, the government monitored dissenting propaganda including meetings, demonstrations, and publications. Letters to recruits, and later conscripts, encouraging contentious objection, and pamphlets, emerged from New Zealand.[105] In addition, material from Britain, Australia and the USA also came into New Zealand, such as 500 copies of an anti-militarist publication by the British Stop the War Committee in late 1915,

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[101] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* p.60; Baker, *King and Country,* p.43; Gustafson, *Labour's Path,* pp.105-108.
[102] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent*, pp.1-2, 8-15; Millman, 'HMG', pp.413-415; Knightley, *First Casualty*, pp.83-85; for New Zealand see, Grant, *Field Punishment,* p.15.
[103] Horne, 'Remobilizing', pp.196-200; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.5-6, 37.
[104] Baker, *King and Country*, pp.11-12, 73-74; Megan Hutching, '"Mothers of the World": Women, Peace and Arbitration in Early Twentieth-Century New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 27:2, (October 1993), pp.173-174; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.553-555.
[105] ANZ, R 22436310 – Colonel Commanding Canterbury Military District memorandum, 15 September 1915; R 22429822 – E.P. Cole to Wellington Military District, 29 November 1916; Memorandum for New Zealand Military Headquarters, 2 December 1916.

imported by prominent Christchurch anti-militarist, Charles Mackie, for which he was fined.[106]

One prominent example of anti-militarist propaganda during the war was the lectures and public meetings given by Adela Pankhurst, a member of the radical British Pankhurst family, who had emigrated to Australia in 1914. Copies of Pankhurst's banned publication 'Put Up the Sword' preceded her visit from Melbourne,[107] and in May 1916, Pankhurst reached New Zealand and began giving public lectures, focusing on mining centres to appeal to labour sentiments. As soon as she arrived, the police received 'serious complaints' regarding Pankhurst's 'pernicious influence', and her meetings were monitored and documented by local authorities.[108] Brock Millman argues that a similar trend of middle class patriotism turning against dissenting movements, particularly working class movements, was also strong in Britain, and many middle class citizens had a natural dislike and distrust of dissenting activity.[109] Pankhurst's visit reflects the highly transnational and imperial dimension of anti-militarist propaganda during the war, representing another vein of ideas and information that circulated throughout the British world, demonstrating that it was not only patriotic and pro-imperial sentiments and beliefs that circulated along these British world networks, but dissenting ideas also.[110] The danger this dissenting action presented was very real to the government; the risks of damaging the recruiting drive, or seriously disrupting economic stability through strikes were both scenarios the government wanted to avoid. It is unsurprising, then, that the government took action early with regard to monitoring and controlling dissent.

After an indecisive approach to dissent at the beginning of the war, first suspending prosecution of dissenters in August 1914, only to reinstate them in November 1914, on 19 July 1915, the Government introduced legislation to control dissent, through the War Regulations Act. This act made it illegal to make, publish, or sell any statement or material with 'seditious intention' likely to interfere with

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[106] ANZ, R 22436310 – Deputy Chief Postal Censor to Gibbon, 24 November 1915, Deputy Chief Postal Censor to Gibbon, 25 February 1916; R 22434534 – Deputy Chief Postal Censor to Gibbon, 4 December 1916.
[107] ANZ, R 22434535 – Chief Postal Censor to Gibbon, 17 March 1916.
[108] ANZ, R 22434535 – A.J. Entrican, Deputy Mayor of Auckland to Allen, 23 May 1916; R 22434535 – Officer Commanding Auckland Military District, 26 May 1916.
[109] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* pp.99-100.
[110] O'Hara, 'Networked World', pp.611-612.

recruitment, training, military activities or discipline, or encourage violence or disorder.[111] This legislation was gradually expanded to restrict anti-militarist action even further throughout the war. In amendments to the regulations in December 1916, 'seditious intention' was taken to mean:

> … to incite disaffection against His Majesty or the Government of the United Kingdom, or of New Zealand, or of any other part of His Majesty's Dominions or … to incite, procure, or encourage violence, lawlessness or disorder whether in New Zealand or any other part of His Majesty's Dominions.[112]

Once again, a strong British influence in approaches to propaganda is evident, as New Zealand's War Regulations closely matched Britain's DORA, which served the same purpose of giving the government control over dissenting publications.[113] In all, 208 convictions, and 71 imprisonments were made throughout the war via the War Regulations.[114]

However, the application of these controls suggests the New Zealand government's approach to dissent was not to aggressively control and suppress it, but rather was highly reminiscent of Britain's approach. It monitored dissent, but mostly used a light touch, and did not suppress or control dissenting propaganda, to avoid unnecessarily agitating labour movements, and making matters worse. For instance, Paul Baker argues the War Regulations were initially only applied to drunken and disruptive individuals, rather than active dissenters.[115] In most cases, police only attended dissenting meetings to decide whether the sentiments expressed required further action, which they most often did not, though a police presence itself was something of a natural disincentive to dissenting speakers.[116] Just as the government frequently relied on the public for patriotic propaganda efforts, often the public's aggressive patriotism, or simple disinterest, could be relied upon to dampen

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[111] ANZ, R 22436310 – New Zealand Gazette, No. 110, 20 September 1915; Baker, *King and Country*, p.45.
[112] ANZ, R 22436310 – New Zealand Gazette, No. 136, 4 December 1916.
[113] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.9.
[114] Parsons, 'Debating the War', p.553.
[115] Horne, 'Remobilizing', pp.196-200; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.5-6, 37.Baker, *King and Country,* pp.75-77.
[116] ANZ, R 22436310 – J.W. Ellison, Superintendent to Commissioner to Superintendent Dwyer, Christchurch, 22 May 1915.

dangerous dissenting opinion; often such public hostility led dissenting meetings to voluntarily close. In Pankhurst's case, despite the infamy of the Pankhurst name, Adela Pankhurst's visit caused little attention or note in New Zealand.[117] Accordingly, the police monitored her meetings, but took no action.[118] In its response to dissent, and its application of coercion and censorship, New Zealand's approach again bore similarity to Britain's, showing shared basic values and approaches to propaganda throughout the British world, thereby linking New Zealand and Britain through a broad shared approach and organisational methods.

Along with the general professionalization of New Zealand's official propaganda campaign, the Military Service Act also prompted discussions of the organisation of the official campaign, and the potential creation of a dedicated propaganda body to aid its effectiveness. These discussions once again represent the interaction of national and imperial identities at work in 'Dominion perspective', as these proposals were both based on New Zealand's national needs and capacity, but were also informed by British examples, particularly Britain's 'rationalisation' of propaganda from 1916 onwards.

The seriousness of public criticism over conscription in 1916 meant the New Zealand government began to consider organising and centralising all of its propaganda activities, such as they were, into a potential dedicated propaganda organisation.[119] This was a shift in the government's approach to propaganda, though emulation of British models remained important throughout such discussions. Correspondence between Major Francis and the New Zealand journalist C.E. Wheeler from 1916 illustrate the measures that were considered. Wheeler suggested that New Zealand create a body similar to Britain's Press Bureau to control the flow of news from the Defence Department to the press, and thereby help to direct opinion in favour of the war effort. Wheeler argued the main issue was that the Defence Department did not understand what the press wanted. Wheeler suggested the department and the press work on a give-and-take basis; the department would regularly supply the press with interesting and newsworthy official stories, and in

[117] Woods, 'Re/producing the Nation', p.81.
[118] ANZ, R 22434535 – 'Report relative to an address by Adela Pankhurst at the Alexandra Hall, 29 May 1916; Allen to Attorney-General, 9 June 1916.
[119] ANZ, R 10701377 – Memorandum for Adjunct General, 25 November 1918; R 22434688 – Publicity General File: Major Francis New Zealand Military Forces memorandum, 25 November 1918.

return the press would be more willing to print stories the department considered important. Accordingly, the man in charge should have access to the Minister of Defence, and be kept well informed of department matters.[120] Wheeler's invocation of Britain's Press Bureau is telling. The Press Bureau managed the British government's relationship with the press, which for the early years in Britain was relatively cooperative, as the press was willing to self-censor. Broadly speaking, the Press Bureau's censorship was fairly light, criticism was allowed, and often the Bureau acted more to restrain overzealously supportive newspapers, rather than restricting dissenting opinions.[121] This relationship did deteriorate as powerful British press magnates and editors such as Lord Beaverbrook and Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe, increasingly pressured the government through constant criticism, even being instrumental in Asquith's downfall, and requiring Lloyd George to 'anchor' them with appointments in British propaganda.[122] Nonetheless, it is clear that British organisations remained the models for New Zealand's propaganda innovations. However, the government did not act on Wheeler's advice in 1916. Once again highlighting the importance of national events in determining the direction of New Zealand's propaganda campaign, correspondence from 1918 indicates that just as government approval was given for the scheme in 1916, popular criticism died down, and it was thought unnecessary to create such a propaganda body.[123] As Major Francis noted, "fortunately the attacks ceased about the same time the authority was given, and no appointment was made."[124] Though emulation of British models and ideals was prevalent, ultimately the government only followed British models when it suited New Zealand's specific needs. Accordingly, these plans were resurrected towards the end of the war, in response to another national development. Towards the end of the war in 1918, vociferous popular criticism of the government returned, decrying the mismanagement of demobilisation and repatriation of returned soldiers. Major Francis noted this change in 1918:

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[120] ANZ, R 22434688 – Publicity General File: C.E. Wheeler to Major Francis, 30 March 1916.
[121] Stephen Badsey, 'Press, Propaganda and Public Perceptions', in *A Part of History: Aspects of the British Experience of the First World War,* ed. Michael Howard (London: 2008), pp.28-32; Deian Hopkin, 'Domestic Censorship in the First World War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 5:4 (1970), p.155; Colin Lovelace, 'British Press Censorship during the First World War' in *Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day*, ed. George Boyce, James Curran & Pauline Wingate (London: 1978), pp.308-314.
[122] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp.89-9; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.126.
[123] ANZ, R 10701377 – Memorandum for Adjunct General, 25 November 1918.
[124] ANZ, R 22434688 – Major Francis New Zealand Military Forces memorandum, 25th November, 1918.

> It is anticipated from the tone of many newspapers during the past month and the desire of a considerable section of the public to criticize the National Government for any real or imaginary grievances that once demobilisation commences a campaign against the 'powers that be' similar to that of 1915-6 may be looked for.[125]

Therefore, in late November 1918, after the war had ended, plans for a propaganda body were revisited, and Wheeler was appointed as the Defence Department's press agent.[126] This time, British examples were once again invoked, referring to the success of Britain's changes to propaganda in 1916, (which were central to New Zealand's connection to British propaganda towards the end of the war);[127] it was noted that a New Zealand propaganda bureau should be created, as this had been "so successful in England at a critical time."[128] Once again, New Zealand was learning from changes to British propaganda. Despite the significance of this appointment in terms of New Zealand's commitment to propaganda, the change was still rather small-scale, and a pared-down version of the 1916 proposal. Wheeler was appointed in 1918 to devote approximately 'half his time' to prepare matter for publication in the press, and monitor and direct opinion, "in order that the public may be kept fully advised of the various activities of the Defence Department," at an annual salary of £250.[129] This appointment also demonstrates the significance of issues surrounding demobilisation in New Zealand; the government deemed demobilisation issues as significant as the introduction of the Military Service Act in 1916, and as similarly demanding changes to propaganda operation. By July 1919, Wheeler suggested his salary be halved, as his workload was severely reduced, and by November 1919, his work was concluded.[130] Though New Zealand ultimately looked to 'British' approaches to propaganda organisation as a guide, the New Zealand government was selective, and only applied British organisational models when national needs called for it; Britain's 1916

[125] ANZ, R 22434688 – Major Francis New Zealand Military Forces memorandum, 25 November 1918.
[126] ANZ, R 10701377 – Memorandum for Adjunct General, 25 November 1918.
[127] See below, Chapter 4, pp.121-126.
[128] ANZ, R 10701377 – Memorandum for Adjunct General, 25 November 1918.
[129] ANZ, R 22434688 – Defence Department memorandum, 19 December 1918; Allen to Robin, 19 December 1918.
[130] ANZ, R 22434688 – Wheeler to Allen, 31 July 1919; Allen to Wheeler, 2 August 1919; Allen memorandum, 19 November 1919.

changes were looked to as a suitable model, but were only borrowed and recreated in New Zealand in 1918, when there was legitimate need for them. Echoing New Zealand's internalisation and adaption of British propaganda rhetoric,[131] New Zealand naturally saw British approaches as the most effective, and as New Zealand's cultural inheritance, but they were not unthinkingly adopted by New Zealand for their own sake.

The government's attempts at better relations with the press, illustrate wider issues of the government's handling of war news throughout the war. Similar to Australia's complaints to the CO, claims of a lack of attention to New Zealand efforts in the press caused criticism from the public and members of the press.[132] Though this was partly a wider issue of the quality of imperial communication, and Britain's distribution of war news to the Dominions,[133] the efforts of New Zealand's war correspondent Malcolm Ross also contributed to this situation. Ross' tenure as New Zealand war correspondent was difficult from the beginning. The mistrust between the Liberal and Reform members of the National Government cabinet delayed Ross' appointment; he arrived in Egypt significantly later than his Australia counterpart, C.E.W. Bean.[134] Throughout his tenure, Ross was criticised for the quality of his reports, and for failing to circumvent British censorship, particularly by the NZNPA, which frequently called for his replacement.[135] However, this was not Ross' issue alone. The lack of coverage of New Zealand's involvement in the Palestine campaign from official sources also caused criticism from the public and the press, and concerns from the public that the actions of troops in that theatre were being misrepresented as ineffective and unimportant.[136] Although General Alexander Godley was also concerned this lack of coverage would mean "much of historical and sentimental interest may be lost",[137] his suggestion that another correspondent be posted in Palestine was dismissed by Commander of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, Major General Chaytor.[138] This marginalisation of the Palestine campaign,

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[131] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[132] Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', p.28.
[133] See above, Chapter 2, pp.66-69.
[134] Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', p.21.
[135] ANZ, R 22319691 – Allen to Massey, 17 March 1917; Ross to Allen, 24 January 1916; Allen to Rhodes, 21 February 1916; Rhodes to Allen, 2 March 1916.
[136] ANZ, R 22434566 – Miss Shelton to Allen, 26 August 1918, Allen to General Robin, 25 March 1918.
[137] ANZ, R 22434566 – Godley to Allen, 19 April 1918.
[138] ANZ, R 22434566 – Chaytor to Allen, 24 May 1918; Chaytor to Allen, 24 July 1918.

despite Dominion involvement, represented a wider issue of coverage of the campaign, as Yosef Bar-Eitan argues: racial issues meant Britain's promotion of the campaign had to be careful.[139] However, despite these complaints, and unlike his Australian counterparts Bean and Murdoch, Ross never pushed the issue of New Zealand promotion in the same way. Besides issues of the cost of cable and postal rates inhibiting Ross' communications, in general he remained much more deferential to British authority. He respected British censorship, stating, "things are very interesting here, but one mustn't give the show away."[140] Whether this is attributable to New Zealand's more loyal and deferential attitude to Britain compared to Australia's, and its reputation as the 'most loyal' Dominion,[141] or more a symptom of Ross' personal and professional limitations or scruples, it emphasises New Zealand's isolation in the wider scope of British world propaganda. Beyond New Zealand's size, limited resources, and isolation, its less tenacious approach to relations with Britain, and lack of a pugnacious advocate for its propaganda campaign, in the mould of Bean and Murdoch for Australia, or Beaverbrook for Canada, meant it failed to get the levels of attention Canada or Australia did.[142]

Attempts to garner greater praise and attention for New Zealand in Britain was certainly not absent from the New Zealand home front, as such promotion had been a major focus of the government since before the war. The Department of Tourist and Health Resorts, established in 1901 by then Prime Minister Richard Seddon, was meant to publicise New Zealand abroad to tourists and migrants, while the actions of patriotic societies such as the Victoria League attempted to promote New Zealand to the Empire.[143] However, it took the government much longer to take up this cause in the direction of publicity and propaganda during the war. In 1918, a decision was made to make another structural change to propaganda regarding this issue. General George Spafford Richardson, the government's military representative in London, established a publicity office in connection with the New Zealand Expeditionary

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[139] Kitchen, 'Khaki Crusaders', p.144; Bar-Yosef, 'Last Crusade', p.99.
[140] ANZ, R 22319691 – Ross to Allen, 24 January 1916; Rhodes to Allen, 15 December 1915; Allen to Rhodes, 21 February 1916.
[141] Mein Smith and Hempenstall, 'Rediscovering', pp.13-14; Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', p.299.
[142] Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', pp.19-20; for discussion of Beaverbrook see, Cook, 'Documenting War', pp.273-274; see also above, Chapter 2, pp.73-76; for discussion of Bean see, Dixon, 'Spotting the Fake', pp.166-167.
[143] Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu', p.195; Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.29-34; for a Canadian example, cf. Pickles, *Female imperialism*, p.23.

Force (NZEF) headquarters in Britain.[144] The decision was based on a belief that New Zealand was not receiving the attention in the British press it deserved, as a report from the NZEF headquarters explained:

> During the recent offensive, when the New Zealanders were playing an important part on the operations, it was noticed that practically no reference was made in the press to the work of the New Zealand Division … in fairness to the men, more publicity should be given to the N.Z. Division than it now receives.[145]

Such attention would have been especially desirable at this point, as New Zealand had modest military successes in 1918, such as at Le Quesnoy.[146] The publicity office's duties were both to keep the New Zealand press better informed of the activities of the NZEF, and the selection and preparation of material to be sent to the British press for publication, to garner more attention for New Zealand in Britain.[147] As with Wheeler's appointment in New Zealand, this was a small-scale change. The office was run from the High Command of the NZEF, through the War Records Section, which never properly understood or invested in the concept, for instance, General Richardson noted the office was a military body:

> As a soldier I am not concerned with this class of work, but if it would be of benefit to New Zealand, I am prepared to organise a small propaganda department to write articles, and to keep the New Zealand press up to date; also to publish pamphlets on the various hospitals, disabled soldiers' work etc. and recover the cost by sales.[148]

Furthermore, the office consisted of only two experienced journalists, and its activities were extremely short-lived. It was established in September 1918, under two

[144] ANZ, R 22436310 – Richardson to Allen, 25 June 1918.
[145] ANZ, R 22436310 – Report No. 28 of G.O.C. NZEF, 7 September 1918.
[146] Glyn Harper, 'Stopping the Storm: The New Zealand Division and the Kaiser's Battle (*Kaiserchlacht)* March-April 1918', *New Zealand's Great War*, ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, p.285.
[147] ANZ, R 22436310 – Report No. 28 of G.O.C. NZEF, 7 September 1918.
[148] ANZ, R 22436310 – Richardson to Allen, 25 June 1918.

months before the war ended, its activities concluded by January 1919.[149] The impact of the publicity office is questionable, but its significance remains. Like the appointment of Wheeler, the publicity office reflects the realisation of the New Zealand government and High Command by 1918 that an improvised, disorganised approach to propaganda was no longer effective, and greater organisation and attention was necessary to control publicity and direct public morale and attitudes, especially in the press. Of course, Massey and Ward's aim to negotiate a satisfactory settlement for New Zealand from the impending peace conference, particularly the retention of territory New Zealand gained in the South Pacific, likely played a part in this late attempt to promote New Zealand's wartime contribution.[150] Regardless, its need to scramble to achieve this illustrates New Zealand's comparative delays in organising its propaganda. Throughout all of these considerations, Britain remained a central focus, whether as an example for the development and application of propaganda, or as a consideration in terms of material and promotion. While New Zealand was not as dogmatic in its attempts to claim British attention, Britain and the British world maintained a central role in New Zealand's propaganda campaign.

While New Zealand's propaganda organisation was autonomous, and responded to specifically national concerns, with major changes in methods and organisation occurring in response to local developments, such as the national debate surrounding conscription, such major changes to New Zealand's campaign still reveal New Zealand's ideological connection to Britain; at such moments of change New Zealand not only looked to Britain for a model to follow, but also considered how best to use propaganda to connect to Britain and the rest of the empire.[151]

In the same way that the content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda illustrates expression of national character and sentiment through engagement with 'British' rhetoric, the organisation and development of New Zealand's official wartime propaganda campaign illustrates the interplay of national and imperial identities. While New Zealand's campaign was determined largely by national

[149] ANZ, R 22436310 – Report No. 28 of G.O.C. NZEF, 7 September 1918; Brigadier General in charge of Administration, NZEF Headquarters in London to Officer in charge of War Records, 13 December 1918.
[150] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.76-80; James Watson, *W.F. Massey: New Zealand,* (London: 2010), pp.59-60; W.J. Gardner, *William Massey,* (Wellington: 1969), pp.22-23.
[151] Baker, *King and Country,* pp. 11-12, 79-80; Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* pp.21-23; Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10; Pickles, 'Mapping Memorials', p.14.

capacity and resources, and developed in response to national issues and needs, particularly the conscription crisis, the initial New Zealand approach to propaganda, and the campaign's developments, were heavily informed by British approaches and examples of propaganda organisation. Despite its practical disconnection from Britain, New Zealand's official campaign thus still followed Britain's lead. This engagement with imperial Britishness, specifically British organisational approaches to propaganda, did not restrict New Zealand's actions, but informed its general approach, and, again, was a way to express national character, showing the operation of 'Dominion perspective' in New Zealand. This ideological identification between New Zealand and Britain's propaganda campaigns proved to be significant during the later years of the war, when British propagandists began to redirect propaganda efforts towards the Dominions. This closer connection between Britain and New Zealand's propaganda campaigns was significant, as it facilitated the realisation of closer imperial connection desired by the Dominions.

Chapter 4: The Ministry of Information and Dominion Inclusion: British Imperial Propaganda Organisation, 1917-1918

For much of the war, while sharing the same objective, New Zealand and Britain's propaganda campaigns were largely disconnected. While ideological connections between New Zealand and Britain remained strong, such as in the content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda, practical, operational, organisational interactions between Britain and its Dominions, particularly New Zealand, were difficult due to practical inhibitions, both long-standing and war-related. Furthermore, despite the importance of concepts of Dominion status and responsible government to official British world interactions, the contestability of such terms complicated interaction between Britain and the Dominions.[1] However, this situation changed drastically from 1917, due to changes to Britain and New Zealand's war efforts, notably the ascension of David Lloyd George, the USA's entry into the war, and the spread of war weariness.[2] In response, by 1918, much of Britain's propaganda was reorganised into a Ministry of Information (MOI), under which the Dominions became a more significant focus for British propaganda.

This chapter therefore focuses on how changes to Britain's war effort allowed and necessitated increased attention and inclusion of the Dominions in Britain's official propaganda campaign, reaching its apogee with the MOI under Lord Beaverbrook. This was a short-term shift in propaganda focus, but represented a long-term refinement and progression of interactions between Britain and the Dominions, and the development of Dominion status. Britain's increased attention to the Dominions through propaganda in the short term fit with the Lloyd George government's new-found focus on domestic propaganda and civilian morale,[3] and in doing so, extended this domestic focus to the Dominions, treating them as an extended home front, a 'hinterland', rather than a distant or foreign periphery.[4] These changes, therefore, allowed and required that Britain practically realise the types of imperial interaction Dominion status and the British world were seen to represent in

[1] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[2] Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; David French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918,* (Oxford: 2002), pp.7-9; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.17-18; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp.65-67; Haste, *Home Fires*, p.39.
[3] Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; French, *Strategy of Lloyd George*, pp.7-9; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.17-18.
[4] For extended discussion of this concept see, Barnes, *New Zealand's London*, pp.5-9; 'Familiar London', pp.397, 400-407.

New Zealand's 'British' propaganda rhetoric. This development also promoted further change, inclusion, and recognition for the Dominions in the imperial community. Therefore, this chapter sees propaganda connections between Britain and the Dominions, and the changes they went through from 1917, as not only an important aspect of the changes to Britain's war effort under Lloyd George, but also centrally important to the long-term development of Dominion status and the imperial community. This approach highlights both strong continuity, and the particular importance of the First World War in this development. This also emphasises that, despite their fluidity, concepts of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and of a central imperial community between Britain and the Dominions as the operation of wartime propaganda shows, were central to interactions between Britain and the Dominions. It was recognition of shared Britishness between the Dominions and Britain that allowed them to be treated as a hinterland, rather than as foreign territories, when circumstances both called for and allowed it, thus suggesting a wider application of 'Dominion perspective' between Britain and New Zealand.[5]

It was not merely the practical limitations of ineffective telegraph lines, and the dangers and distance of wartime shipping between Britain and the Dominions[6] that restricted the flow of propaganda from Britain to New Zealand. Britain's focus and priorities also defined its propaganda interactions with the Dominions. From 1914 to 1916, Britain's main priority under the Asquith government was attaining neutral support, especially from the USA. As such, Britain's early propaganda campaign prioritised neutral, enemy, and somewhat later allied audiences, while domestic and Dominion audiences were relegated, with the Dominions being treated as a small and relatively unimportant focus. In terms of domestic propaganda, as was the case in New Zealand, for the first half of the war Britain mainly applied domestic propaganda for specific purposes such as recruitment, through the PRC, and left wider propaganda to public initiative.[7] From 1916, Britain's priorities shifted, and with them, British propaganda foci were accordingly reoriented. In December 1916, under the weight of heavy public, press, and political criticism, Asquith resigned, and a new coalition

[5] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.400-407; Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, pp.1-4; Hall, 'British World', pp.36.
[6] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.2012-202; O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.611-613; Bell, 'Dissolving Distance', pp.524-525.
[7] Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.203; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.1; De Groot, *Blighty*, p.174-5; Reeves, *Film Propaganda*, p.10; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.3.

government was formed under Lloyd George.[8] The situation the Lloyd George government faced in 1917 was precarious, and necessitated a dramatic shift in focus for Britain's war effort, if it was to endure.[9] By 1917, what was to have been the decisive knockout blow, the Battle of the Somme, had descended into an exhausting and costly battle of attrition. The British government's projected timetable for the war now looked unlikely, with Germany yet to show any serious signs of collapse. The entry of the USA on the Allied side in early 1917 theoretically alleviated the pressure on Britain and the Allies, however, the impact was not immediate, as the USA's comparatively small standing army would take a long time to mobilise in Europe before it was able to make a significant contribution.[10] The most significant impact the USA's entry had in terms of Dominion propaganda, however, was that it naturally freed space and attention in Britain's campaign for other audiences. For much of the war propaganda towards America was a major priority, whereas after its entry, Britain's propaganda efforts to America necessarily reduced and changed, with some even questioning the necessity of any efforts to the USA after April 1917.[11] This potentially opened a window of space for the Dominions in Britain's propaganda campaign.

As David French argues, by 1917 Britain also had to reconsider its war effort in terms of endurance, and timing became crucial. French argues that British strategists and politicians were always considering and aiming for a victory that would not only restrict Germany's ambitions, but also those of its Allies France and Russia, leaving the British Empire as the most powerful party, and restoring an isolationist balance of power in Europe.[12] This crucially meant outlasting all other belligerents, including European Allies. However, this prospect became difficult by 1917, with the emergence of war weariness. With discouraging news such as the revolution in Russia and reports of mutiny in France, combined with widespread general fatigue and exhaustion as the war entered its fourth year, a general pattern of war weariness emerged in 1917, not only in Britain, but also through all allied nations, including the Dominions.[13] War weariness certainly reached New Zealand;

[8] John Turner, *British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918,* (New Haven, CT and London: 1992), pp.112-151; French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.13-15.
[9] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.7-8; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.1, 17-19.
[10] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* p.8.
[11] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.185.
[12] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.3-4.
[13] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.17-18, 24; Haste, *Home Fires,* p.39.

both public and political discontent emerged in 1917, as the significant losses sustained throughout 1916 and 1917 were increasingly blamed on 'British bungling'. As a result, British pleas for an increase to New Zealand's manpower contribution were rebuffed in 1917, due to fears New Zealand's small population would be critically damaged should the war continue for much longer.[14] This was a significant shift for New Zealand, formerly the most enthusiastic of the Dominions. In terms of both simply enduring and surviving the war, and achieving a satisfactory settlement for the British Empire, Lloyd George realised that managing domestic opinion would be crucial to the prosecution of Britain's war effort. Therefore, from late 1916 onwards, Britain's propaganda underwent a sharp about-face in prioritising domestic, and more widely 'British' morale and opinion, redirecting its focus towards the British world, along with a general 'professionalisation' of Britain's war effort in terms of control of conscription, food, and resources.[15] Though Lloyd George had always been interested in propaganda, by 1917 he thus recognised the necessity of increased propaganda on all fronts, especially domestic and Dominion audiences, given wider social and political changes to the war effort and opinion.[16] Concerning the Dominions, Britain's focus shifted from courting neutral support, to maintaining and encouraging its own base of support. Like the home front, the Dominions were central to this, and Lloyd George encouraged Dominion leaders to contribute more, reinforcing the Dominions' position as part of Britain's central base of power, even above the Allies, as they ultimately shared 'British' aims, and wished to see the empire triumphant at the war's close. Lloyd George's institution of the Imperial War Cabinet clearly reflects this change in approach, and the realisation that Britain could not ask the Dominions for further sacrifice and not address their desires for greater inclusion and voice in imperial policy.[17] This marked a significant shift in relations between Britain and the Dominions; for the first time in the war, Britain's approach to the Dominions began to emphasise the British world community of the Dominions and Britain in an organisational sense, prioritising the Dominions as a privileged, distinct, and trusted group, because of their shared Britishness, thereby bringing

[14] Olssen, 'A Nation', p.329; Parsons, 'Debating the War', pp.553-555.
[15] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.3-9; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.17-19; Haste, *Home Fires*, p.39.
[16] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, pp.17-18; see also Haste, *Home Fires* p.39.
[17] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.63-64; French, *Strategy Lloyd George,* pp.62-64.

'imagined' constructions of the British world into line with 'organisational' realities.[18] This was both a shift in Britain's war effort, and in British world relations. By 1917, Britain had to court the Dominions as it had the USA, and this naturally flowed to propaganda.

From Lloyd George's accession in late 1916, Britain's propaganda campaign was substantially changed and reoriented to serve the wider renewed British strategy, particularly in terms of organisation, and in efforts to appeal to particular audiences. Efforts to 'rationalise' propaganda had taken place since late 1916, when propaganda was first centralised under the FO. However, this was problematic; Lloyd George criticised the effect of the centralisation, and felt that centralisation should not be under an existing ministry, particularly the FO, as this moved propaganda in exactly the wrong direction, away from the home front. In terms of the Dominions, this also further emphasised the Dominions' already relegated position in Britain's propaganda campaign. Throughout 1916 criticism of the FO's efforts, particularly from the WO, continued until, in December 1916, Lloyd George called for immediate action in the organisation of propaganda, through a report by journalist Robert Donald. On the advice of Donald's critical report, in February 1917 the Department of Information (DOI) was established under the leadership of the novelist John Buchan, effectively centralising all propaganda activity and organisations, including Wellington House, under one organisation.[19]

With this rationalisation, the Dominions became a firmer category of Britain's propaganda work, and efforts towards them became more professional and extensive, with greater amounts of propaganda material sent to New Zealand. Under the DOI, utilisation of existing channels of propaganda between Britain and the Dominions expanded. In particular, increased amounts of propaganda were sent through the official channels of New Zealand's Governor General and High Commissioner, the latter of which the CO saw as the only suitable channel for propaganda distribution.[20] From a small number of British recruiting posters and publications sent sporadically up to 1916,[21] from late 1917, Mackenzie received extensive collections of

[18] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Barnes, 'Familiar London', p.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* p.2-10.
[19] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp.55-63.
[20] TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 'Propaganda in the colonies', 17 November, 1916, p.29; For further discussion see above, Chapter 2, pp.62-64.
[21] TPA, MU000207/001/0001 Mackenzie to Massey, Memorandum No.7223, (November 1918); ANZ, R 22434750 – Allen to Lord Liverpool, 6 June 1918.

propaganda, including posters and pamphlets, from the British 'Propaganda Department'. Along with these personal transmissions, from late 1917 and into early 1918, large shipments of British publications, up to 9,000 at a time, were also sent directly to New Zealand through steamship companies.[22] These exchanges continued into early 1918, with tens of thousands of pamphlets being sent on a regular basis, ranging from the mundane, such as 'Reports on British Prison Camps in India', to evocative and deliberately inspiring publications including 'British War Aims', and, 'The Deliverance of Jerusalem',[23] the latter illustrating Lloyd George's belief in the propaganda and morale-boosting potential of the capture of Jerusalem.[24] Though Mackenzie misattributed this material as from the 'Propaganda Department', it is clear that this increased material was a result of the DOI. However, despite this increase, the method of transmission was still that outlined by the CO to Wellington House in 1916, and did not denote a closer 'organisational' relationship between Britain and New Zealand, or increased attention or the consideration the Dominions felt they deserved.

Under the DOI, the Dominions felt the benefits of general developments and innovations in propaganda material, such as photographic propaganda. After being treated with either suspicion or disregard early in the war, photographic propaganda began to be taken more seriously by the British High Command in 1916, with the appointment of the first official British photographer at the front, Ernest Brooks. This new engagement with photography was to ensure maximum exposure, and accordingly public response and resonance, for the ultimately costly Somme Offensive.[25] Thus, by early 1917, the DOI had a wealth of official photographic material from the Somme Campaign. Charles Masterman, head of Wellington House, (which became a pictorial and literature branch under the DOI) and long-time war photography advocate, was particularly enthusiastic and utilised the photographs.[26] In accordance with the increased inclusion of the Dominions, lantern slide sets of these photographs were created and distributed to the Dominions for exhibition through

[22] ANZ, R 22434750 – Mackenzie to Massey, 28 December 1917 (Memorandum No. 10332).
[23] ANZ, R 22434750 – Mackenzie to Massey, 19 February 1918 (Memorandum No. 1127); see also, Mackenzie to Massey, 5 March 1918 (Memorandum No. 1394); Mackenzie to Massey, 22 January 1918 (Memorandum No. 400); Mackenzie to Massey, 3 January 1918 (Memorandum No. 39).
[24] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.7-9; Kitchen, 'Khaki Crusaders', p.144; Bar-Yosef, 'Last Crusade', p.99.
[25] Jane Carmichael, *First World War Photographers*, (London: 1998), pp.48-49.
[26] TNA:PRO, INF 4/1B – 'The activities of Wellington House during the Great War, 1914-1918'; 'Ministry of Information as at September 1917'.

patriotic societies. The University of Canterbury's Macmillan Brown Library holds one such collection, of 220 slides, donated to the library by the Canterbury Branch of the Victoria League of New Zealand.[27] The collections of slides came to the Victoria League in London in early 1917, then being distributed to the various imperial branches of the League as 'gifts'.[28] The First World War provided an ideal outlet for the Victoria League's work, as the increased cooperation between Britain and the Dominions that it brought, aligned with its imperial interests in promoting increased understanding between Britain and the Dominions, and between the Dominions themselves.[29] New Zealand Leagues used the slides in public and private showings and lectures,[30] conforming to the league's pre-war activities.[31] For the first time in Britain's wartime imperial propaganda, the level of organisational inclusion of the Dominions approached the depiction of British world community and inclusion depicted in the propaganda itself, as a British world community, linked through shared Britishness, between Britain and the Dominions, demonstrating an organisational manifestation of 'imagined' British world spaces.[32] However, disparity was still evident. This innovation was not exclusive to the Dominions, rather, the collection's significance is that the DOI bothered to include the previously neglected Dominions in this new innovation. In all other ways, the DOI's approach to the Dominions was to merely expand existing methods. In character, the donation of the slides to the Victoria League complemented Wellington House's established methods of propaganda distribution, utilising public figures and the imperial networks of patriotic societies as distribution lines, to maintain secrecy and extend influence. The Victoria League was ideal in this regard, and was strongly associated with Britain's official propaganda campaign; many league members were wives of British propagandists, for instance both John Buchan and his wife were committee

[27] Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch (MBL), MB 367 - Victoria League of New Zealand Canterbury branch records.
[28] VLA, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Victoria League Head Office (1917), p.18. For further discussion of contents of slides, see Chapter 1, pp.36, 40, 51-52.
[29] Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.195; Eliza Reidi, 'Women, Gender, and the Promotion of Empire: The Victoria League 1900-1914', *The Historical Journal*, 45:3 (2002), p.598; Sarah M. Dowling, 'Female Imperialism: The Victoria League in Canterbury, New Zealand, 1910-2003', (MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2004), p.40; Bush, *Edwardian Ladies*, pp.195-199.
[30] Untitled (Advertisement for Victoria League Lantern Slide Show), *New Zealand Observer,* 25 May, 1918, p.22; 'Women in Print', *Evening Post,* 3 July, 1918, p.9; 'Exhibition of Official War Pictures' Advertisement, *Wanganui Chronicle*, 31 May, 1918, p.7.
[31] Pickles, 'Victoria League', p.195; Reidi, 'Women, Gender', p.598; Dowling, 'Female Imperialism', p.40; see also, James R. Ryan, 'On Visual Instruction', in *The Nineteenth Century Visual Culture Reader*, ed. V.R. Schwartz and J.M. Przyblyski (New York, NY: 2004).
[32] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

members.[33] Despite the innovation of material, the broad approach of this donation of slides conformed to Britain's early wartime approaches to propaganda. The DOI did attempt to professionalise and improve aspects of Dominion propaganda, such as the distribution of war news. While the CO's news service was retained, the DOI made efforts to assist Dominion journalists with interviews and visits to the front, and despatched special press articles to Dominion newspapers.[34] There was still little innovation or specific consideration of the Dominions, but some increased effort is clear. Essentially, the Dominions remained in their peripheral position under the DOI, even if methods improved and material expanded. This was significant, but not a dramatic shift.

Ultimately, the DOI itself was problematic, and required further professionalisation. Leadership remained an issue; Buchan sustained continued questions and criticism of his effectiveness, while Lloyd George found Buchan difficult to work with, particularly as he refused to consult the advisory committee he had appointed.[35] Buchan had been something of a last resort appointment,[36] and was in a difficult position, as his role had little official, ministerial, or Cabinet standing, rank, or influence. In August 1917 Lloyd George tried to remedy these issues by appointing the Irish Unionist MP and Cabinet Member Edward Carson as head of all propaganda, partly as a cynical ploy to distract Carson from Irish agitation.[37] However, Carson was ineffective due to his lack of experience and disinterest in propaganda, and was also an extremely divisive figure, not least for his involvement in Irish politics, and soon resigned.[38] Organisationally, the DOI also retained many of the issues of propaganda organisation Lloyd George had hoped to avoid in reorganisation, particularly the FO's continued control and influence over the DOI's operation.[39] From late 1917, further reorganisation and reinvigoration of British propaganda on all fronts was required, notably to move propaganda away from the

[33] VLA, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Victoria League Head Office' (1917), p.18; TNA:PRO, INF 4/5 'Report on the work of the Bureau established for the purpose of laying before neutral nations and the Dominions the case of Great Britain and her Allies', (15 July, 1915); 'John Buchan's report on the workings of the Ministry of Information' (September, 1917); INF 4/1B 'The activities of Wellington House during the Great War'; See also, Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*, p.152; Messinger, *British Propaganda,* pp.12-14; De Groot, *Blighty*, p.174.
[34] TNA:PRO, INF 4/1B – Buchan to Carson, Department of Information Report, September 1917, p.2.
[35] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.72.
[36] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp.62-63.
[37] Haste, *Home Fires*, p.44.
[38] Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.126; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.226; Haste, *Home Fires,* p.44.
[39] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.73; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*, p.26.

FO more definitively.[40] With the DOI at a low point, Lloyd George ordered a second Donald Report, which confirmed the need for further change.[41]

These issues all negatively impacted the plight of Dominion propaganda. The most significant issue, however, was a broad issue of categorisation; the continued lack of committed space and focus for the Dominions under the DOI. Categorisation was a central issue to Dominion propaganda throughout the war, as the contested and complex position of the Dominions in Britain's propaganda campaign led either to the CO's attempts at limiting and restricting propaganda, or to the Dominions simply being relegated, disregarded, or forgotten, as they did not fit the clear organisational categories, and also central focuses, of neutral, allied, or enemy work, while also not falling under the remit of domestic propaganda, despite their self-perceived centrality to the empire.[42] This is a clear illustration of the disparity in 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of the British world and Dominion status in propaganda relations. Despite cultural constructions of the Dominions as closely linked to Britain, and as 'hinterlands' rather than foreign audiences,[43] in practical, official, organisational interactions, the Dominions were difficult to place in existing categories. Often this meant the Dominions ended up in a more distant position than they imagined or expected themselves to be in.[44] This often led to the Dominions simply slipping through the cracks and being forgotten, as a report into Wellington House from the Second Donald Report, by Treasury official Arthur Spurgeon, illustrates:

> Mr. Masterman emphasised the point that his Department had no concern with propaganda in the United Kingdom, and what has been done in the Dominions and in India has been of such a casual character that one can rule out for practical purposes the whole of the British Empire.[45]

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[40] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.134; French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.3-9; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.17-19; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.126.
[41] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.73.
[42] See above, Chapter 2, pp.60-61, Chapter 1, pp.36-50.
[43] See, Barnes, *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[44] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[45] Parliamentary Archives, London (PA), BBK/E/3/37 – Appendix V, 'Report on the Operations of Wellington House by Arthur Spurgeon', p.23.

Efforts towards the Dominions to late 1917 were so casual and scant that the empire and the Dominions barely registered as a category of the DOI's work in the broader scale. Similarly, the CO also continued to limit action towards the Dominions, insisting when approached on the issue of imperial film distribution in early 1918, that it be consulted and involved in distribution to the Colonies and Protectorates, and that the consultation of the High Commissioners in the cases of the Dominions continue, showing the dominance of the CO's policy until early 1918.[46] However, Masterman's linking of the situation of the Dominions to the 'home' audience is significant. In August 1917, Britain's NWAC was established; the first domestically-focussed British propaganda organisation, and a significant step forward in Lloyd George's aim to focus attention on domestic opinion and morale.[47] As part of the same wider development, from early 1918, the Dominions finally became a more focussed and central part of Britain's propaganda campaign. As it had been throughout the war, the issue of categorisation was significant in this development, but this time, in the direction of including the Dominions as a central, important, and 'British' part of the empire, rather than a peripheral focus. Dominion status and 'Dominion perspective' continued to inform these developments into 1918.

Britain's propaganda organisation again changed drastically between late 1917 and early 1918, this time more in line with Lloyd George's approach, and also finally in such a way that the Dominions became a central focus. Following the Second Donald Report, submitted in December 1917, the MOI was established in February 1918, designed as a separate ministry, to finally separate propaganda from the FO, and give propagandists more ministerial influence.[48] Unlike the DOI, the MOI did not attempt to centralise all propaganda, but was part of a new approach from late 1917 of organising propaganda according to audience, rather than through existing ministries, or attempting to centralise all propaganda.[49] Alongside the NWAC, and the Department of Enemy Propaganda at Crewe House, led by Northcliffe, the MOI covered the remaining audiences of neutral, allied, and Dominion audiences.[50] This

[46] TNA:PRO, CO 323/786 – G. Grindle to Assistant Director of Department of Information, 20 February, 1918, pp.248-249.
[47] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.3-9; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.17-19.
[48] Messinger, *British Propaganda*, pp.126-127; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* pp.70-73.
[49] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p.134.
[50] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda*; Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p.89.

separation of audiences meant there was naturally more space for the Dominions, with the potential for greater attention. However, this greater space did not by default mean the Dominions would become a greater focus of British propaganda, as the DOI had clearly shown. It also took a committed leader with an interest in imperial and Dominion matters to exploit these changes, which was exactly what was appointed in Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook.

The role of Minister of Information was given to Lord Beaverbrook, who, significantly, was a Dominion citizen himself, with strong imperial views.[51] Favourable interpretations claim Beaverbrook's appointment resulted from his extensive influence with both Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law.[52] Though Beaverbrook was certainly influential, and was clearly held in high enough esteem by Lloyd George to give him peerage in 1917, his appointment as Minister of Information had more to do with Lloyd George's aims for the reorganised propaganda campaign. Of central importance to the Lloyd George government in managing domestic morale, was limiting the capacity for newspaper editors and magnates to criticise and undermine the coalition government. Lloyd George was right to be wary of the power of newspaper magnates such as Beaverbrook and Northcliffe; the vociferous criticism of Lord Northcliffe, who owned the *Daily Mail*, *The Times,* and *The Daily Mirror,* against Asquith, had been central to his downfall, while Beaverbrook owned the *London Evening Standard,* and *The Daily Express*, the latter of which was a particularly jingoistic and aggressive paper, with considerable influence.[53] Therefore, Beaverbrook's appointment as Minister of Information was the same as Northcliffe's to Crewe House; Lloyd George wished to achieve two aims in 'anchoring' the two dangerous influential newspaper magnates, while also utilising their skills, experience, and connections in managing opinion and propaganda.[54] Lloyd George countered Unionist criticism of this move by arguing that the danger of these two men was exactly what made them suited to their new propaganda roles, Beaverbrook being an 'unscrupulous ruffian', and Northcliffe as being perfectly suited to undermining enemy populations' confidence in their governments and

[51] Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.123; Cook, 'Documenting War', p.270; Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent*, p.53.
[52] Messinger, *British Propaganda,* pp.124-126.
[53] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent*, p.53.
[54] Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp.77-78; 89-90.

General Staff.[55] Beaverbrook's biographer, A.J.P. Taylor, tries to downplay and excuse this aspect of Beaverbrook's career and character, arguing that during the war Beaverbrook was not really a newspaperman, and only took a serious interest in the *Daily Express* after the war.[56] Regardless, his very ownership of two prominent papers made him dangerous, influential, and divisive.[57] Beaverbrook also had the experience to make him an ideal candidate for Minister of Information, and for Lloyd George's vision of a 'modern' propaganda campaign. He was well versed in publicity, both commercial publicity from his business ventures in Canada, and political publicity from his campaign to win a parliamentary seat in Manchester, for which he ran a sophisticated publicity campaign, with elaborate displays and hospitality-based publicity. He also used his influence to publicise the new coalition government in 1916.[58] More specifically, Beaverbrook also had direct experience and success with propaganda, specifically in a Dominion context.

Beaverbrook was originally Canadian, and though firmly established in Britain, he maintained a strong interest and investment in Canadian affairs, particularly its propaganda, throughout the war. [59] Early in the war, Beaverbrook acted as an 'eye-witness' and advocate for the Canadian government in London. In early 1915, Beaverbrook expanded this role, and established the Canadian War Records Office (CWRO), to publicise, preserve, and mould the presentation of Canada's contribution to the war.[60] Beaverbrook's efforts in publicising Canada illustrate the potential wider application of 'Dominion perspective'. Like Bean and Murdoch for Australia, Beaverbrook sought to emphasise Canadian success against Britain's policy of 'generalisation', but this was not an attempt to define a Canadian identity at odds with British identities, as Tim Cook claims, but was an attempt at recognition and definition of Canadian identity within a wider British identity.[61] Much like New Zealand's propaganda, Beaverbrook's construction of Canadian

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[55] Leo Amery, Diary entry 5th March, 1918 in, *The Leo Amery Diaries – Volume 1: 1896-1929,* ed. John Barnes and David Nicholson, (London: 1980), p.208.
[56] A.J.P. Taylor, *Beaverbrook*, (London: 1972), pp.135-140; see also, Messinger, *British Propaganda,* p.136; Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* p.53.
[57] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.226.
[58] Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.123; Taylor, *Beaverbrook*, p.131.
[59] Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.123; Cook, 'Documenting War', p.270; Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* p.53.
[60] Cook, 'Documenting War', pp.273-274.
[61] For further discussion of Dominion competition, and Australia and New Zealand's response to Britain's 'generalization' policy, see above, Chapter 2, pp.73-76; Cook, 'Documenting War', pp.274-278.

identity utilised shared imperial Britishness.[62] Through a combination of Beaverbrook's work with the CWRO, and the success and effectiveness of the Canadian troops, and their commander General Currie, Canadian war efforts were well publicised, and established an enduring image of the success of the Canadian forces. Accordingly, Beaverbrook's impact and legacy is similar to Bean's in Australia.[63] Through his Canadian work, Beaverbrook eased into British propaganda; in recognition of the success and potential competition of the Canadian Cinematograph Committee, which he established in 1916, Beaverbrook was put in charge of the WOCC in late 1916, through which he expanded and professionalised Britain's cinema propaganda.[64] Therefore, through a combination of his expertise and influence, Beaverbrook was the ideal candidate for Minister of Information in 1918, and for the Dominions, was a perfect candidate with perspective, enthusiasm, and expertise in Dominion propaganda.

Beaverbrook's appointment was perhaps the most significant development for Dominion propaganda throughout the war, and his Dominion origin was crucial to the increased focus towards the Dominions of British propaganda and the MOI from 1918. Beaverbrook was a staunch imperialist, who 'blazed with fervour for the British Empire'.[65] For Beaverbrook, the war presented an opportunity of realising the type of imperial solidarity that was a major focus for him,[66] representing a wider 'Dominion perspective' towards closer cooperation, recognition, and community with Britain for the Dominions. As a Dominion citizen, he was acutely attuned to the needs and desires of the Dominions in terms of propaganda, and connection to Britain. Therefore, under Beaverbrook, the Dominions received much greater focus from British propaganda. The significance of this was not that the Dominions simply received more material, but instead that they were finally treated as a separate and important category of British propaganda, with specific campaigns and focuses, and a much greater degree of inclusion and consultation. This spoke to the central thrust of a wider 'Dominion perspective'. The Dominions did not want to simply rely on Britain and blindly receive material, but wanted to be actively consulted, treated as equals, and part of a distinct community with Britain during the war. Under

[62] Cook, 'Documenting War', p.274-278.
[63] Cook, 'Documenting War', p.293; Taylor, *Beaverbrook,* p.137; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.125; Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', pp.19-20; Dixon, 'Spotting the Fake', pp.166.
[64] Cook, 'Documenting War', p.286; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.129; Haste, *Home Fires*, p.46.
[65] Beaverbrook's friend L.W. Needham's words in, Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.124.
[66] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* p.53.

Beaverbrook, the Dominions no longer simply received the odds-and-ends of other propaganda campaigns. This refocused approach fit alongside the prioritisation of audiences that characterised the changes to British propaganda from 1917, and suggest that by 1917, Britain was moving closer to practically and organisationally treating the Dominions as 'hinterlands', and central imperial communities, instead of this being limited to rhetoric.[67]

Unlike under Wellington House and the DOI, under the MOI, the Dominions were a committed, focused, and defined category of British propaganda work, on which the MOI focussed considerable resources, and more importantly attention, on. By 1918, it was generally accepted that Dominion propaganda was the responsibility of the Ministry, and accordingly it had the final word on how the Dominions should be handled, as Beaverbrook outlined in a clash with the FO:

> The Ministry of Information claims that … for the Dominions with which it deals, it alone is in a position to decide the requirements of propaganda of all categories, and the preparation of such propaganda, whether in the field or elsewhere, subject only to … military, naval or air censorship.[68]

It was significant that the MOI so confidently claimed its authority over Dominion propaganda, suggesting its commitment to this audience, in stark contrast to Masterman's admission of relative indifference by 1917. Overall, the MOI had Dominion expertise, with a number of staff from the Dominions,[69] and was enthusiastic and committed to Dominion propaganda. Equally significant, the CO, which previously staunchly protected imperial propaganda, agreed to the MOI's control by 1918, and deferred to it for propaganda in the Dominions, a concession of control to Beaverbrook and the MOI that other bodies, particularly the NWAC, refused to make.[70] For instance, in discussing film distribution throughout the empire, while the CO representative took interest in arrangements in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, he deferred to the Ministry over the Dominions:

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[67] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.3-9; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.17-19; see also, Barnes, *New Zealand's London,* pp.5-9; 'Familiar London', p.397, 400-407.
[68] PA, BBK/E/3/35 – Memorandum 3 September 1918; see also, BBK/E/3/3 – 'Draft of Ministry of Information Memorandum'.
[69] PA, BBK/E/3/38 – 'Staff Report'.
[70] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.37.

> No action on our part is required in regard to the self-governing Dominions. I believe that the War Office Cinematograph Committee have already done what is needful as regards those Dominions, presumably in consultation with the High Commissioners and Agents General.[71]

Though the CO still presumed its policy of consulting High Commissioners was being followed, it deferred responsibility of Dominion propaganda (which it refused to relinquish in 1916) to the MOI, the WOCC, and Beaverbrook by 1918.[72] Therefore, under the MOI, the Dominions were a committed category of official propaganda, acknowledged within the MOI, and outside it. Once again, this represented 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of the British world moving closer together.[73]

The MOI's propaganda work towards the Dominions reflected this move towards greater inclusion and definition of the Dominions, rather than simply increasing the degree of material sent. A clear example of this is the MOI's interaction with the Dominions' press and journalists. In general, the MOI sought to improve circulation and distribution of war news to all its audiences through personal propaganda. A major innovation in this direction was the creation of the press centre, where overseas journalists in London could gather, be briefed, receive the latest information from the MOI, and attend lectures and talks by important figures. This would, according to the MOI, "influenc[e] the opinions of all these correspondents favourably and so [affect] all their publics throughout the world."[74] This reflects the MOI's more cooperative, 'personal' tone of propaganda and news distribution. Beaverbrook strongly believed that 'popular diplomacy' or 'personal propaganda', influencing opinion through cooperation, hospitality, and use of notable figures, should be a central aspect of Britain's propaganda work, and was the most effective approach.[75] However, within this approach, the Dominions were still treated as distinct, and given a privileged position. Within the MOI's press organisation, a separate department was set aside for the Dominions and the USA. The 'Dominions

[71] TNA:PRO, CO 323/789 – 'Distribution of Official Cinematograph Films in the Colonies', p.149.
[72] See above, Chapter 2, pp.62-66.
[73] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[74] PA, BBK/E/3/38 – 'Extension of Ministry Work' Report, 1918.
[75] PA, BBK/E/3/3 – Draft Ministry of Information memorandum; see also, Taylor, *Beaverbrook,* p.144.

and USA Department' coordinated press interactions between Britain and the Dominions, dealt with visiting Dominion nationals, supervised despatches of literature to the Dominions, and generally established a firm, organisational link between Britain and the Dominions that had not existed outside the CO in terms of propaganda before 1918, reflecting the increased need to 'court' the Dominions through propaganda in the same way as the USA by 1918.[76] The grouping of the Dominions with the USA does somewhat complicate the concept of the Dominions as a distinct group within the British world, illustrating the potential of the 'Anglo-world' in an organisational sense.[77] While this decision was likely at least in part down to organisational expediency in organising English-speaking nations together, once again the key significance of this innovation was that it afforded the Dominions increased attention and consideration, placing them in a position of privilege alongside the USA, instead of being obscured or deferred. This department was designed to avoid overlap, and keep the Dominion press "in very close touch with the Ministry".[78] Perhaps the clearest example of the level of cooperation, and the privileged position for the Dominions, that this work brought about was the department's organisation of visits of press delegations from the Dominions. These visits privileged the Dominions with Beaverbrook's 'personal propaganda', with the aim of reassuring the Dominion populations of Britain's commitment to the war. The visits included tours to the front and around Britain for 'responsible' journalists from Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, to see 'every aspect of our national life', and so inform Dominion populations 'what Britain is doing for the Allied cause'. It was generally agreed within the department that these tours were successful.[79] Beaverbrook also personally hosted these delegations, taking them to personally-funded luncheons and dinners, similar to the NWAC's hospitality efforts towards the press.[80] The representatives of these visits came from a variety of Dominion newspapers, with some being specifically chosen for their political views, or involvement with dissenting or labour-focussed papers. For instance, one journalist

[76] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.62-64.
[77] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth,* pp.9-14; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[78] PA, BBK/E/3/4 – 'Memorandum of the Committee', pp.29-30.
[79] PA, BBK/E/3/4 – 'The Ministry of Information – Report', 4 March – 4 August, 1918, p.31; see also, TNA:PRO, CO 209/299 – Mackenzie to Massey, 1918, p.53.
[80] PA, BBK/E/3/4 – 'Cheques refunded by Lord Beaverbrook in respect of Luncheons and Dinners paid for by the Ministry'; Ministry of Information to Stanley Baldwin, Treasury, 6 November, 1918; see also, Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* p.55.

from the Australian paper *Labour Call*, was chosen for this reason, with the positive impact of the visit noted:

> [The journalist was] believed to be a pacifist in his sympathies, prior to his visit. There is every reason to believe that there will be a change in his opinions since visiting the fleet and witnessing the effort the Motherland is putting forward in this War.[81]

This shows the increase of attention British propagandists, through the MOI, paid to dissenting opinion in the Dominions as, by 1918, Britain had an interest in ensuring that Dominion opinion remained enthusiastic and committed to the war.[82] These visits also emphasise the privileged and personal position of the Dominions within the MOI's work – Beaverbrook personally hosted the Dominion delegates, including them as members of an exclusive British club. This was a significant change from the unimportant, relegated position the Dominions occupied in Britain's propaganda campaign for the rest of the war, approaching a more personal, cooperative relationship between British and Dominion propaganda organisations, practically realising the familiar, and often familial depictions of the British world in New Zealand's propaganda.[83]

As Minister of Information, Beaverbrook also acted as an advocate for the Dominions, promoting their interests, and ensuring they were well within the networks of propaganda distribution. Under the control of the WOCC, the Dominions were kept better informed by the circulation of the committee's 'Topical Budget' films of war news, and regular circulation of feature war films, by 1917.[84] However, more significantly, under Beaverbrook's control, the Dominions were also heavily included in the production of war films. One of Beaverbrook's schemes in this direction was the production of a second 'imperial' budget, as Beaverbrook notes:

> I am writing to place before you a proposal for expanding our existing cinematograph organisation so as to include the Dominions in a general plan

[81] PA, BBK/E/3/4 – 'Herewith a brief outline respecting the personal of the Dominion Press Mission'.
[82] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.62-64.
[83] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; *New Zealand's London,* pp.2-10.
[84] PA, BBK/E/2/9 – 'Memorandum re. War Office Cinematograph Committee and Topical Budget'.

> for producing and exhibiting cinematograph films throughout the whole Empire and the world … The subjects treated in [the Topical Budget] have necessarily been items of local or purely British interests, and I feel that it would be an immense step in advance if we could take advantage of this existing distributing organisation … to put into circulation a Budget truly Imperial in its interest and character.[85]

This scheme reflects Beaverbrook's interest in involving the Dominions in the production of propaganda, while also advocating their interests, and promoting them to foreign audiences. Apart from catering to their needs, Beaverbrook and the MOI also saw it as their responsibility to promote the Dominions, and by extension British imperialism, to a wider audience, as Robert Donald outlined:

> It comes within the province of the Ministry of Information to advertise the British Empire, for the purpose of making known to all neutral countries – and for that matter, also to our Allies – what it stands for, and what our system of self-government means; to explain the vastness of our resources, our commanding control over great many raw materials, and the way we have built up a free commonwealth of nations by freedom, instead of by force.[86]

Therefore, the aim of the 'Imperial Budget', and Beaverbrook and the Ministry's general approach to imperial propaganda was not only to include the Dominions, but also to advocate and advertise them, something that was rarely considered before 1918 in such a cooperative and inclusive manner. This is significant, as it once again reflects that by 1918, 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of British world space, as described by Pietsch, were moving closer into line, with rhetorical constructions of the Dominions as the 'central community' of the empire being organisationally recognised and realised by British efforts at inclusion, consultation, and promotion of the Dominions.[87] The MOI also included the Dominions in the profits of war cinematograph propaganda. In 1919, according to a long-standing

[85] PA, BBK/E/3/35 – General Correspondence – 4 June – 28 September 1918 – Beaverbrook to N.W. Rowell, 29 June, 1918.
[86] TNA:PRO, INF 4/8 – Deposited papers of Sir Robert Donald – correspondence and press cuttings – 'Advertising the Empire', 19 May 1918.
[87] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

agreement, the profits of all war films were divided up between British and Dominion war charities. This was significant, as funds went to Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India, affirming this group as the central community of the empire, and distributing funds accordingly, while also reinforcing India's more privileged place in the empire compared to other colonies and protectorates, along with British concerns over Indian loyalty post-war.[88] These actions under the MOI and Beaverbrook's operation represent a significant shift in British propagandists' focus towards the Dominions. Under the MOI, the Dominions were treated as a separate and privileged category, which received specific attention and focus, and was considered in terms of distribution, production, and promotion. Beaverbrook played a central role in this shift, and, it seems, was more successful than the CO in appealing to 'Dominion perspective' in all its complexity.

Despite this, difficulties still existed. As under the CO, differences and competition between the Dominions meant they were also not treated exactly equally under the MOI. In particular, Beaverbrook's strong Canadian interests meant Canada was generally privileged ahead of the other Dominions in MOI propaganda: the Canadian press delegation was privileged in that Beaverbrook met with them separately, and hosted a much more expensive dinner with the Canadians, while Beaverbrook met the rest of the Dominions as a group, spending thirty-six pounds on a Dominion luncheon, to two hundred and sixty-four pounds on a Canadian dinner.[89] Film propaganda was another area of clear privilege for Canada, as Beaverbrook always ensured Canada was well represented in film propaganda, and that the best cinematographers shot Canada's war films.[90] In the distribution of profits of war films Canada was also privileged, receiving a share of ten thousand pounds, while Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India received five thousand pounds, and Britain received twenty thousand pounds.[91] In practical terms this is somewhat reasonable; Canada had a larger population than either New Zealand or South Africa, and was the most active Dominion in the production of war films. However Australia

[88] PA, BBK/E/2/19 – September 1918 – 'Second Report of the War Office Cinematograph Committee', August, 1919; see also, Stephen, 'Brothers of the Empire?', pp.164-166; Robb, *British Culture,* pp.19-20; Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, pp.41-57, see above, Chapter 1, pp.32-33.
[89] PA, BBK/E/3/4 – 'Cheques refunded by Lord Beaverbrook in respect of Luncheons and Dinners paid for by the Ministry'.
[90] Cook, 'Documenting War', p.286.
[91] PA, BBK/E/2/19 – 'Second Report of the War Office Cinematograph Committee', August, 1919.

and India were by no means small populations, and it certainly helped that Canada had Beaverbrook as an advocate close to this operation to argue its case. It would appear a degree of Canadian pride coloured Beaverbrook's work at the MOI, suggesting a similar interaction of imperial and national sentiments as in 'Dominion perspective'.

This illustrates the potential wider applications of 'Dominion perspective'. 'Dominion perspective' is clear in the interaction between New Zealand and Britain in propaganda distribution, and it seems possible that this same perspective may be found operating in the other Dominions. A strong Dominion focus is evident in the perceptions of the empire of imperialists such as Amery and Milner,[92] while Andrew Smith and John Mackenzie have demonstrated the importance of imperialism in Britain, in terms of finance and popular culture respectively.[93] Furthermore, as previously noted, awareness of Dominion status clearly informed the CO's approach to imperial propaganda.[94] However, Beaverbrook's work is a particularly strong evocation of 'Dominion perspective'; his actions in imperial propaganda demonstrate the interconnection of 'British' and national loyalties, and how these intertwined and reinforced each other, factors inherent to 'Dominion perspective'. He wished to promote the Dominions more generally, but he always prioritised Canada, reflecting the broadly competitive tone between the Dominions, which Australians such as Bean and Murdoch also exhibited.[95] This speaks to the possible wider applications of the concept of 'Dominion perspective'. The concept is strongly evident in the interaction of Britain and New Zealand's wartime propaganda, and is likely to be found throughout the Dominions. This favouritism also does not detract from the significance of the shift towards the Dominions under the MOI.

However, it is important not to exaggerate Beaverbrook's role, and thereby fall into the trap of 'important man' theories of explanation, such as Taylor's claims that Beaverbrook was "the most experienced war propagandist in [Britain]", and that "he had invented all the methods of publicity which were now belatedly used in Great Britain",[96] or Haste's incorrect view, that Beaverbrook pioneered the uses of film,

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[92] For Amery see, Amery, 'Introduction', p.12; For Milner see, Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism*, pp.2-4.
[93] Smith, 'Patriotism, Self-Interest', pp.59-62; Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire*', pp.1-4; see also, Hall, 'British World' p.36; Paul Ward, *Britishness since 1870,* (London: 2004).
[94] See above, Chapter 2, pp.69-72.
[95] Palenski, 'Malcolm Ross', pp.19-20; Dixon, 'Spotting the Fake', pp.166; Cook, 'Documenting War', pp.273-274; see above, Chapter 2, pp.73-76.
[96] Taylor, *Beaverbrook,* p.137.

photography, and war artists.[97] These interpretations misread the progression of British propaganda throughout the war, underestimating the work of propagandists like Masterman and Buchan in developing new materials throughout the war, and generally extend the legend of Beaverbrook too far; for instance the PRC had been using cinema since 1915.[98] Furthermore, the shift towards the Dominions in British propaganda was not solely down to Beaverbrook, but reflected wider changes in priority by Lloyd George's government in managing the war, and maintaining Dominion enthusiasm and loyalty, illustrated through the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet.[99] However, Beaverbrook did shape this progression of the MOI's inclusion of the Dominions. As a Dominion citizen, and one who advocated a personal, inclusive approach to propaganda, he could accommodate the Dominions on a level they desired, something the CO had continually struggled with. Furthermore, Beaverbrook had a central role in the enduring significance of these changes to Dominion propaganda. Millman argues that Beaverbrook saw the war as an opportunity to achieve changes to imperial interaction and community between Britain and the Dominions that he had long aimed for,[100] which broadly reflected the desired tone of interaction amongst the Dominions. These changes to Dominion propaganda reflect a wider change in British recognition and of interaction with the Dominions, but it was through the efforts of imperialists and Dominion advocates, such as Beaverbrook and Amery, and through propaganda, that some of these long-term proposals came to be realised.

The greater focus and inclusion of the Dominions in Britain's propaganda campaign represented a shift in Britain's conduct of the war under Lloyd George. However, the significance of this change, and the sentiments and developments it tapped into, were much broader and enduring issues of imperial organisation, identity, and status in the British world. Even Beaverbrook was just one of a group of imperialists, such as Alfred Milner, Amery, Lionel Curtis, and groups such as the Round Table Movement, all of whom had called for greater Dominion inclusion, and utilised the closer cooperation the war brought about between the Dominions and

[97] Haste, *Home Fires*, p.44.
[98] Reeves, *Film Propaganda,* pp.72, 116-117; Messinger, *British Propaganda,* pp.42-43.
[99] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.7-8, 62-63; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198.
[100] Millman, *Managing Domestic Dissent,* p.53; Messinger, *British Propaganda*, p.124.

Britain, to push such changes into the post-war environment.[101] Beaverbrook's propaganda works, and wider changes under the MOI represent a step forward for such proposals and debates dating back to the introduction of Dominion status in 1907, and which continued after the war. Accordingly, wartime imperial propaganda demonstrates the significance of the war in long-term developments of Dominion status and the British world.[102]

While cultural nationalist historians tend to emphasise the war as weakening imperial sentiments in the Dominions,[103] its impact was more complex, and was a crucial turning point for Dominion status. While the war did expose the divergence in specific and practical issues between Britain and the Dominions, and inspired confidence in national sentiments, it also strengthened Dominion identifications with the empire, and inspired confidence that Britain and the Dominions could operate and achieve as a coherent group. This, of course, demanded that the Dominions be accommodated on a more equal level.[104] This resulted in Dominion politicians and imperialists pushing for further recognition and solidification of Dominion status, rather than attempts to weaken or dispel it, with a newfound confidence of course, and a desire to express and protect national characters and sovereignty at the same time.[105] Dominion consultation through the Imperial War Cabinet, and representation at the Paris Peace Conference, for instance, were practical, obvious, and significant evocations of validation of Dominion status, and a sign that the Dominions would no longer accept subordinate positions in policy decisions.[106]

Beaverbrook's efforts through the MOI are part of this wider development. One of the most significant examples of this is Beaverbrook's push for an imperial wireless chain towards the end of the war. The operation of wartime propaganda demonstrated both the importance, in terms of forming British world connections, and the inadequacy of, the empire's existing lines of communication, especially in terms of cost and reliability.[107] Echoing wider sentiments, Beaverbrook complained in 1918

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[101] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.
[102] Ward, 'Imperial Identities', p.235; Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.240-242.
[103] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apar*t, p.173.
[104] Ward, 'Imperial Identities'; p.235, Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.240-242; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.
[105] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.
[106] McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.65-68, 77; Scott, 'End of Dominion Status', p.34.
[107] Aitor Anduaga, *Wireless and Empire: Geopolitics, Radio Industry, and Ionosphere in the British Empire*, (Oxford: 2009), p.57; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.2012-202; O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.611-613; Bell, 'Dissolving Distance', pp.524-525

that these limitations restricted the empire's capacity for joint action, and inhibited communication and interaction.[108] At the same time, wireless technology was emerging as a viable competitor to telegraph communication.[109] Therefore, in late 1918, Beaverbrook took action to push for this change, by proposing the construction of a chain of wireless stations in Britain and the Dominions, to establish:

> A rapid, cheap and reliable system of telegraphic communication between the various parts of the Empire … not only for Military reasons but also for the development of trade after the war and for the reinforcement of the bonds which the war has done so much to strengthen between the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and the United Kingdom."[110]

The system entailed establishing eleven wireless stations throughout the empire, with six in Britain, two in Canada, and one each in India, Australia, and South Africa.[111] No station was proposed for New Zealand, likely due to its proximity to the Australian station, once again highlighting its position at the end of the Australian line of imperial communication, as was the case in the distribution of propaganda material. New Zealand would still have to rely on its physical Tasman world connections to facilitate connection to the British world.[112] Beaverbrook's justification for the 'imperial chain' was to capitalise on the increased imperial cooperation and unity of the war; arguing that through better interaction and distribution of news and information amongst Britain and the Dominions, the wireless chain would "strengthen the ties of unity" in the empire.[113] Through this proposal, Beaverbrook was taking action to realise the types of closer cooperation and community between Britain and the Dominions that were so strongly illustrated in New Zealand's propaganda rhetoric. This shows that practical limitations, not apathy, remained the biggest inhibition to closer British world ties, thus confirming Pietsch's

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[108] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'On the Subject of Inter-Imperial News Service' – Memorandum to the Imperial War Cabinet, Beaverbrook, 18 June, 1918.
[109] Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.201-202.
[110] TNA:PRO, T 1/12227 – War Cabinet 'Proposed "Communications Board" Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War', 1918.
[111] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'British Imperial News Wireless Service' Memorandum for War Cabinet by Minister of Information, 1918; see also, Anduaga, *Wireless*, pp.60-63.
[112] See above, Chapter 2, pp.77-79; see also, Mein Smith, 'Tasman World', pp.303-306; Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[113] TNA:PRO, T 1/12227 – 'Imperial News Service' Memorandum, 10 July, 1918.

assertions of the various forces at work on British world relationships beyond enthusiasm and identification, and the operation of different types of British world 'space'.[114] This proposal linked to pre-war calls for such a system that had been made frequently leading up to the war, first suggested by the wireless corporation Marconi in 1910, proposed at the 1911 Imperial Conference, and begun in 1913.[115] The scheme was to build six stations, in Oxford, South Africa, East Africa, Egypt, India, and Malaya or Singapore. However, the war halted this work, and the plans were abandoned in December 1914.[116] The 1918 proposal built on and adapted this earlier scheme, but was significantly changed, as it became centred on the Dominions, rather than Asia and Africa, thus reinforcing the shift towards greater focus and inclusion of the Dominions in the changes to British propaganda between 1917 and 1918.

The 1918 proposal was much more firmly centred on a construction of the 'British world' community as between Britain and the Dominions, evident in New Zealand's propaganda rhetoric, and was designed as much to connect the Dominions to each other as to Britain, as Beaverbrook explained:

> At present, for example, Canada knows practically nothing of New Zealand; for although currents of news do already flow – however inadequately – from centre to circumference and from circumference to centre, there is practically no current of news between the various points in the circumference … the impediment of distance, the menace of remoteness, the peril of aloofness must be overcome. They can be overcome, and they can only be overcome by the establishment of an Imperial News Service based on an Imperial Wireless chain.[117]

This suggests the limitations of British world communication and interaction, and the war's role in both exposing this, and providing an opportunity for change. Once again, this also clearly illustrates the disparity and difference between different British

[114] See Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.
[115] TNA:PRO, T 1/12227 – Beaverbrook to Walter Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 September, 1918; Anduaga, *Wireless*, pp.58-59.
[116] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'British Imperial News Wireless Service' Memorandum for War Cabinet by Minister of Information, 1918; TNA:PRO, T 1/12227 – Beaverbrook to Walter Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 September, 1918; see also, Anduaga, *Wireless*, pp.58-59.
[117] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'British Imperial News Wireless Service' Memorandum for War Cabinet by Minister of Information, 1918; see also, TNA:PRO, T 1/12227 – 'Imperial News Service' Memorandum, 10 July, 1918.

world spaces, specifically between 'imagined' constructions of the British world community, and its operational reality in terms of official interactions. Though the British world certainly connected through a passage of shared ideas, and through interactions of migrations, communications, and efforts of groups such as patriotic societies, this was a more public and spontaneous development, rather than officially orchestrated connection. By the end of the war, as Beaverbrook's proposal illustrates, no 'official', solidified imperial network of communication existed to connect Britain to the Dominions in close community.[118] Therefore, this highlights the significance of the war in this long-term development, as the war gave weight to calls for increased Dominion inclusion with Britain. The experience of the war allowed Beaverbrook to push the proposal of the imperial wireless chain forward, and added weight to the argument, which Beaverbrook believed had "now become overwhelming,"[119] because in future conflicts the empire would need such a chain, the war had revealed the insufficiencies in the established imperial system, and greater communication and cooperation was needed:

> The War has broadened and vivified the Imperial vision, and that which seemed desirable before August 1914 is only a fraction of what is now seen to be essential … The time has come when the Empire must only be allowed to grow on homogeneity … The pious hope must give way to the Crusade.[120]

Accordingly, the imperial wireless chain proposed in 1918 was eventually constructed in 1924.[121] Sentiments in New Zealand echoed such calls for Dominion inclusion in London. A strong feature of New Zealand politicians' speeches throughout the war was emphasising the significance of the war in promoting the cause of the Dominions, and drawing the empire closer together, often linked to specific discussions of

[118] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450; Potter, 'Communication and Integration', pp.2012-202; O'Hara, 'Networked World', p.611-613.
[119] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'British Imperial News Wireless Service' Memorandum for War Cabinet by Minister of Information, 1918.
[120] PA, BBK/E/3/8 – 'British Imperial News Wireless Service' Memorandum for War Cabinet by Minister of Information, 1918; 'A Proposed British Imperial News Wireless Service', Beaverbrook, 1918.
[121] Anduaga, *Wireless*, pp.64-65.

Imperial Conferences and federation.[122] This echoes what Monger highlights as a similar feature in the NWAC's propaganda of the 'concrescent community', the rhetorical concept of local and supranational communities, including the empire, growing together through the war.[123] This was sometimes parlayed into proposals in both New Zealand and Britain for the continuation of joint propaganda work and interaction into the early 1920s. Such proposals were ultimately rejected particularly due to the British decision to quickly dispense with propaganda organisations after the war to avoid accusations of government misuse of propaganda to influence domestic politics in Britain, or of involvement in internal Dominions affairs, in contravention of responsible government.[124] These discussions also naturally fed into wider post-war discussions of changes to the imperial community, such as the imperial preference debate, the creation of the Dominions Office, and on-going discussions of what Dominion status meant, and how the central imperial community should interact, all of which marked significant steps towards bringing 'imagined' and 'organisational' manifestations of the British world into line, and finally recognising Dominion status in a practical sense.[125]

The development of Britain's approaches, in terms of propaganda, to the Dominions over the course of the war, demonstrates the complexity of the British world. The unity of the British world, emphasising the Dominions' centrality, and a shared Britishness between them and Britain, was continually stressed in Dominion and 'British' propaganda rhetoric, particularly in New Zealand. However, such rhetoric was often very far from the reality of the interaction and communication that Britain and the Dominions experienced. During the war, practical limitations and issues of focus, capacity and the direction of Britain's war effort meant that the supposedly central Dominions were relegated to small focus in Britain's propaganda

[122] 'For the Empire', *Evening Post,* 7 January, 1915, p.6; 'What we have we'll hold', *Dominion,* 29 January, 1917, p.6; 'The Empire and the Future', *The Press,* 8 May, 1915, p.10; 'Britain's Part', *The Press,* 19 January, 1917, p.7; 'General Assembly', *The Press,* 8 November, 1918, p.8.
[123] Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.93-94.
[124] For New Zealand see, ANZ, R 22434688 – Richardson to Potter, 26 June 1920; R 22434795 – Extract from Letter from Chief of Imperial General Staff, 14 October 1920; R 3091266 – 'National Education System' proposal, National Efficiency Board, 7 March 1918; R 22434688 – Richardson to Potter, 26 June 1920; For Britain see, TNA:PRO, CO 537/1014 – The Ministry of Information – as to the winding up of – and as to the proposed transfer to the Colonial Office of such part of their work as concerns the Dominions, pp.1-2; Monger, *Patriotism and Propaganda,* pp.268-269.
[125] See for example, Lobell, 'Second Image Reversed', p.679; TNA:PRO, CAB 19/199 – Imperial Cooperation – Memos by Mr. L.S. Amery – 1918 – 'The Future of the Imperial Cabinet System', pp.2-6; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', pp.45-46.

campaign. This was not simply a symptom of the war, as imperialists in Britain, and Dominion politicians, had long identified the issues and limitations of the established imperial system. Such issues were central to the tensions of 'Dominion perspective'. The contestability and lack of official solidity of central concepts of Dominion status encouraged this variable interaction between Britain and the Dominions. However, the changes to Britain's propaganda, from 1918 in particular, show that despite this myriad of issues, Dominion status and shared Britishness remained significant in defining the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. It provided the justification for limited propaganda from 1914 to 1916, and similarly allowed for closer cooperation, and an extension of Britain's domestic focus on propaganda from 1917. The First World War was a crucial turning point in this development, exposing the nature of this relationship, and illustrating how the relationship progressed to eventually achieve specific changes to the interactions between Britain and the Dominions, and bring practicality in line with aspirations and rhetoric.[126] Beaverbrook may have been one of a distinct group calling for such change in Britain, but he spoke to the wider 'Dominion perspective', and the continued renegotiation of Britishness within the empire. The operation and connection of Britain and New Zealand's propaganda campaigns demonstrates the complexity of the British world, and Dominion status, during the war. Rhetorical conceptions of the Dominions as a central 'British' community in the empire, more as 'hinterlands' to Britain than distant peripheries, sharing an internalised, natural, Britishness, were clearly important to perceptions and understandings of the British world. However, it took time before official interactions between Britain and the Dominions mirrored such rhetorical constructions of close connection and interaction in the British world.

[126] See for example, Lobell, 'Second Image Reversed', p.679; TNA:PRO, CAB 19/199 – 'The Future of the Imperial Cabinet System', pp.2-6; Stewart, 'Bloody Post Office', pp.45-46; McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.64-80.

Conclusion

In focussing on the interaction of New Zealand and Britain's official First World War propaganda campaigns, this thesis has addressed gaps in three historiographies – New Zealand's First World War home front, Britain's wartime propaganda, and wartime British imperial interaction and patriotic activity. It has also contributed to much wider historiographical explorations of identity, status, and interaction in the British world. In doing so, the nature of the relationship between New Zealand and Britain has been reconsidered.

Imagined constructions of the British world, and practical, official, organisational interactions between Britain and New Zealand's wartime propaganda campaigns have been used to explore the nature of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated that while Pocock's original call to consider history through a 'British world' focus is still valid, this should not be a simple assertion. Building on postcolonial critiques of British world historiography, this thesis has attempted to complicate the obvious connections within the British world. An important aim has been to reconsider how the British world functioned, and how the concept should be considered in analysis. In particular, Tamson Pietsch's conception of British world history, which stresses the need to consider the different types of 'space' that made up the British world, has been utilised to explore the British world as a complicated, problematic, contradictory, and awkward community and concept, rather than an officially mapped community with limits and boundaries, or a monolithic construction imposed by historians.[1] The concept of 'Dominion perspective' has also been discussed throughout as a theoretical framework for addressing identity in the Dominions and the British world. The concept considers identity in the Dominions as a distinct and unique historical force, in which various strands of identity - local, national, imperial, British - were not strictly individualised or competing, but intertwined, reinforcing one another. Fundamentally, this multifarious bundle of identities was informed by a broad acknowledgement of the particularity of the settler experience. This has revealed the complexity of the British world, and identity in the Dominions.

[1] Pietsch, 'Rethinking', pp.447-450.

Propaganda interactions between New Zealand and Britain's official campaigns have addressed this broad scope of issues, encompassing not only New Zealand's cultural constructions and depictions of the war, the British world, and its various loyalties, identities, and patriotisms, but also the nature of official interactions between Britain and the Dominions. Considering both together provides a complicated, but detailed and revealing picture of identity and interaction between New Zealand and Britain during the war. A central focus of this work has been to show the complexity of this relationship through the disparity between these different types of interaction, or 'British world spaces', between New Zealand and Britain, specifically between 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions and interactions. The content of New Zealand's wartime propaganda shows New Zealand's heavy investment in the concept of a 'British world', and shared Britishness, not only to inform its perception to the war, but also as central to its identity, and its place in the empire and the world. [2] New Zealand relied on an understanding of the British world as a central, privileged, familial community between Britain and the Dominions. In its propaganda, New Zealand heavily borrowed 'British' propaganda rhetoric, and used this to place New Zealand in an 'imagined' British world space, associating its history with a wider British heritage and racial identity. However, this did not denote reliance on Britain to construct or impose identity upon New Zealand. Instead, New Zealand readily internalised and reshaped such 'British' rhetoric to suit its particular situation and wartime experience, showing confidence in its ownership of a shared British cultural legacy. This demonstrates the efficacy of considering identity in New Zealand through 'Dominion perspective'. In New Zealand, imperial, national, and local identities were not sharply distinct or individualised, or naturally antipathetic towards one another, but were deeply intertwined and reflexive. This picture is further complicated by comparing rhetorical or 'imagined' constructions of the British world with the practical, operational, 'organisational' British world space and interactions through wartime propaganda.

In contrast to the picture of the British world and the relationship between New Zealand and Britain demonstrated in the content of New Zealand's propaganda, operationally, New Zealand and Britain's official propaganda campaigns were relatively disconnected for most of the war. Due to practical inhibitions to British

[2] Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.397-398.

world interactions, both long-standing and particular to the war, very little propaganda material made its way to New Zealand from Britain through official connections, especially early in the war, and despite the transmission of war news through telegraph cables, such official interaction was problematic, limited, and disorganised between Britain and the Dominions. This disconnection was acknowledged in Britain, and in a practical sense, was fairly reasonable. Especially for the first half of the war, Britain's priorities were naturally appealing to the neutral USA, or countering German propaganda, rather than focussing on imperial cooperation, and considerations of imperial community. This practical disconnection was also evinced in New Zealand's domestic campaign. Despite the clear reliance on 'British' rhetoric, and cultural constructions of the war, practically speaking, New Zealand sustained its domestic propaganda campaign in isolation from Britain, and was determined by issues of capacity, and local developments, particularly the conscription crisis of 1915-1916. When New Zealand's campaign did rely on examples of British, and, at times Australian, propaganda, it did so through national initiative, not through passive 'reliance'. In many ways, the operation of New Zealand's propaganda campaign demonstrates the much greater practical relevance and importance of its Tasman world connections, over British world connections, despite the clear rhetorical importance of the later, complicating understandings of the British world. This illustrates the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' British world spaces through propaganda organisation. However, despite this disconnection, characterising the relationship between New Zealand and Britain as entirely distant and disconnected is inaccurate and limiting.

Despite considerable practical, operational disconnection between New Zealand and Britain's official wartime propaganda campaigns, a shared understanding of a British world as formed of Britain and her Dominions and based on a shared imperial 'white Britishness', and of Dominion status, as denoting a privileged, central position in the empire, is clear in the organisation, operation, and most importantly connection, of New Zealand and Britain's official propaganda campaigns. However, due to the contestability of such concepts, the impact on each campaign was different, again demonstrating the complexity of this relationship. Despite the New Zealand campaign's isolation, and the central importance of national developments and capacity to its development, throughout the war New Zealand propagandists adhered to a broad British approach to propaganda, and constantly looked to British examples

for inspiration. As during New Zealand's conscription debate, referring to British examples was a way to legitimise a delicate or problematic issue. New Zealand adhered to the same broad initial approach to propaganda as Britain, in terms of official restraint, and belief that the public should control propaganda. Furthermore, each time the government took more control of propaganda, it referred to British examples. This shows that even in an organisational sense, New Zealand's British connection and identity remained important.

Britain's approach to imperial propaganda shows a similar awareness of Dominion status and the British world. However, this relationship was complicated, as the contestability of Dominion status led to varied understandings and applications between Britain and New Zealand, and inevitably to Dominion dissatisfaction and criticism. In their approach to propaganda interaction with the Dominions, British propagandists, directed by the CO, were restrained. The CO was quick to caution British propagandists not to overstep the limits of responsible government, and impinge upon Dominion status. From the British end, the aspects of Dominion status that prioritised self-sufficiency, and British non-interference in domestic politics were emphasised. Despite this approach in theory appealing to central tenets of Dominion status, Dominions representatives often felt affronted by this British approach. On the one hand they frequently complained that Britain's approach did not prioritise the Dominions as a distinct and privileged group within the empire, deserving of attention and close communion with Britain, while conversely complaining individually of British disregard and a lack of attention for specific achievements and characters of each Dominion. Despite both Britain and New Zealand clearly investing in concepts of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and the British world, the contestability of these concepts meant that there was seldom a cohesive, unified understanding and application of these concepts that satisfied everyone. Therefore, through exploring the connection between New Zealand and Britain's official wartime propaganda campaigns, the British world is revealed not as a single cohesive unit, but rather a highly complex, contested, often difficult community, although one that was also vital, developing, and immediately relevant to both Britain and the Dominions.

This complexity and contestability demonstrates that the relationship between Britain and the Dominions was not fixed, but was constantly developing and in flux, particularly due to the contestability of concepts of Dominion status and the British world, and the lack of officially defined understanding of how the British world

should function. As such, the First World War was an important moment in this broader development, as it both illustrated the nature of, and significantly changed, the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. The change in Britain's focus late in the war, away from attaining neutral support, and towards maintaining itself, and making sure the empire could endure the war, meant that supporting and engaging with the Dominions, particularly to combat war weariness, became a focus for Britain, which necessarily changed the operational relationship between Britain and the Dominions.[3] Accordingly, this change in focus of the Lloyd George government influenced propaganda interaction, and from 1917 propaganda reorganisations in Britain increasingly included the Dominions as a greater focus. This culminated in 1918 when, under the MOI, led by Beaverbrook, the Dominions were treated as a separate and important category, and given focus and attention by British propagandists they had not previously received, validating their Dominion status. The impact of these changes was to bring the practical, organisational reality of the British world closer in line with the imagined British world of close communication and cooperation expressed in the content of New Zealand's propaganda. Therefore, the First World War was a key moment in the wider development of New Zealand's relationship with Britain, and in the formation of the British world and Dominion status. The war heightened and exposed the complexity of Dominion perspective, highlighting certain key tensions at its core, between imperial loyalty, and belief in the British world, and a concomitant belief in Dominion independence and self-reliance, and the disparity between 'imagined' and 'organisational' constructions of the British world.[4] Official propaganda interactions therefore reveal the wider significance of the war to British world relationships, specifically between New Zealand and Britain, and the ways that such interactions developed. Propaganda is an important, yet until now under-researched, aspect of this wider development. In exploring the propaganda interactions between Britain and New Zealand during the war, this thesis offers a vital new dimension to the historiography of the development of the imperial community, and the imperial identities of both New Zealand and Britain.

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[3] French, *Strategy of Lloyd George,* pp.7-10, 62-64; Horne, 'Remobilizing', p.198.
[4] Grey, 'War and the British World', pp.238-239; Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', pp.16; see also, McIntyre, *Dominion of New Zealand,* pp.62-65.

Any assumptions regarding identity must necessarily be limited to New Zealand, as an examination of this process throughout all of the Dominions is beyond the scope or capacity of this thesis. However, 'Dominion perspective' should be considered a British world concept, and may prove meaningful in the other former Dominions, and even Britain. Accordingly, more work is still necessary to explore these connections during the war, linking cultural constructions of the British world, with practical, organisational, operational interactions, particularly to expand the picture provided here of wartime propaganda interactions in the British world.

Within this thesis, wartime propaganda has been used to reveal a vital, yet under explored, aspect of the relationship between Britain and New Zealand during the war. In doing so, it has expanded and linked three historiographies, and provided new considerations of New Zealand identity, imperial interactions, and the operation of the British world. In focusing on official First World War propaganda interactions, and in seeking to reveal the complexity and 'awkwardness' of 'obvious' British world connections between New Zealand and Britain, this thesis has argued that the relationship between New Zealand and Britain, and the British world more widely, was complex and problematic, but that concepts of Britishness and the British world still remained central, though not in obvious ways. Complex interactions such as First World War propaganda must therefore be considered an important aspect in the wider picture of this relationship.

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